

THE POWER RELATIONS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND USE RIGHT TRANSFERS UNDER THE EXISTING CHINA RURAL DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

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Abstract

The objectives of this research were: 1) To understand the rural development contexts for agricultural land use right transfer policy of China in the previous years. 2) To analyze the power relations patterns in the agricultural land use right transfer process in Shanpotian village in Yaoan county, Yunnan province. A qualitative methodology is utilized by applying documented research, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with 45 farmers. The results of the study show that the ongoing agricultural land use right transfer is promoted and encouraged by the Chinese government's rural development strategies under the background of industrialization and urbanization. In a transfer process, powerful groups will attempt to use their social, economic, formal, and informal powers to influence the transfer process, to gain more benefits from the negotiation; and the poorer groups will always be the disadvantages. Thus, public interests should be more well-considered by the government.

Keywords: Chinese rural development, agricultural land use right transfer, power relations, negotiation

Introduction

At the beginning of 1980s, China implemented the “rural reform” policy which was to allocate the agricultural land into individual households based on the family’s population (family members) and ended the collective agricultural production system in China. This policy extremely encourages the farmers’ interest to work harder in agricultural production than the collective time. This led to the result of basically solved the food quantity supply problem in Chinese history. This is the greatest contribution of rural reform policy in Chinese history. It is the most successful rural development policy. (Han Jun, 1995).

But by the time of 1990’s, the objective of China’s agricultural production had been changed, the objective of agricultural production is more and more for the market, rather than food for self-demand of the farmers. (Han Jun, 2000). At the same time, the industrialization and urbanization has become the mainstream or the main strategy for China’s social-economic development. So the concepts of rural surplus labor and non-farming activity have come into people’s consideration (Wen Tiejun, 1998). The rural labors moved from rural areas to the cities, and doing the non-farming activities in the cities has become one important social-economic phenomenon in China.

The industrialization and urbanization process are leading more and more agricultural land together with farmers transfer from agricultural use into industry purpose and urban population (Cai Fang, 2001). According to Chinese Agricultural Laws, the owner of the agricultural land in the rural area only can be the state or community (village committee or villager group), each rural household only have the use right of agricultural land (the county government extends this use right every 50 years) (Chinese Agricultural Land Law, 2000). However, every household can decide to manage his agricultural

land by himself or to rent the use right of his agricultural land to others with agreed price and period (less than 50years). But the new land investment or management has to keep using the land for agricultural purpose only, it can't be used for other purpose like housing, road construction and processing industry etc (Chinese Agricultural Land Contract Law, 2000).

In most situations or land use right transfer, the ordinary farmers especially the poor farmers always got regret after they transferred out their agricultural land use right for 3-5 years later, then they complained to the local government, or had conflict with the new land managers. (Mou Yan, 2006). The major reason of their complaining is the price is too low, or the transfer contract conditions are more benefit the land receivers. That is because the powerful stakeholders always can influence, can control, can dominate the transfer process, and the control does not necessary by force, but by many "natural" forms of power, like influence and negotiation. If we do not understand the different powers of different stakeholders, do not understand the power relations, do not understand the forms of power influence, and do not know how to balance the power relations, then the agricultural land use right transfer will not help to reach the objective of rural sustainable development, the related research is urgent needed.

Objectives

This study aimed to: 1) understand the rural development contexts for agricultural land use right transfer policy of China in the previous years. 2) analyze the power relations patterns in the agricultural land use right transfer process in the past 10 years in Shanpotian village in Yaoan county, Yunnan province.

Methodology

This research used qualitative methodologies consisting of documentary research, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions. In this research, the related publications and reports at several levels were reviewed. First, at the village level, there are yearly statistics book and different report topics that are related to the social-economic developments of situations in the village. Second, at the township and county level, there are some special reports that are related to agricultural land use rights transfer, and there are some documents on agricultural land registration information in offices. The third level is research articles and reports. The researcher selected papers that are related to policy history and rural developments in China, for the understanding of the historical agricultural land right management changes in China, and the researcher reviewed all of the related historical policies, and summarizes these into several stages, in an attempt to construct a clear “map” for the changing history of this topic. Also, data on the social-economic developments of the village and the township government are analyzed. Moreover, in-depth interviews are the major methods in this research for interviewing the different stakeholders that are related to agricultural land use rights transfer, to know about their judgments, values, and suggestions. When different stakeholders felt sensitive about the topic, or when facing complex situations, the researcher took time with conducting the interview 45 people in the village, including rich farmers, poor farmers, male farmers, female farmers, young farmers, and old farmers, covering all of the types of farmers in the village. For some of the important issues, there might be some topics that yield very confusing information from different individuals during the in-depth interviews, and so focus group discussions were conducted. This discussion also helped with making suggestions for balancing power relations and negotiations in agricultural land

use rights transfers. The researcher organized focus group discussions for the village committee staff, township government officers, and the county government officers.

Results

The Existing Contexts of Rural Development in China

Historically, China is considered as a agricultural country or rural society for a long time, the major reason is the large rural population and lives in the wider rural areas (see Table1 and2). (Wen Tiejun, 2010). By the year of 2015, in China, talking about the same administrative level in rural and urban areas, there are 32683 rural townships and towns, but there are only 6686 urban community offices; there are 585451 rural village committees, but there are only 19000 urban residents' committee. Both township and town belong to rural administrative unit in China, but township is in countryside, the town is in suburban, both township and town are at the same administrative level with urban community office, but the urban community office is in the urban. Again, the rural village committee and the urban resident's committee are at the same administrative level, but the former is in rural area, and the latter is in urban area. The following two tables tell us that still the rural resident area is bigger than urban resident area.

Table 1 The Rural Local Organization in China

Order	Rural Local Organization	Year 2017
1.	Township/Town	32683
1.1	Township	12282
1.2	Town	20401
2.	Village Committee	585451

Source: Chinese National Statistics 2018

Table 2 The Urban Local Organization in China

Order	Urbanization Local Organization	Year 2017
1.	Urban Community Office	6686
2.	Urban Resident's Committee	19000

Source: Chinese National Statistics 2018

The major population are rural population (see Table 3 and 4) (Wen Tiejun, 2010). In the year of 2015, both the number of rural household and population is much bigger than the urban household and population, the bigger population are still living in the rural China that's the reason of China is considered as a agricultural country in the world.

In general, the rural population in China is defined as farmers who's household registration is in rural areas and makes a living on farming activities. The urban population is defined as urban people who's household registration is in urban areas and makes a living on non-farming activities.

Table 3 The Rural Household and Rural Population in China

Order	Rural Household and Population	Million
1	Rural Household	268
2	Rural Population	970

Source: Chinese National Statistics 2018

Table 4 The Urban Household and Urban Population in China

Order	Urban Household and Population	Million
:	Urban Household (Million)	127
:	Urban Population (Million)	430

Source: Chinese National Statistics (2018)

But from the time of 1980s, many things started changed in rural China, just like JiZhizhi (2010) introduced, In China, from the time of 1980 – 1990, the main objective of social-economic development is economic reform. First started the reform from rural area, rural villagers stop the agricultural production in collective way. And the agricultural land was allocated to individual household, each household make the production decision by himself. This reform encouraged the farmer's interest in agricultural production, and increased the productivity in agricultural sector. From the time of 1990 – 2010, the main objective is to establish and develop the market economy, this period is the fast growth of GDP in Chinese history, China became the second largest GDP country in the world.

In the whole country, agricultural and rural development is emphasized by the national government, there are following encouraging policies. Politically, because the major population in China are farmers, the Chinese government now is highly strength the rural development work with a lot of rural development policies. For example, cancel the agricultural product taxes, provide the subsidy for grain production, provide the subsidy for farmers if they buy domestic appliances, and cancel or decrease the education fee for farmers' children. For the young farmers who are working in the cities, the government tries to help them get salary on time. For the rural infrastructure construction, the government has the policy to provide inputs for each village. For improving the management ability of the local government, the government selects the young people who has the university degree, and send them to work in the village level. Especially from the year of 2015 to 2020, the Chinese government has the objective of solving the rural poverty problem in China by the year of 2020 with a lot of rural development projects. Economically, a lot of young farmers left the villages to find jobs in the cities, they get higher income than their parents

who are working in agriculture, they learn new technologies and development ideas from the cities, they get more market information for agricultural products from the cities. The most important is they open many processing enterprise in rural areas, they process many agricultural materials and sale the products to city market for getting higher profits. Technically, 92% of the rural children get free education for 9 years to finish their middle school. More than half of the university students are from rural population. The central government emphasis and strength the ability of the local (township and village committee) government officers, so they can provide the technical services for the farmer's agricultural activities. At the same time, the local cultural activities are encouraged by the government and practiced based on different cultures to enjoy different groups of people. (Chinese People's University, 2015).

Although the Chinese government implemented above encouraging policy for rural development, there are still the following problems in Chinese rural development.

1. The central government in Beijing hope and actually provide the very supportive policies for rural development, but different local governments do not strictly follow the central government's policies, or the local policies always have the discount in implementation of the central government's policies. The "discount" of different local governments means occupy the benefits which should belong to the farmers, so the farmers always complain about this.

2. The rural environment has been degraded. One is the fast decrease of natural resources like forests and grass, two is the pollution of the water, three is the pollution of farmer's living environment, four is the decrease of agricultural land because of urbanization and industrialization.

3. The rural social capitals have been decreased. Because most of the young farmers left the rural areas and work in the cities, only the old people and children are left and live in the rural areas. The relationships among farmer families are getting looser, the old people feel lonely, the children feel not have the family, the rural communities to some extent have “died”. Only during the spring festival, the young people come back to the rural areas, the rural communities looks “alive” again.

4. The growth of rural children has become the problem. Because they are left and growing in the rural areas without the accompany of their parents, they seldom can stay with their parents, they feel lonely in their childhood, so some of them even hate their parents and the society, they are called stay behind at home generalization. In the future, this may cause the social problems.

5. The young farmers working in the cities are marginalized by the main stream city society. The young farmers from the rural areas who working in the cities are called “farmer workers”, they are working in the cities but not as city citizen, they have lower income and live in the poor conditions, they always feel the discrimination from the city people. They are going for the hard labour work but get lower salary, even the lower salary still not payed in time by the employers, so they are the marginalized group in the cities. (People’s University, 2015)

6. Future Chinese rural development strategies:

In the future, the Chinese government proposes the following rural development strategies.

1. Strength the implementation of rural development policies from the central government, to be sure that the farmers do get benefits from the policies, or at least to be sure that the farmers can get the fair benefits with the urban people.

2. Try to ask and encourage the government in different levels to really provide the qualify services to the farmers, at least to be sure that the government is helpful to the farmers, or let the farmers can feel the help from the government.

3. Try to improve the rural infrastructure conditions, like road, irrigation system, market, information etc. so as to decrease the costs of rural development.

4. Try to emphasis the development of rural cultural activities, so as to enrich the farmer's cultural life. "Not the richest, but the happiest" lifestyle should be respected.

5. Try to provide the continue training to the farmers, so they can work as qualify labor for modern agricultural development.

6. Try to expand the working opportunities for the young farmers to work in or near their hometown, so they can take care of the old people and children. (Chinese People's University, 2015).

In China, before 1980, the socio-economic development is under the planning economy system, the main purpose of agricultural development is feed the big population, but still there is the difficulty to solve the food problem at that time. Start from 1980, the Chinese government implement the "rural reform", it greatly encouraged the farmer's working interest, and solve the food problem shortly. After 1990, the market economy system is almost established in China, the main purpose of agricultural development is increase the cash income of farmers. After 2000, the urbanization and industrialization are the main stream for socio-economic development in China.

So the agricultural land use right transfer in China now is under the background of: (1) Most of the young rural labour have transformed their occupation from rural area to urban area, (2) Most of the rural family's cash

income is coming from off-farming activities, (3) The agricultural land is getting less important in farmer's livelihood, (4) The investment from rich farmers or cities are trying to concentrate the agricultural land use right together and manage the land in bigger scale, (5) the farmers are getting more and more different each other in economic and social conditions in the community, (6) More stakeholders are involved in agricultural development process from outside of the rural community.

Power relations patterns in the agricultural land use right transfer process in Shanpotian village

The Shanpotian village committee is in Yaoan County, Yunnan Province. Under the Shanpotian village committee, there are 16 natural villages and there are 28 village groups. The population of the village committee was 5,682 persons; within the population, the labor force was 3,940 persons, which is 69% of the total population. There are Han and Yi nationalities in the population; Han comprises 90% of the population, and Yi is 10% of the population. There are 305 hectares of agricultural land in the village committee; the agricultural land is managed by individual households (Shanpotian village statistics, 2017).

With the limited agricultural land, the major summer crops are rice and tobacco, and the winter crops are different vegetables. The common animals are cows, pigs, and chickens, but vegetables, pigs, and chickens are only for self-consumption by the family, and these are seldom sold in the market. In the village, there is still a large area of forestry land, because of the environmental protection program in China, which stipulates that farmers cannot cut down the trees for timber sales. However, there are other forestry products in the village, such as walnut, chestnut, prickly ash, pear, and peach (Shanpotian Village Committee Statistics, 2017).

Over recent years, farmers' cash incomes have become more and more reliant on non-farming activities, such as salaries from working in the cities. There are 3500 people who work outside of the village yearly, and at times, this can comprise up to 62% of the village committee's population. Especially for the young farmers, more than 95% of the young laborers work outside of the village. This has been the biggest change in this village over the past 30 years, and this is also the reason for why some farmers want to transfer out their agricultural land use rights (Interview Mr. Liu, the township government officer, 2017). The agricultural land use rights transfer process involves different stakeholders involved. They represent different interests; different views, different objectives and different roles, and most importantly, they have different degrees of power within the transfer process (Focus group discussion with village committee members, 2017). Formal powers are not only provincial, central, county and town governments, but also village committee and companies. The informal powers in Shanpotian village are those that we cannot see them recorded in public documents or observe them in public spaces; they work "under-table", based on certain relationships. Different powers will attempt to gain the maximum benefits for themselves in the agricultural land use rights transfer process; they will negotiate with each other, compromise with each other, and reach an agreement. However, the so-called agreement is never fair; it is always the result of powerful stakeholders obtaining more benefits, and the powerless stakeholders obtain less benefits (In-depth interview with different stakeholders, 2017).

The powerful stakeholders will always go through government officers or directly through the village leaders to hire land, or they will let their relatives and friends in the village hire land; the only objective for doing this is to obtain agricultural land under any favorable conditions, such as

cheaper rent, the better location of the land, etc. The different power relations interact according to the following steps:

Step 1: Market information showed that tobacco leaf crops would have a good price and a higher profit, and the county tobacco company had a policy of providing an allowance to big plantations (a large plantation area, over 50 Mu). Market information also showed that traditional crop plantations such as rice and corn were no longer profitable, and that new agricultural species should be considered.

Mr. Li: "If I plant 2 Mu of tobacco, my wife and I will have to work for it throughout the year; even if we sometimes have spare time, we will not be able to go out to work. If I plant 10 Mu tobacco, my wife and me will be busy throughout the year, but the income will be much higher than the 2 Mu plantation. So, the bigger plantation of tobacco is more profitable than the smaller plantation" (Interviewed by Ms. Fu Xiran on 22 June 2017).

Step 2: The rich farmers in the village decided to hire agricultural land from other farmers, to expand their tobacco plantation. The other farmers in this village include two types, one type are the families who have already moved and are working in the cities; they will generally transfer out all of their agricultural land. The second type are the poor households who do not have enough investments, and they will transfer out part of their agricultural land.

The external company decided to plant pomegranate in this village, because they saw that higher profits of pomegranate than rice and corn would occur in the future, and they wanted to hire agricultural land from the villagers, but they asked for help from the village heads to hire land from the farmers, and they paid working fee of 100 yuan per Mu to the village heads.

Mr. Liu: "I preferred to rent my family's agricultural land to the outside company, because if I rented to farmers in my village, I would be shy

to ask for a high price, because we are relatives. But for the outside company, I can ask for a price that is as high as possible, because we do not know each other.” (Interviewed by Ms. Fu Xiran on 21 June 2017)

Step 3: The rich farmers used two methods for obtaining the land, one was go to their relatives and friends to see whether they would want to rent out their agricultural land, or whether they knew whether others would want to rent out land; this an informal social networking process for obtaining land, because most people in the one village are relatives or friends of each other. The second method was to go to the village heads to ask for their help, and to let the village headers to help them to hire the agricultural land, the farmers did not pay any working fees to the village heads, but they would become friends with the village heads for future land management, and would share the benefits from other aspects with each other.

The outside company also had two ways of obtaining land, one way was to go to the village heads to ask for help from them, and let them hire the land from the farmers, with the company paying a working fee to the village heads. The second way was to go to the county government, and to let the county government ask the town government to make arrangements, and for the town government to also ask the village heads to help. These two ways both involved the village headers. The salary of the village head from the government was only about 1700 yuan per month; this salary was lower than any one farmer working in the city, and even lower than any one farmer who worked in the village; the monthly costs for the village head were also much higher than for one ordinary farmer. However, the village head still liked this line of work, with one important factor being that he could gain more benefits from other sources, directly or indirectly.

Step 4: Once the agricultural land was hired, both the rich farmers and outside company needed to hire labor for the management of activities

on the land, and both needed to have good relationships with the local people, and especially with the village heads, because they needed continued local support for sustainable management. They both needed to develop good relationships with the town and the county government, so that they could gain government project support in the form of resources or funds.

Mr. Zhang (town government officer): “The real reasons for an outside company to hire agricultural land are two folds: one is to plant pomegranates to get a higher profit; two is for getting support from our government projects, and the company will even use the agricultural land use rights as a guarantee for getting loans from the bank.”

The effects of agricultural land use rights transfers that are influenced by power relations

Advantaged groups control the agricultural land use rights transfer process, and they can help “big rural families” and agricultural companies to obtain agricultural land use rights easily, in time, and effectively, they can increase the inputs of technologies and materials toward the agricultural land, and they can help farmers to save costs, and decrease the market risks of agricultural products. However, according to my study, this also brings about the following negative effects.

1. The poor farmers easily lose their benefits during the agricultural land use rights transfer: According to the law, or superficially, agricultural land use rights transfers are based on the needs of supply and demand; no-one can force anyone in the process. In reality, what we have seen is that powerful groups can easily use formal or informal means, and economic or social powers, to influence the decisions of the poor farmers. For example, they will make up a good story for the poor farmers, use benefits to attract them, use relatives and good friends to persuade them, or make the current

profits from the farmers' cultivation yields unsatisfactory. The usual way in which they achieve this is to offer a cheaper price to the poor farmers for their current yields, or even let the poor farmers carry the burden of risk in the current crops plantation.

2. The local governments are easily controlled by powerful stakeholders in agricultural land use rights transfers: The government should maintain a position of protecting the benefits of the poor farmers, or a position that backs public benefits, such as environment protection. However, in reality, powerful stakeholders use two tools to persuade the local governments support them, and not the poor farmers and the public. One tool is to make up a good story to the government, and to let the government believe that their investments are good for both the government and the local community. The second tool attempts to share some profits with the government through many aspects; this is key to maintaining power relations, and many unfair things have occurred just because of this.

3. The entire cost of agricultural production is greatly increased after the transfer process: After the agricultural land use rights transfer process, the new land users are different from the traditional land users in two aspects. One is that the new land users will not manage the plantation by themselves; they will hire more than 98% of the management labor, and will pay the labor salary, with the labor salary increasing year by year. Two is that the new form of land use will not be purposed for traditional crop plantations; the land will be used for planting new and or higher-value but higher-cost crops. This will increase the agricultural production cost as a whole, and then increase the price of the agricultural products.

4. Agricultural land management is challenged by the new land users: The new land users only gain the agricultural land use rights for a certain number of years (less than 50 years), and sometimes this is year-by-

year, and so the only objective for the new land users is the highest output of the land. They will prefer to use more chemical fertilizer and pest control measures; these are effective in producing high outputs, but these are not good for future agricultural land quality, and they will even have negative impacts on the environment. However, both the farmers and the new land users will not care about this issue.

5. The farmers are becoming more and more dependent on the new land managers: After the agricultural land use rights transfer, the farmers essentially become agricultural workers for the rich farmers and the company; they do not think about the input-output relationship, the price changes, the crop species, or the technology, and they only participate in one process of the agricultural production process year after year. The farmers' knowledge will become limited, and they will have to rely on the new land managers. If the new form of land management fails, the farmers will no longer be unable to continue the agricultural production process.

Discussion

Power relations are dependent on culture, place, and time. Power not only operates in specific spheres of social life, but it occurs in everyday life. Power occurs in sites of all kinds and sizes, including the minutest and the most intimate, such as the human body. Or power is not limited to political institutions, as has been commonly thought. Power has a direct and a creative role in social life. It is multi-directional, and it operates from the top-down, and from the bottom-up. Although power is at its peak when it is situated inside specific institutions such as schools, prisons, or hospitals, we should be wary about identifying technologies of power with particular institutions, because power is neither a superstructure, nor the quality of an institution (Foucalt).

In Shanpotian village, in general, the agricultural land use rights transfer process is driven by the market force, and the transfer price is determined by the demand and supply. In this situation, it seems that the economic powers are the main power, but there are actually many other forms of powers, such as formal governmental official powers and social informal powers, that exist everywhere; for example, the village heads, the township and county governments, and even the provincial government. Village relatives and friends, and the rich farmers, all play different roles in the agricultural land use rights transfer process. Power negations happen all the time. In general the outside agricultural company is the most powerful stakeholder in the agricultural land use rights transfer process, as the company always finds support from the township and county governments, or even from the provincial government. The governmental officers introduce the company into the village, and the company offers cash or non-cash benefits to the village heads, so that the village heads will help the company to gain agricultural land use rights at a cheaper price. However, at the same time, the village heads will try to obtain a higher price from their relatives and friends in the village, for the company's and their benefits. The final transfer results are negotiated among the different powers.

Giddens (1975) said that power is integrated within complex social practices, in which human agency has structural qualities, and that the social structure is part of the human activity that creates it, and which ensures its continuity. This duality of the structure model sees the social structure and the human agency as the two factors who build and activate these social relations, and sees power as a central and important component of both. This social structure makes human activity possible, and it also limits it—by the means of laws, rules, and resources, and also by the means of the human practices that are part of it. It is human agency that creates the social

structure—the human agency establishes it, consolidates it, and also changes it while it acts. To the same extent, social structure is a component of all activity. In Shanpotian village, the market force is a major power for agricultural land use rights transfer. However, the market power only determines whether or not to demand the transfer, but for transfer prices and conditions, social powers play important roles in the transfer. For example, transfers occur among relatives and friends, among villagers, and between villagers and the company; the prices are different, with the former being the lowest, and the latter being the highest.

According to Weber's (1970), his theory of community power, power is exercised in a community by a particular concrete individual, while other individuals, in reality, are prevented from doing what they prefer to do. Power is exercised in order to cause those who are subject to it to follow the private preferences of those who possess the power (Mills, 1956; Hunter, 1953). Gaventa's (1965) theory of power will serve, further on, as a basis for a discussion of powerlessness, not as a personal problem of the powerless, but as a social situation that has its roots in conditions of social inequality, and in disempowering social solutions. An inequality exists in different peoples' abilities and access to resources, which also creates an inequality among them in the sphere of power. Hence, the development of ability and access to resources are key concepts for an understanding of the power that people can exercise (Gaventa, 1965). In the case of Shapotian village, the township and county governments connect with different powers or stakeholders; for example, the government invites outside companies that come to the village to provide agricultural development investments, the government guides the village committee to provide support to outside companies for obtaining agricultural land use rights. In this village, we observed the power of the government, but in the power negotiation process, we found that the

government mostly remained with the outside companies, because the government was eager to gain outside investments, and at the same time, the outside companies had many resources to influence the government, so that the benefits of the poor people, the public, and the environment were not fully considered in this village. Thus, the most important role of the government is to balance the power relations, to join the power relations negotiation process, to protect the reasonable benefits of the poor, to limit the power of the powerful groups, and to reach the objectives of rural development.

In Shanpotian village, the power and power relations exist everywhere, in general, the agricultural land use right transfer is driven by market force; the transfer price is determined by the demand and supply. In this situation, it seems that the economic power is the main power, but actually there are many other forms of powers like governmental official formal powers and social informal powers exit everywhere. For example, the village headers, the township and county government, even the provincial government. The village relatives and friends, the rich farmers, they all play different roles in agricultural land use right transfer process in this village.

Recommendations

From the above discussion, power and power relations exist is normal, the power relations negotiation happens is also normal, or even the powerful groups control the powerless groups is also normal. But for the agricultural development and for a harmonious society, different stakeholders all should do something, to change something. The government, the new land managers and the farmers became the main actors in agricultural land management in and after the agricultural land use right transfer, in order to

balance the power and power relations, I recommend each actor should act as following.

The Government: The government role is key power, thus, the government should monitor the management activities by the new agricultural land users, to see whether it is profitable for their management. The government should observe, support, and take care of the farmers and natural resources, especially should be sensitive with the poor farmers, to see the impacts of the new agricultural land user's management activities to poor farmers and natural resources, to come out the encouraging or punishment policy for the new agricultural land users based on the impacts. First, the government must represent the public interests in agricultural land use right transfer and agricultural land management by to be sure that 1) the agricultural land use right transfer must follow the laws, regulations and policies; 2) the reasonable benefits of the poor farmers will not be taken by others in agricultural land use right transfer process; 3) the quality of agricultural land will maintained or improved; 4) the agricultural land management activities by the new land managers will not bring the negative impacts to the agricultural environment; and 5) the agricultural land management activities of the new land managers will not cause the social conflicts in the local community. Second, the government should establish an informal representative committee which is consisted by government officer, researcher, technician, investor and farmer, the researcher should coordinator this group, to have the monitor report every year for the agricultural land use. This committee should be independent, should be from the outside of the village or even the county.

Farmers in the village: There are two groups of farmers. First group of farmers are farm workers need to change themselves from self-managers, self-workers to agricultural workers for the new land managers. They should

to establish the awareness of link work quality with salary. Another group of farmers are the people in the village. They need to monitor the agricultural land management activities of the new land managers. They are the direct people to know the management activities to the field, so they can monitor these activities in time.

Organizations: The outside cycle, the society like NGOs, universities, media and research institutes will also monitoring and study the inside three actors, to help to balance the power relations from the third way.

In conclusion, represent the public interests in rural development, agricultural land use right transfer and agricultural land management, the government must follow the related laws, regulations and policies, and to be sure that the reasonable benefits of the poor farmers will not be taken by others. Moreover, the government should make sure that the quality of agricultural land will maintained or improved, the agricultural land management activities by the new land managers will not bring the negative impacts to the agricultural environment and will not cause the social conflicts in the local community. However, this is difficult because the power of rich farmers and company is very strong. They always try to influence or attract the governments so as to get more benefits. The government should represent the public interests to monitor the transfer process, and provide the suggestions to the new land managers, even to punish the new land managers if their behavior damages the public interests. The government should establish the independent monitoring system that the village headers and villagers are deeply involved in the agricultural land use right transfer, they have their own benefits in the transfer process.

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