

# The Mongol-Yuan in Yunnan and ProtoTai/Tai Polities during the 13th-14th Centuries

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**ABSTRACT**—This article examines Mongol-Yuan influence on the emergence of proto-Tai/Tai polities after c. 1260 in the upper Ayeyarwaddy (Irrawaddy) and Mekong river regions using the *Yuan History*, a recently discovered tomb inscription of 1461, and other Chinese and Tai sources. I make five arguments. The first is that as a successor state the Mongol-Yuan gained possession of former Dali kingdom territories in Yunnan and northern mainland Southeast Asia by restoring political power to the deposed Duan royal family. The second is that the restoration of the Duan aided the Mongol-Yuan advance into northern mainland Southeast Asia along communication routes leading from western Yunnan to the upper Ayeyarwaddy and Mekong river regions established during the Dali Kingdom period. The third is that Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup> (Moeng Mao, Chinese: Luchuan 麓川), a large political Tai confederation in the western mainland, arose c. 1335-1350s in the context of the expulsion of Mian power from the Upper Ayeyarwaddy by the Mongol-Yuan during the 1280s, and after the garrisoned Mongol-Yuan troops withdrew in 1303. The fourth is that the case of a Han Chinese man appointed to the Pacification Office in Lan Na c. 1341 attests that the Duan family aided Mongol-Yuan administration of northern mainland Southeast Asia by supplying lower level personnel to staff the yamen of Tai rulers appointed as native officials. The fifth is that, judging from the historical data, such yamen exercised limited influence as catalysts of Tai polity building. These five arguments are linked. Taken together, they demonstrate that available evidence does not substantiate Victor Lieberman's claim that the Mongol-Yuan "encouraged the creation of Tai client states" in the upper Mekong by providing them with "new military and administrative models" through their status as native officials. My conclusion is that notions of "patronage" and "client states" are misleading because they downplay the centrality of the proto Tai/Tai as agents navigating their own way to polity building; proto Tai/Tai agency is verified by their ambitious acquisition of new skills, technologies and writing systems.

Qubilai Qan's conquest of the Dali Kingdom 大理國 (937–1253) in 1253/54 by order of his elder brother Möngke marked the first encounter that Mon-Khmer and proto-Tai/Tai polities within the orbit of Yunnan had with direct administration by Chinese dynastic power, and triggered momentous changes over the 127 years of rule by the

Mongol-Yuan.<sup>1</sup> The Mongol-Yuan launched campaigns into mainland Southeast Asia early after the conquest, even before they gained complete control over the core areas of the fallen Dali kingdom on the Yun-Gui plateau. Initially designed to establish a bridgehead for attacking the Southern Song, the conquest ultimately turned the kingdom's territory into a province of China, and laid the foundations for administration by the Ming and Qing dynasties.<sup>2</sup> The failure of campaigns against the Tran dynasty 陳朝 (1225–1400) of Dai Viet and the Mian 缅 of Pagan, has led historians to conclude that Mongol-Yuan intrusions exerted limited influence on the course of indigenous history in Southeast Asia. In this article, I argue that their administration of Yunnan did influence polities located at the southern edge of the Mongol-Yuan world in today's northern Southeast Asia.

Empirical evidence comes from a recently-discovered tomb inscription of 1461 which, for the first time, divulges details of Mongol-Yuan administration of polities formerly subordinate to the Dali Kingdom through native officials (*tuguan* 土官).<sup>3</sup> This stele documents the appointment of a Chinese man, named Kang Min 康旻, to the “nominal office of Pacifier 宣慰名職” in the Babai Pacification Office 八百宣慰司 c. 1341. Residing at Zhaozhou 趙州 (today's Fengyi township 凤儀鎮) near Dali, safe from malaria-carrying mosquitos at an elevation of over 1,900 metres, he ventured down to his jurisdiction in the insalubrious climate of northern Thailand for roughly four months every year. According to malaria legends in China, contact with mists, miasmas, or pestilential vapours caused death, so his service was seasonal, “assuming office in winter, and returning [before] summer”.<sup>4</sup> Babai 八百 is the Chinese designation for the Tai polity of Lan Na (also known as Babai Xifu 八百媳婦) founded by King Mangrai (r. 1259–1311)<sup>5</sup> in northern Thailand. It is highly unusual for a non-indigene like Kang Min, who hailed from Shaanxi 陝

<sup>1</sup> His elder brother Möngke (Xianzong 憲宗 r.1251–1259) ordered Qubilai Qan (1215–94; shizu 世祖 r.1260–1294) to begin the campaign against the Dali Kingdom in the summer of 1253. For the Mongol conquest of Dali, see Herman (2007), pp. 47–49. The Mongol-Yuan 蒙元 period dates from the foundation of the Great Mongol Nation (Yeke Mongghol Ulus) in 1206. In Yunnan, the Mongol-Yuan period begins with the conquest of 1253 and ends in 1382 when overthrown by the Ming. Note that Mongol-Yuan domination of Yunnan commenced twenty-six years before the demise of the Southern Song, and ended fourteen years after the foundation of the Ming dynasty in 1368.

<sup>2</sup> The Branch Secretariat of Yunnan and other places (*Yunnan dengchu xingzhong shusheng* 雲南等處行中書省) was established in 1276, over twenty years after the cataclysmic fall of the Dali kingdom, and it marked the foundation of Yunnan as a province of China, see YS, 61.1458. This was 137 years before the creation of Guizhou province in 1413 by the Ming dynasty.

<sup>3</sup> The term for native officials during the Yuan and early Ming was *tuguan* 土官. The earliest appearance of the term *tusi* 土司, which was used extensively during the Qing period, was in an entry for 1542 (Jiajing 21) in the *Shizong Shilu* 世宗實錄. The same source records ten more instances up to 1566 (Jiajing 45), see Luo Zhong and Luo Weiqing (2016), pp. 7–8, and Dai Jinxin (2015). None of these early references recorded the usage of the term *tusi* in Yunnan.

<sup>4</sup> The stele titled, “Tomb Inscription for Instructor Mr. Kang (*Jiaoyu Kang Gong Muzhi* 教諭康公墓誌)”, is dated 12 March to 10 April 1461 (Tianshun 5/2). The printed version is in DFGJ, pp. 203–205.

<sup>5</sup> For the biographical data of King Mangrai, I follow Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Wichienkeo (2008), p. 53 fn 203.

西 in faraway north China, to serve as a native official.<sup>6</sup> The *Yuan History* recorded Phayu (Han Bu 韓部 r. 1337/38–1355), the incumbent ruler of Lan Na, as the native official of the Babai Pacification Office in an entry dated February 1, 1346 (Zhizheng 至正 6/12/ *jiawu*). The years from 1341 to 1346 roughly accord with the period of Kang Min’s appointment, but no Chinese or Tai source mentions Kang Min.<sup>7</sup> Deployment of non-indigenous officials to participate in the administration of Mon-Khmer and proto-Tai/Tai polities reveals a more enduring Mongol-Yuan presence in northern mainland Southeast Asia than suggested by conventional accounts of short-lived, futile military forays. Official service in the Upper Mekong river region by men like Kang Min raises the issue of whether the Mongol-Yuan actually did prompt the sudden entrance of Tai polities onto the historical stage.

By the early 1300s, Tai dominated the upper and middle Mekong, Haripunjaya Kingdom centred at Lamphun, and most of the Chaophraya plain where they mingled with Mons and Khmers. They commenced attacking the charter state of Angkor at roughly the same time as they started raiding Mian polities. As early as 1297, Tai-led forces destroyed villages on the Cambodian plain, and incursions against Angkor escalated after the founding of Ayutthaya in c. 1351.<sup>8</sup> Victor Lieberman and others identify martial skills (“mercenaries and low-level tributaries”), superior agricultural techniques (dissemination of productive new rice strains and water management skills) and climate change as factors causing the expansion of Tai polities and the decline of Mon and Khmer royal power in the Upper and Middle Mekong.<sup>9</sup> By contrast, the impact of Tai (Shan) polities in the Upper Ayeyarwaddy river region on Mian polities was not long lasting, a situation dissimilar to the influence of Tai polities on the Mon and Khmer in the Mekong areas. First, Tai raids did not end in systematic settlement because Tai migrants assimilated to Burman culture, often becoming “‘Burman’ after one or two generations”.<sup>10</sup> Second, political disunity among Tai leaders prevented them from mounting united campaigns against Ava.<sup>11</sup> Third, Tai elites emulated Burman Buddhist culture, so they “never seriously threatened Burman cultural supremacy”.<sup>12</sup>

Though Tai pressure on Angkor and Pagan commenced only after the conquest of

<sup>6</sup> The Mongol-Yuan 蒙元 period dates from the foundation of the Great Mongol Nation (Yeke Mongghol Ulus) in 1206. In Yunnan, the Mongol-Yuan period begins with the conquest of 1253 and ends in 1382 when overthrown by the Ming.

<sup>7</sup> YS, 41. 876. Also, see Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Wichienkeeo (2008), p. 86.

<sup>8</sup> Lieberman (2003), pp. 241–242. Concerning early Tai movements and culture, see Lieberman (2003), pp. 240–242; Wyatt, (1984), pp. 24–60; Luce (1958), pp. 123–214; and O’Connor (1995), pp. 982–83.

<sup>9</sup> Lieberman and Buckley (2012), pp. 1075–10768) also downplays Tai influence.

<sup>10</sup> Lieberman (2003), p. 125.

<sup>11</sup> For Tai raids on Pagan and Ava see Sun (2000), pp. 34–44, 224–42; Fernquest (2005), pp. 284–395, and Fernquest (2006), pp. 27–81.

<sup>12</sup> Lieberman (2003), p. 125. Aung-Thwin (1998) also downplays Tai influence. Daniels (2012) cites the borrowing of Burmese script by the Tai of northern Burma and south-west Yunnan as an example of Burmese cultural influence on Tai rulers and aristocracy in the 13th century after the weakening of Pagan and the rise of Ava.

Yunnan, past scholarship has downplayed the role of the Mongol-Yuan. This article sets out to gauge the extent of Mongol-Yuan influence on the emergence of proto-Tai/Tai polities in the Upper Ayeyarwaddy region, especially their influence on the formation of the large Tai polity of Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup> (Tay: Moeng Mao, Chinese: Luchuan 麓川).<sup>13</sup> I use the case of Kang Min and his sons to elucidate how the Mongol-Yuan administered Mon-Khmer and Tai polities. On the eve of Qubilai Qan's conquest, the frontiers of the Dali Kingdom reached "the city of Koncan / Kaungzin [Chinese: Jiangtucheng 江頭城, literally "the city at the head of the river" near Bhamo] in the land of the Mian in the south-west, and "the Lucang river 鹿滄江 in the Lin'an Route 臨安路" to the south-east (YS, 61.1457). The area controlled by the Dali kingdom stretched in an arc from the Upper Ayeyarwaddy, through the upper Mekong river region to the Da River (黑河 Black river) in Lai Châu 萊州, north-west Vietnam. Bordering on the Tibetan cultural area to the north-west, and on Song China to the north-east, the territorial reach of the kingdom encompassed parts of present-day northern mainland Southeast Asia and Sichuan province. To assess the influence of the Mongol-Yuan on the formation of proto-Tai/Tai polities, we need first empirically to verify the process by which they laid claim to the territories of the Dali Kingdom. I argue that the Mongol-Yuan utilised the political authority of the deposed royal Duan family 段氏, and slowly moved south in stages to establish control over the upper Ayeyarwaddy and upper Mekong river regions. Tortuous as it will seem, I provide considerable detail on the relationship between the Duan family and the Mongol-Yuan advance south because this important association has never been demonstrated before, and because the Duan facilitated Mongol-Yuan access to the region. Opportunities for Kang Min and his sons to serve as Mongol-Yuan officials derived from their close association with the Duan family. The stele is significant precisely because it recorded the case of the Duan supplying officials to staff administrative units in Mon-Khmer and Tai polities. The Duan clearly played a vital role in aiding Mongol-Yuan administration of these polities. By focusing on the role of this family, we are able to access Mongol-Yuan influence on the formation of Tai polities from a fresh perspective, one that enhances our overall understanding of polities at the southernmost margins of the Mongol-Yuan world.

### The text of the 1461 stele

The published version of the stele, hereafter the *Inscription*, appears in a collection of 104 *stelae* from Fengyi township, many of which have never been published before. Mr. Ma Cunzhao 馬存兆, an independent scholar from Fengyi Township, collected and transcribed the *stelae* with co-operation from Professor Ma Jianxiong 馬健雄 at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) and researchers at Dali University. Staff at the HKUST, the South China Research Center 華南研究中心

<sup>13</sup> The upper Ayeyarwaddy river region includes the Shan and Kachin areas of northern Myanmar and the Dehong Tai and Jingpo Autonomous Area in south-west Yunnan.

心. both at Nansha 南沙 in Guangzhou and at Clearwater Bay in Hong Kong, inputted and edited the texts. The South China Research Center published the *stelae* in a single volume book under the title, *Dali Fengyi Gubeiwen Ji* 大理鳳儀古碑文集 (DFGJ Old Stelae from Fengyi, Dali) in 2013.

Descendants of Kang Min unearthed the *Inscription* (engraved on locally quarried marble), from their own dry field on Snake mountain (Sheshan 蛇山) in Zhihua Village 芝華村, Fengyi township. The version published in 2013 was based on a transcription executed by Ma Cunzhao, a native of this village, circa 2004, about the time of discovery. On my visits to the site in 2015 and 2016 respectively, I collated the published version with the stele now standing (see Figure 1), and observed some discrepancies, which arose due to: (1) mistakes in the initial c. 2004 transcription; (2) errors that crept in during the input/proof-reading process; and (3) re-engraving of a limited number of characters on the stele before erecting it at the place of discovery, circa 2011. Though these discrepancies do not affect the factual evidence recorded, I have prepared an amended version of the text, reproduced in this article, by comparing Ma Cunzhao's original c. 2004 transcription (now in the possession of my colleague, Professor Ma Jianxiong), the published version and the stele now standing.

The front side of the *Inscription* recorded the lives of Kang Haoqian 康好謙 and his ancestors since Kang Min, in Chinese. It has a mushroom-shaped cap with five *bija* (seed) letters encircling the Chinese title, “Jiaoyu Kanggong muzhi 教諭康公墓誌” above the Chinese text (see Figure 2). The reverse side is inscribed with



Figure 1. Chinese text of *Inscription*, dated, 1461, standing at Zhihua Village 芝華村, Fengyi 鳳儀, Dali, Yunnan.



Figure 2. The five *bija* (means seed) letters on the cap of the tombstone on the front side of *Inscription*. Each *bija* letter represents a Buddhist divinity, and from right to left reads: *ah*, *hrīh*, *āmīh*, *tām* and *hūm*. I am grateful to Dr. Bill Mak for the decipherment.

a Sanskrit *Uṣṇīṣavijayadhāraṇī* (Chinese: 佛頂尊勝陀羅尼), a Mahāyāna formula associated with Buddhist funerary rites widely practised across Buddhist Asia since the 8th century (see Figure 3). This *dhāraṇī*, written in *nāgarī* script (eighteen lines), is dedicated to Kang Haoqian, and lists the names of family members in Chinese at the bottom.<sup>14</sup> Kang Min's descendants cemented over the mushroom-shaped cap and the left and right edges on the reverse side, which has resulted in the loss of one row of Sanskrit text at the top and some letters at both edges. The *Uṣṇīṣavijayadhāraṇī* is an undated religious text, and is not a translation of the Chinese text on the front side.<sup>15</sup> *Dhāraṇīs*, or *mantras*, were only efficacious if scripted in Sanskrit, because they lost their potency in translation, and, indeed, it is probably for this reason that no Chinese renditions of *dhāraṇī* have been discovered in Yunnan. Tantric magic spells written in *siddhamāṭrkā* (or *siddham*) script on the underside of burial urn lids dated the 12th to the 14th century have been unearthed at Laifeng Mountain 來鳳山, Tengchong 謄衝, deep in Mon-Khmer and proto-Tai/Tai territory.<sup>16</sup> The twelve Chinese characters embedded in line thirteen of the Sanskrit text on the

<sup>14</sup> Dr. Bill Mak 麥文彪 of Kyoto University has identified the script as an intermediate form, lying “between *siddhamāṭrkā* (or *siddham*) and *nāgarī*, exhibiting characteristics resembling the latter more closely than the former.” Although Oskar von Hinüber (1989) identified this script to be *siddham*, Dr. Mak points out that the vowel representation and letters such as “a” and “i” indicate a *nāgarī* affiliation (not *devanāgarī*). Furthermore, he notes that the usage of *nāgarī* during the early Ming is not surprising since Sanskrit inscriptions in other parts of China during the Yuan/Ming period were written in either *rañjana* (*lantsa*) or *nāgarī* scripts, not *siddhamāṭrkā*. Indian monks who came to China during the Song period used *nāgarī* script, instead of the *siddhamāṭrkā*, script of the Tang period. Dali scribes used *nāgarī* script to copy two Sanskrit texts included in the *Fanxiang juan* 梵像卷 (Scroll of Buddhist Images) executed by the Dali Kinggdom court painter, Zhang Shengwen 張勝溫, and dated 1180; the *Duoxin Jingzhuang* 多心經幢 (Heart Sutra Pillar) and the *Huguo Jingzhuang* 護國經幢 (Realm-Protecting Sutra Pillar), see Li Lincan (1982), pp. 121. The *Uṣṇīṣavijayadhāraṇī* on the reverse side of the *Inscription* followed the Yuan/Ming tradition of Sanskrit orthography. This explanation is based on Dr. Mak's seminar talk at the Division of Humanities, HKUST, titled “Sanskrit inscriptions and manuscripts in Yunnan, a preliminary survey”, 30 August 2017, and email communications dated 31 August and 1 September 2017 respectively.

<sup>15</sup> The absence of a date is not unusual. Dr. Mak informed me that he has not seen any dates on Sanskrit materials from Yunnan, or other parts of East Asia, email communications of 31 August and 1 September 2017 respectively.

<sup>16</sup> These magic spells were probably designed to prevent evil spirits from entering the burial urn. My colleague, Professor Takashima Jun 高島淳, of the Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, kindly provided a tentative transcription of the text in an email dated 13 September 2004. A photograph of the text was published in Tōkyō Gaikokugo Daigaku Ajia Afurika Gengo Bunka Kenkyūjo Ed., (2005), p. 40. Taking into consideration the mistakes in the orthography of the original, Dr. Mak has kindly emended the text as shown below and provided an English translation.

Transcription: “*om visphuradakṣa vajrapañcara hūṃ phat*”

Emendation: “*om visphurad rakṣa vajrapañjara hūṃ phat*”

Translation: “*Om!* Protect by darting asunder! Oh, the Diamond Net *vajrapañjara* 金剛網) ! *Hūṃ!* *Phat!*”

Dr Mak suggests that it may be connected to the *Vajrapañjara Tantra*, sometimes translated as the “Indestructible Tent Tantra”, email from Dr Mak dated 19 September 2017.



Figure 3. The text of the *Uṣṇīśavijayadhāraṇī* in nāgarī script on the reverse side of Inscription. According to decipherment by Dr. Bill Mak, the text begins with "... siṣṭāya buddhāya", ending with "nāma dhāraṇī samāpadam [sic] iti" plus the additional *bīja* letters "om am svāhā". He notes that the inking of the letters in black is rare, although colouring with red and black ink is found in a number of Ming specimens. The content of this text is practically identical to other *Uṣṇīśavijayadhāraṇī* from Yunnan, as deciphered by Walter Liebenthal (1947a), (1947b) and (1955), and more recently by Oskar von Hinüber (1989). Dr. Mak points out that a comparison with other specimens from Yunnan reveals that the textual content of the *Uṣṇīśavijayadhāraṇī*, on the reverse side of Inscription, resembles that of the late Ming type reported by Liebenthal (1955). The key characteristic of the late Ming type was the inclusion of the *bīja* letter "bhūmī" in the text, as seen in the first row of this photograph, after the letter "om".

on the grounds of a lack of corroborative evidence. Likewise, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the *Inscription*.

I discussed the *Inscription* in a paper presented at the Sixth International Symposium on the Chinese Tusi System and Culture held at Yongshun 永順, Hunan, on 22 October 2016, and no participants raised concerns about its value as a historical source.<sup>17</sup> The format of the text resembles other mid-15th century tombstone inscriptions from Dali, especially in the recording of female offspring and their marriage unions. Also, the place names in the *Inscription* can be verified by other sources.

reverse side of the *Inscription*, 追為顯考康公諱賜好謙神主, confirm Kang Haoqian as the dedicatee, corroborating that this *Uṣṇīśavijayadhāraṇī* matches the deceased recorded in the Chinese text on the front side.

As protégés of the Duan family, it is not surprising that the *Yuan History* failed to record Kang Min and his sons. Extant sources only scantily described the activities of their illustrious patrons, the Duan, during the Mongol-Yuan period, not to speak of upstart migrant families like the Kangs. Single steles recording valuable information about local history are common amongst pre-Ming historical materials for Yunnan. For instance, the renowned stele, *Cuan Longyan Bei* 穢龍顏碑, is the only source documenting the political career of Cuan Longyan 穢龍顏 (386-446), a local magnate whom the Jin 晉 and Liu Song 劉宋 dynasties appointed to administer Jianning Prefecture in Ningzhou 寧州建寧郡 (today's Qujing City 曲靖市 in eastern Yunnan). No standard history ever recorded his name and his appointment to the offices listed in this stele (Kajiyama, 2017). Numerous *stelae* from the Yuan to the Ming included in the *Dali Congshu Jinshi Pian* 大理叢書金石篇 (DCJP Collected Materials on Dali: Epigraphy Volumes) recorded unique data, yet historians do not query their veracity as valuable sources simply

<sup>17</sup> For the published version of this conference paper, see Tang Li (2017), pp. 15-19.

## Restoration of the Duan family

One event, hitherto overlooked, yet vitally important for comprehending Mongol-Yuan strategies to acquire former territories of the Dali Kingdom in northern Southeast Asia, was their relationship with the once deposed Duan royal family. Möngke restored temporal power to the last King Duan Xingzhi 段興智 in 1255, and revived his Sanskrit regal title *maharajā* (*maheluocuo* 摩訶羅嵯) in 1256.<sup>18</sup> The title *maharajā* conneded Duan Xingzhi's role as a *cakravartin*, or universal ruler, with an ancestry consecrated by the weight of history; the Duans were a royal family reincarnated from a Maitreya Buddha descended from the *Tuṣita* heaven.<sup>19</sup> Mongol-Yuan recognition of this title reinstated his religious and temporal authority (and presumably that of his descendants too), a political resource that facilitated their administration of Yunnan. To further this purpose, Möngke invested Duan Xingzhi with authority to control local peoples described as the various barbarians (*zhuman* 諸蠻), white *Cuan* 白爨 and other tribes (*dengbu* 等部). Möngke also assigned the youngest brother of Xingzhi's father, Duan Fu 段福, to lead the indigenous armies. Duan Xingzhi responded enthusiastically to demands from the Mongol-Yuan. He handed over power to his younger brother Duan Shi 段實 (also known as Duan Juri 段苴日; incumbent 1261-1282), and set out to recover polities formerly subordinate to the Dali kingdom, with Duan Fu at the head of a 20,000-man strong

<sup>18</sup> We learn from the *Yuan History*, Möngke appointed “Duan Xingzhi to take charge of state affairs (*yi Duan Xingzhi zhu guoshi* 以段興智主國事)” after the conquest of Dali, in recognition for the loyalty he displayed by presenting maps, requesting the pacification of ethnic groups, and suggesting policies for administration and taxation in 1255, see YS, 166. 3910. Neither Hayashi (1996), nor Fang Hui 方慧 (2001), pp. 48–52, pointed out the important role played by the restored Duan Family in managing polities formerly subordinate to them. Fang Hui summarised the contribution of the Duan family to Mongol-Yuan rule as assisting in the conquest of local leaders, participating in the campaign against the Tran Dynasty of Annam, and aiding them overthrowing the Southern Song.

<sup>19</sup> Zhang Xilu (1991), p. 183-184, interpreted the restoration of the *maharajā* title as signifying that Duan Xingzhi was “a great tantric king (*mijiao dawang* 密教 大王)”. Judging from the *Nanzhao Tuzhuan* (12th or 13th century copy), *maharajā* referred to the Mahayana tradition of kingship. This scroll depicted Menglonghao 蒙隆昊 or Longshun 隆舜 (reigned 877-?), the twelfth Nanzhao King, barefooted with his hair in a topnot and his hands cupped, waiting to be consecrated with water 灌頂 and pronounced monarch in front of a statue of Guanyin (Avalokitesva Bodhisattva 觀世音菩薩). An inscription in Chinese beside Longshun identified him as the “*maharajā* 摩訶羅嵯, the local *cakravartin* (*tu lunwang* 土輪王)”, who “accepts responsibility for the good and the mean, and requests all four quarters come together as one family 擔界謙[慊]賤, 四方請為一家”, see Li Liancan (1982), p. 137. The *Fanxiang juan* 梵像卷 of c. 1180 also illustrated a *maharajā* about to be consecrated with water before being declared king, see illustration 55 in Li Liancan (1982), p. 96. The coupling of the terms *maharajā* and *cakravartin* indicates the existence of the Mahayana tradition of kingship in Yunnan from the later 9th century, at least. Apart from inferring that the king was a universal monarch (世界大王) and a king of kings (王中之王), the term *cakravartin* 轉輪王 also signified that the king had assumed the form of a Bodhisattva Maitreya 彌勒菩薩 to found and rule his royal kingdom according to Hindu or Buddhist beliefs. Ku Cheng-mei (2016), p. 245, pointed out that this tradition of kingship was a characteristic feature of Mahayana Buddhist kingship in her study of the King of Dvaravati.

Bo 梠 and Cuan 穢 army, serving as the vanguard for the battle-hardened Mongol commander, Uriyangqadai (兀良合台 d. 1272).<sup>20</sup> Although the restoration of the Duan family stabilised the Dali region, it took the Mongol-Yuan until about 1274 to overcome local leaders in the Shanchan 善闡 (Kunming) area (Herman 2007, 48-49).

These are the events surrounding the escalation of the deposed Duan royal family to the highest ranking native office in western Yunnan. Unofficial histories (*yeshi* 野史) refer to them as the Duan Family General Administrator (*Duan shi zongguan* 段氏總管), a hereditary office headed by a total of twelve Duan men during the Mongol-Yuan period. Hayashi Ken'ichirō (林謙一郎) divides Duan family administration history into three periods, and empirically demonstrates that the term *Duan shi zongguan* actually included two different administrative titles, one civil and one military.<sup>21</sup>

The first period encompassed the first twenty years of Mongol-Yuan rule, from 1253 to 1273, prior to the foundation of Yunnan province in 1276. By restitution of temporal and religious authority as *Maharajā*, Duan Family General Administrators redeemed some measure of control over their former territories, or spheres of influence. This benefited the Mongol-Yuan by facilitating the mobilisation of Duan-led “Cuan-Bo armies” (爨僰軍) to eradicate resistance in Yunnan, and aided the conquest of the Southern Song. Some Cuan-Bo troops even settled in Hunan (湖南), where their descendants still reside today (Hayashi 2016, 378-379).

The second period lasted from 1274 until c. 1330. After the foundation of Yunnan Province 雲南行省, the Mongol-Yuan rescinded the Duan entitlement to govern the whole of Yunnan on their behalf, and confined their administrative power to western Yunnan, which included Mon-Khmer and proto-Tai/Tai areas *en route* to the Upper Ayeyarwaddy. Two different hereditary offices established at this time attested to this rearrangement. The title of the first office was the General Administrator of the Dali Route (*Dali lu zongguan* 大理路總管), bestowed on Duan Shi in 1274 (YS,166.3910); incumbents of this office were also known as the Military-cum-Civilian General Administrator of the Dali Route (*Dali lu junmin zongguan* 大理路軍民總官). The title of the second office was the Pacification Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of Dali, Jinchi and Other Places (*Dali Jinchi deng chu Xuanweishi Duyuanshuai* 大理金齒等處宣慰使都元帥), and its holder served as a military officer responsible for western Yunnan, including Dali, Jinchi and proto-Tai/Tai territories.<sup>22</sup>

Duan males headed both hereditary offices, which they passed down, either from brother to brother, or from uncle to nephew. Hayashi argues that this dual structure constituted the backbone of restored Duan political power, and he cites three pairs of appointments (1) Duan Xingzhi and Duan Fu; (2) Duan Zhong 段忠 (incumbent 1283)

<sup>20</sup> YS, 166.3910 refers to Duan Juri as *Xinjuri* 信苴日.

<sup>21</sup> Unless otherwise noted, the periodisation and source material is based on written comments presented by Hayashi Ken'ichirō at the Historical Development of the Plains and Hills Bordering Southwest China and Southeast Asia Zomia Study Group Special International Workshop, at Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 13 January 2017.

<sup>22</sup> YS, 166.3911 recorded the bestowal of this title on Duan Shi's son, Duan Aqing 段阿慶. For the dates of Duan Zheng and Duan Aqing, see Fang (2001), p. 8.

and Duan Qing 段慶 (incumbent 1284-1306); and (3) Duan Qing and Duan Zheng 段正 (incumbent 1307-1316).<sup>23</sup> A stele, *Jiafeng Kongzi Shengzhao Bei* 加封孔子聖詔碑 (dated 1309), discovered at Dali in 1984 and now held at the Dali City Museum, recorded Duan men contemporaneously assigned to these two offices: namely Duan Zheng, who was appointed as Brilliant Awe-Inspiring General and the Military-cum-Civilian General Administrator of the Dali Route 明威將軍大理路軍民總管, and Duan Qing, who was appointed as Realm Protecting Generalissimo and Pacification Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of Dali, Jinchi and Other Places 鎮國上將軍大理金齒等處宣慰使都元帥. According to Hayashi, these two titles represent a dual system of organisation, the first civilian and the second military.<sup>24</sup> He also hypothesises that this division of power may date back to 1255/56 when the Mongol-Yuan assigned Duan Xingzhi to manage state affairs, and Duan Fu to lead Cuan and Bo armies.

The third period started in 1331 and ended in 1381 with the collapse of the Mongol-Yuan regime in Yunnan. Due to disorder, and reduced capability, the provincial authorities lost control over Yunnan, and political power fell into the hands of the two Mongol imperial princes (蒙古宗王): the Yunnan King 雲南王 at Dali and the Liang Prince 梁王 at Kunming. The Duan family gained potency during these troubled times, and even styled themselves “the Duans of the Great Houli Kingdom 大後理國”.<sup>25</sup> They stood united in their collaboration with the Mongol-Yuan until power struggles erupted within the Duan, widening fissures among family members during the late 1320s; the assassination of Duan Gong 段功 (incumbent 1345-1366) by the Liang Prince in Kunming eventually caused the entire family to embrace an anti-Mongol-Yuan stance (Hayashi, 1996, 9-13; 28).

Restoration after 1255 authenticated Duan family governance over proto-Tai/Tai ethnic groups, known as Jinchi 金齒 (literally, “golden teeth”) and Baiyi 百夷/白衣/白夷 (Daniels, 2000. 54-58). The title, Pacification Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of Dali, Jinchi and Other Places, manifested the historical associations of the Duan with the Mon-Khmer and proto-Tai/Tai. Duan Shi, the first General Administrator, governed Tengyue 謄越 (today’s Tengchong 謄衝), strategically located for controlling the Upper Ayeyarwaddy region (YS, 166. 3910; Fang, 2001, 8). Although Mongols, such as Hülegü (Hugechi 忽哥赤), brother of Qubilai Qan, also oversaw the Jinchi area bordering Tengyue,<sup>26</sup> the Mongol-Yuan relied heavily on the Duan to control the Jinchi / Baiyi. The mobilisation of Bo and Cuan forces to support the wars against the Jinchi / Baiyi, sometime between 8 November and

<sup>23</sup> Hayashi (1996), pp. 9-13.

<sup>24</sup> The civilian title was Military-cum-Civilian General Administrator of the Dali Route 大理路軍民總管, Assistant Grand Councillor 參政 and Administrator 平章 in the Branch Secretariat while the military title was that of a Pacification Commissioner.

<sup>25</sup> Based on Hayashi’s written comments mentioned above.

<sup>26</sup> Qubilai Qan assigned his brother, Hülegü (Hugechi 忽哥赤), the King of Yunnan, to take charge of Dali, Shanchan, Chahanzhang 茶罕章 and Chituge’er 赤禿哥兒 on 15 October 1267 (Zhiyuan 至元 4/9/gengxu). Chahanzhang refers to the white barbarians, or Baiman 白蠻, on both sides of the Jinsha river 金沙江 in north-west Yunnan, see Fang Guoyu (1987), pp. 788-790. Chituge’er refers to the spirit barbarians 鬼蠻, or black barbarians wuman 烏蠻, in eastern Yunnan and western Guizhou, see Fang Guoyu (1987), pp. 791-793.

6 December 1276 (Zhiyuan 13/10) verifies the role played by the Duan. This campaign resulted in the capture of 40,000 households, the submission of 109 forts (*zhai* 篝) of the Heni 和泥 (ancestors of today's Hani), and the surrender of the native official, Pusi 翦思, and others (Su Tianjue, ed. 1987. 41: 46b, 1367–529). Deployment of Duan-led indigenous armies mitigated aggression by Mon-Khmer and Jinchi / Baiyi on the thoroughfares leading to the Indian ocean.

Before the conquest, the Dali court controlled leaders in frontier areas through a feudatory system of pledged alliances, which resembled “the halter and bridle policy (*jimi zhengce* 羈縻政策)” of the Tang and Song periods. For 317 years, twenty-two Dali Kings ruled over an assortment of ethnic groups: Baiman 白蠻, Wuman 烏蠻, Han 漢人, Mon-Khmer, Jinchi/ Baiyi, and others. They assigned elite noble Baiman families, such as the Duan, the Gao 高, the Yang 楊 and the Dong 董, to oversee people at the southern periphery, and permitted the hereditary transfer of appanages to descendants (Fang. 2015. 485–497). For instance, Gao Shengtai 高升泰, who wielded political power during the late 11th century, stationed family members at vital points along the communication routes in western Yunnan, and some descendants even held appointments until the arrival of the Mongol-Yuan. He assigned his nephew, Gao Mingliang 高明量, to build a city at Weichu 威楚 (today's Chuxiong 楚雄), and this place remained under family control until the time of Gao Changshou 高長壽.<sup>27</sup> In addition, the Gao family must have governed Tengyue, on the communication route to Mian and India, because Gao Jiu 高救 administered it in 1255 (YS, 61.1480). By controlling strategic positions, the Dali kingdom dominated local leaders on a north-south axis down to the Upper Ayeyarwaddy in the west and to the Upper Mekong in the east. The Mongol-Yuan laid claim to this area by utilising the political authority of the Duan and their associations with indigenous rulers cultivated over generations through the elite noble families assigned to oversee them.

Duan experience in managing the territory that overlapped with Mian (Pagan) controlled enclaves scattered along the banks of the Ayeyarwaddy river proved invaluable to the Mongol-Yuan. The monetary historian Kuroda Akinobu 黑田明伸 suggested that the Mongol-Yuan advance into Pagan territory derived from their desire to connect Yunnan with the Indian Ocean. He argued that Qubilai Qan's desire to create “a thoroughfare for an expansion of trade with Burma and India” by opening trade routes from Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal, constituted a part of the Mongol-Yuan grand scheme to expedite the circulation of silver at the upper levels of the economy over the entirety of Eurasia (Kuroda, 2009, 253–254; Rossabi, 1994, 418). Kuroda tabled evidence to demonstrate that economic links between Yunnan and the Bay of Bengal served as a medium for the inflow of silver into China. First, he points to the usage of cowries from the Maldivian islands as currency in Yunnan as proof of strong economic connections between Yunnan and Bengal, 1330–1350.<sup>28</sup> Second, he interprets the establishment of an administrative unit with an unwieldy title, Chief Military Command of the

<sup>27</sup> YS, 61.1460. Gao Zhisheng 高智昇 dispatched his grandson Gao Dahui 高大惠 to administer Beisheng Prefecture 北勝府, see YS, 61.1464.

<sup>28</sup> Kuroda (2009), pp. 253–254 hypothesised that Sylhet, which lay on the contemporary eastern frontier of Muslim rulers in Bengal, functioned as the gateway to Yunnan.

Pacification Commission of Pinya and Other Places with Supervisorate-in-Chief Attached (*Bangya Dengchu Xuanweisi Duyuanshuaifu Bing Zongguan Fu* 邦牙等處宣慰司都元帥府並總管府) at Pinya in Upper Burma on 18 January 1339 (Zhiyuan 4/12/wuxu) as facilitating the flow of silver from China to India, via Burma, from 1339 to the early 1360s.<sup>29</sup> Experience, accumulated over generations by the Duan, would have aided the setting up of administrative offices in these areas. Motives for mobilising the political resources of the Duan may also have stemmed, in part, from Mongol-Yuan concerns about potential threats to Yunnan from the south.

For the Duan, restoration signified more than mere titular restitution. The Gao family served as the Ministers of State (*xiangguo* 相國), and wielded considerable political clout from the early years of the Dali Kingdom period; their grip on administration constrained the Duan.<sup>30</sup> In fact, their influence grew so immense that contemporaries referred to them as “Gao, the masters of the state 高國主”. By appointing the Duan to the highest office in western Yunnan, the Mongol-Yuan clearly recognised them as the paramount local leaders, superior in rank to their adversaries, the Gao family. The Duan clearly emerged from the conquest as the undisputed heirs to the legacy of the Dali kingdom. This emboldened the second last head of the Duan Family General Administrator regime, Duan Bao 段寶 (incumbent 1366-1381), to request the invading Ming officials to recognise them as a dynasty named the Latter Li Kingdom 後理國 (Hayashi, 1996. 28). The investiture of Duan Shi as the first General Administrator in 1261 was important because it restored prestige to the family name, confirmed their legitimacy, and augmented their authority in local communities.

The Mongol-Yuan sorely needed Duan authority to enhance the administration of local peoples along the thoroughfares leading to the Indian ocean. The Mongol-Yuan system of governance divided Yunnan into Circuits (*dao* 道), Routes (*lu* 路), Sub-prefectures (*zhou* 州) and Counties (*xian* 縣); they appointed local leaders as native officials in newly conquered areas to head Pacification Offices (*xuanweisi* 宣慰司) and Routes (*lu* 路).<sup>31</sup> They assigned *daruyaci* (*dalu huachi* 達魯花赤) to oversee local

<sup>29</sup> YS.846. Kuroda is mistaken in locating Pinya in the Shan states. He noted that the stream of silver ceased with the “decay of Shan rule in Burma, and the collapse of the Mongol empire in China”. Kuroda (2009), pp. 255-256, surmised that the development of the Burma trade route through military means in 1338, together with the acquisition of stored silver from the Southern Song in 1276, explain the increase in silver during the late 13th and the first half of the 14<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>30</sup> For instance, a stele, dated 8 May 1376, recorded that during the pre-Mongol-Yuan period: “due to the distinguished meritorious service rendered by the Gao, [the Duan] appointed their descendants to prefectures, commanderies, sub-prefectures, and counties (*fujun zhoushian* 府郡州縣), and they built all the great monasteries on famous scenic mountains (*mingshan dacha* 名山大刹)”, see “Chongjian Yangpai Xingbao si xuzhi changzhu ji 重建陽派興寶寺續置常住記”, dated 8 May 1376 (Xuanguang 宣光6丙辰/4/guimao), DCJP, vol. 10, p. 8.

<sup>31</sup> YS, 91.2308 recorded: “The Pacification Commissions 宣慰司 are in charge of military and civilian matters, and are divided into Circuits (*dao* 道) for supervising commanderies and counties (*junxian* 郡縣). When the Secretariat 行省 issues administrative directives, they convey them to subordinate units, and when commanderies and counties have requests they report them to the

leaders, and stationed Mongol troops to ensure tighter control.<sup>32</sup> We know that local leaders, traditionally owing fealty to the Dali Kingdom from Dali down to the Upper Ayeyarwaddy, still recognised Duan overlordship, even after the conquest. Jinchi/ Baiyi envoys to the Mongol-Yuan Court in 1261 explained their political affiliation as “subordinate to the six *zhao* (*liuzhao* 六詔)”, or Dali kingdom, thus testifying to current allegiance to the Duan (Wang, 1498, 779; Daniels, 2000, 72). Mongol-Yuan reliance on the Duan recognised the historical connections of their forebears with local leaders. This arrangement facilitated the mobilisation of local troops in military campaigns against the Mian; it enabled the Mongol-Yuan to muster troops and gather provisions while on the march. Joint administration by Mongol-Yuan and the Duan laid the foundations for the thrust south towards the Indian ocean.

### Kang family males serving the Duan

The case of Kang Min provides an example of the Duan family providing personnel to staff native offices in Tai and Mon-Khmer polities at the margins of Mongol-Yuan control. Although written for Kang Min’s great grandson, Kang Haoqian, who was recruited by the Ming dynasty sometime after 1394, the *Inscription* recounted family history since Kang Min’s settlement in Zhaozhou, c. 1341. It enhances our understanding of Mongol-Yuan management of native officials in Yunnan precisely because it narrated official service rendered by three successive generations of Kang males.

The translation of the official careers of Kang Min and three male descendants, based on my amended text of the *Inscription*, follows:

The Instructor Mr. Kang, was posthumously bestowed the style Haoqian 好謙. His great grandfather, Kang Min, hailed from Gongchang 鞏昌 in Shaanxi.<sup>33</sup> He arrived in Dali [as a person in] embroidered uniform (*xiuyi* 裳衣) in the southern campaign at the beginning of the Zhizheng reign period during the former Yuan, and soon settled at Yanpingyin, on land conferred by the Duan family. He was assigned the “nominal office of Pacifier 宣慰名職” in the Babai Pacification

Secretariat. When military issues arise on the frontiers, they double as Chief Military Commands (Du Yuanshuai Fu 都元帥府), or merely serve as Military Commands (Yuanshuai Fu 元帥府).”

<sup>32</sup> Endicott-West (1989). pp. 44–63 emphasised the fragmentation and disorganisation that *daruyaci* brought to civil administration.

<sup>33</sup> Gongchang Prefecture 鞏昌府 was under the jurisdiction of Shaanxi Province during the Yuan and Ming dynasties, see Tan (1982), pp. 17–18 & pp. 56–60. It came under the jurisdiction of Gansu province during the Qing. According to the “Stele Recording the genealogy of the pedigree of the Kang family (*Kang shi diefu shixi jilue beiji* 康氏牒譜世系紀略碑記)” dated 1-29 October 1864 (Tongzhi 同治 3/9), Kang Min was “originally a person from Shaanxi who was ordered to come to pacify the Duan Family, and he was assigned the rank of Pacification Commissioner for his meritorious service , see DFGJ, pp. 210–211, for the text of this stele. The claim that the Mongol-Yuan sent Kang Min to pacify the Duan family is based on documentation provided by a descendent in the 19th century, but it is not substantiated by the *Inscription* of 1461.

Office; he assumed duty in winter, and returned [before] summer to avoid vapours and miasmas.

His wife, surnamed Yang 楊氏, bore two sons: Boren 伯仁 and Bohui 伯惠. Boren was assigned Confucian duties (*ruzhi* 儒職), educating and tutoring the male offspring of the Duan family. Bo Hui served as the Record Keeper (*zhupu* 主簿) of Qingdian county 慶甸縣, now renamed Shunning 順寧. Boren's wife, surnamed Li 李氏, bore two sons named Zhongyi 仲義 and Mengli 孟禮, and a daughter named Miaoxiu 妙秀. Zhongyi was appointed as the Administrative Clerk (*zhishi* 知事) of the Tengchong Route 滕衝路, and Mengli served as a Military Brigade Commander.<sup>34</sup> The daughter, Miaoxiu, married Wang Zhongren 王仲仁, a Company Commander (*Baifuzhang* 百夫長), and today their descendant holds the office of Centurion Commander (*Baihu* 百戶) of the Battalion (*Qianhusuo* 千戶所) at Taihe 太和 [county in Dali prefecture].

Zhongyi's wife, surnamed Yang 楊氏, bore their first son named Haoqian, a second son named Yuchenghai 榆城海, and six daughters named Huan 桓, Gui 貴, Man 滿, Xi 息, Shou 壽, and Jin 錦. They all married into magnate families, and some of [their husbands] were assigned duties as District Governors (*xianyin* 縣尹) and to assist with granaries (*zuolin* 佐廩).

Pure and sincere by nature, Haoqian studied diligently from an early age. When our sage dynasty fortuitously recovered Yunnan, it united all under heaven, and widely sought men of talent. In Hongwu *jiaxu* [1394], the Assistant prefect (*tongpan* 通判) of Dali prefecture, Zhao Yanliang 趙彥良 nominated him as a classicist (*mingjing* 明經), and sent him to the Ministry. He passed examinations at the Hanlin Academy, and apart from serving as an Assistant Instructor (*xundao* 訓導) at the Zhaozhou Confucian School in the prefecture, he attained distinction three times and returned to resume his duties at the School ....

教諭康公諱賜字好謙。先祖康旻，乃陝西鞏<sup>35</sup>昌人氏。前元至正年始，以繡衣征南至大理遂<sup>36</sup>居鴈平音<sup>37</sup>，段氏賜地，授以八百宣慰司，宣慰名職。因避煙瘴，冬任夏回。<sup>38</sup> 室娶楊氏，生男伯仁，伯惠。伯仁授以儒職，教授訓誨段氏子弟。伯惠授慶甸縣主簿，今改順寧是也。伯仁娶<sup>39</sup>李氏，生男曰仲義，曰孟禮，女曰妙秀。仲義任騰衝

<sup>34</sup> Junzhi Wanhu 軍職萬戶 may be an error for Junmin Wanhufu 軍民萬戶府, or Tribal Commander.

<sup>35</sup> Jin 晉 in the stele, but gong 鞏 in DFGJ and in Ma Cunzhao's c. 2004 transcription held by Ma Jianxiong 馬健雄 at HKUST.

<sup>36</sup> Sui 遂 in the stele and in the c. 2004 transcription, but zhu 逐 in DFGJ.

<sup>37</sup> Yan pingzhang 焉平章 in the stele. Ma Cunzhao copied the three characters as *yanpingyin* 雁（雁）平音 in his c. 2004 transcription. At the time of my first visit on 22 June 2015, Ma Cunzhao mentioned that in the ancient Bai language, *yanpingyin* means “flat land under the rocks”, and the place is now called *da pingchang* 大平場. DFGJ, p. 203, note 3 explained that the tract of land known as *yanpingyin* was held by the Duan family residing at “the prince’s city, the seat of power in Zhaozhou (*Zhaozhou zhishuo xinju cheng* 趙州治所信苴城)”, and it is for this reason that the text recorded its bestowal on Kang Min.

<sup>38</sup> In the c. 2004 transcription, Ma Cunzhao gave *ri* 曰. The stele standing now has *hui* 回.

<sup>39</sup> Qu 娶 in the stele, but *qu* 取 in DFGJ.

路知事，孟禮<sup>40</sup>授軍職萬戶。女妙秀嬪于百夫長王<sup>41</sup>仲仁，子孫見任太和千戶所百戶。仲義娶楊氏，生男長曰好謙，次曰榆城海；生女六人，曰桓，曰貴，曰滿<sup>42</sup>，曰息，曰壽，曰錦，皆嬪巨族，或仕縣尹<sup>43</sup>佐廩<sup>44</sup>之職。好謙天資純篤，早歲勤學。幸際聖朝克復雲南，混一區宇，旁求俊彥。洪武甲戌<sup>45</sup>，大理府通判趙公彥良，以明經舉送赴部，翰林院試中，除授本府趙州儒學訓導，三度<sup>46</sup>榮歸，復任本學。....

The *Inscription* testified that Kang Min along with three male descendants served as officials in Tai and Mon-Khmer polities under Mongol-Yuan administration. By documenting that members of this migrant family from North China served in polities at the southern edge of the Mongol-Yuan world, it verifies strong connections between their appointments and the Duan Family General Administrator regime. Important points include:

First, Kang family success depended on Duan munificence. The Duan granted Kang Min land at their own power base in Zhaozhou, either within, or close to, the demesne of the Huazang temple 華藏寺, which remained associated with Duan religious and political authority during Mongol-Yuan times. The Huazang temple, stood in Zhihua Village 芝華村 until its destruction by the Ming army during the conquest of 1382, an act which itself is prime evidence of the obliteration of vestiges of Dali kingdom elite culture by the chauvinist turn of the Ming.<sup>47</sup> Ma Cunzhao identified Snake mountain where *Inscription* was unearthed as part of the tract of land named Yanpingyin 鴈平音, originally bestowed on Kang Min by the Duan family.

As a centre of Buddhism during the Dali Kingdom period, the Huazang temple was patronised by the Dong family 董姓, practitioners of Acharya Buddhism, who for generations had served Dali Kings as state ritualists (*guoshi* 國師).<sup>48</sup> The Zhao 趙, the dominant family in Zhaozhou, maintained their own large temple, the Xiangguo temple 相國寺, located adjacent to Puhe 普和, the seat of Tianshui prefecture 天水郡, the name for Zhaozhou during the Dali kingdom period.<sup>49</sup> After the

<sup>40</sup> *Li* 礼 in the stele, but *li* 禮 in DFGJ.

<sup>41</sup> *Zhu* 主 in the stele, but *wang* 王 in DFGJ.

<sup>42</sup> *Man* 滿 in the stele and DFGJ, but *ye* 濱 in the c. 2004 transcription by Ma Cunzhao.

<sup>43</sup> *Yin* 尹 in the stele and DFGJ, but *li* 里 in the c. 2004 transcription by Ma Cunzhao.

<sup>44</sup> *Lin* 廩 in the stele, but *wei* 位 in the c. 2004 transcription by Ma Cunzhao and *hu* 扱 in DFGJ.

<sup>45</sup> *Xu* 戌 in the stele and DFGJ, but *wu* 戌 in the c. 2004 transcription by Ma Cunzhao.

<sup>46</sup> *Du* 度 in the stele, but *qing* 慶 in the c. 2004 transcription by Ma Cunzhao and DFGJ.

<sup>47</sup> According to the stele, *Zhaozhou Nanshan Da Facang Si Bei* 趙州南山大法藏寺碑, written by Dong Xian 董賢 and dated 12 August 1421 (Yongle 19/7/15), Prince Duan Xiang 段信苴祥, magistrate (*zhizhou* 知州) of Zhaozhou, arranged for the deposit of the Qiantang yinzao Sancheng Dacang 錢塘印造三乘大藏 at the Huacang temple during the Yuan period. Construction of the Facang temple began in 1392 after the destruction of the Huacang temple c. 1382, see DFGJ, pp. 44–45. DFGJ gives 錢塘 for Qiantang, but the stele standing in the Facang temple at Beitanqian 北湯天 that I saw on 5 July 2016 has 錢唐.

<sup>48</sup> The stele titled *Dong Shi Benyin Tulue Xu* 董氏本音圖略敍, dated 24 June – 3 July 1892 (Guangxu 光緒 18/6/shanghuan 上浣), chronicled the history of the Dong Family as state ritualists from the Nanzhao period to 1461, see DFGJ, pp. 94–99.

<sup>49</sup> YS, 61.1481 recorded that during the Nanzhao period the name was Zhaozhou, but the Duan

destruction of the temples patronised by the magnate Zhao and Dong families, the Ming converted the Bianzhi temple 遍知寺, located at the centre of the Zhaozhou basin, into a new religious centre.<sup>50</sup> Place of residence reveals close ties between the Kangs and Duans.

Second, government assignments for the four Kang males must have been arranged by the Duan. Kang Min's second son, Bo Hui, served as the assistant magistrate of Qingdian county, and his eldest grandson, Zhongyi, served as the Administrative Clerk of the Tengchong Route. Qingdian was a powerful Mon-Khmer polity that only submitted to the Mongol-Yuan during the Taiping period (1324 to 1327), and at that time, Tengchong still remained uninhabited by Chinese garrison troops (they only arrived in the 15th century), so Bo Hui and Zhongyi both ministered to the needs of newly conquered areas with sizeable populations of Mon-Khmer and other ethnic groups (Daniels, 2000, 60–63). His second grandson, Mengli, served as a Military Brigade Commander in an unspecified area, most likely with an indigenous population. Proficiency in written Chinese, a prerequisite for administrative communication, must have made Kang males attractive candidates for office.

Third, one possible reason for the Duan favouring Kang Min may have been related to his status as a person “in embroidered uniform”. Many Northern Chinese families became *genjiaoren* 根腳人, or men associated with the Mongols through “*huja’ar*” (historical connections to descendants of Chinggis Qan) after surrendering to the Mongol-Yuan and participating in the conquest of the Jin dynasty (Wang, 2016, 207). If Kang Min’s “embroidered uniform” status included “*huja’ar*”, the Duan may have prioritised him in accordance with the Mongol custom of privileging *genjiaoren* in the recruitment of civil and military officials.

Fourth, the Duan entrusted the education of their male offspring to Kang Min’s eldest son, Boren. This reveals deep bonds of affinity between the two families, and constitutes further evidence that literary proficiency proved an asset for the careers of Kang men.

Fifth, the *Inscription* celebrated the marriages of Kang Min’s female descendants to distinguished men. It applauded the betrothal of Zhongyi’s six daughters into magnate families, even detailed the official positions of their husbands, and proudly noted that a descendant of Bo Ren’s eldest daughter currently served as the Centurion Commander of the Battalion at Taihe county, Dali. Early Ming tomb inscriptions in western Yunnan commonly recorded daughters and grand-daughters by name, and delighted in mentioning their matches with men of prominent families.<sup>51</sup> Successful unions by female family members bespoke the glory and amplification of the Kang family

changed the name to Tianshui prefecture during the Dali Kingdom period.

<sup>50</sup> The stele, dated 14 August 1604 (Wanli 32/1/15) concerning the renovation of the Bianzhi temple 遍知寺, recorded that a monk, named Yinxuan 印玄, from the Gantong temple 感通寺 in Dali, rebuilt it during the early Ming. The Ming issued Yinxuan with a seal of office as a Sangha Official (*sengguan yin* 僧官印), see DFGJ, p. 244.

<sup>51</sup> Numerous tomb inscriptions from 1416 (Yongle 14) until 1490 (Hongzhi 3) recorded marriages by daughters and grand-daughters to prominent men, see DCJP, Vol. 10, pp. 31–67.

name, and reflected the extension of Kang connections beyond Zhaozhou. The careers of male and female descendants demonstrated how association with the Duan elevated the family status to the level of local luminaries within a few generations.

### Dali and Yongchang as bases for the conquest of the Mian

The Mongol-Yuan used Dali and Yongchang 永昌 as bases for launching campaigns against the plethora of large and small proto-Tai/Tai polities that blocked their advance to the Pagan kingdom and the Indian ocean. They launched small-scale campaigns against the Jinchi / Baiyi from 1254,<sup>52</sup> and gradually tightened control over them after 1261, but local leaders thwarted them by blocking thoroughfares<sup>53</sup> and, as already mentioned, Mongol-Yuan armies often had to rely on support from Duan-led Cuan and Bo forces. In addition, forests, precipitous mountains and the sub-tropical monsoon climate strained the capabilities of Mongol horsemen. In the upshot, the Mongol-Yuan did not succeed in establishing administrative offices in the Upper Ayeyarwaddy region until over thirty years later (c. 1286); the process proceeded at a glacial pace.<sup>54</sup> Thoroughfares doubled as supply lines, so the maintenance of safety on them was essential for securing provisions, guides and troops from the Duan and other local leaders.<sup>55</sup>

Closer supervision over the Jinchi / Baiyi by the Mongol-Yuan only became possible after the foundation of the Pacification Commission of the Jinchi and Other

<sup>52</sup> According to the *Yuan History*, they “continued conquering the Baiyi and other barbarians” immediately after the pacification of Dali in 1254, see *YS*, 61.1482.

<sup>53</sup> *YS*, 210.4656. recorded that “Pu 蒲 Bandits blocked the roads” in Jinchi territory when officials were dispatched from Yunnan between 19 November and 18 December 1275 (Zhiyuan 12/11) to enquire after the Mongol envoy, from Yunnan sent to Mian, who failed to return. A leader with the surname Pu, residing in the area near Tagaung, was among those who surrendered to Nasir ed-Din sometime between 28 October and 26 November 1277 (Zhiyuan 14/10). *YS*, 210.4657 recorded the submission of “4,000 households under the native official Pu Zhe of Qula 曲蠟蒲折”.

<sup>54</sup> Policies initiated c.1286 by the head of Yunnan province, Nasir ed-Din (Nasulading 納速刺丁), son of Qubilai Qan’s trusted Moslem Uighur minister, Sayyid Ejell (Saidianchi 賽典赤 (1211–1279), aided the Mongol-Yuan to keep routes towards the Upper Ayeyarwaddy region passable, thereby facilitating their access through Jinchi territory. According to *YS*, 14.288, his policies to “establish postal relay routes in Yunnan (開雲南驛路)” and “relax prohibitions concerning roads and routes, and allow people to travel back and forth (弛道路之禁、通民往來)” were finally approved by imperial decree on 28 April 1286 (Zhiyuan 23/4/ *gengzi*) after his death. Nasir ed-Din (Nasulading 納速刺丁) replaced his father, Sayyid Ejell, as head of the Yunnan Branch Secretariat in 1280, rising to the position of Manager of Government Affairs (*Pingzhang Zhengshi* 平章政事) in 1284, see *YS*, 125.3067.

<sup>55</sup> An example of the Duan providing logistical support for the Mongol-Yuan campaigns against the Mian appeared in a tombstone inscription, *Gu Dali Lu Chaiku Dashi Dong Yucheng Fu Muzhiming* 故大理路差庫大使董踰城福墓誌銘 dated 10 July 1337 (Zhiyuan 至元 3/6/12). This stele recorded that superiors (*shangsi* 上司) appointed a man named Dong Fu 董福, from a magnate family closely connected to the Duan with a pedigree dating back to the Nanzhao kingdom, to take charge of storing provisions for the punitive forces dispatched against the Mian (probably in 1287/8) at Longwei guan 龍尾關 at Dali, and he even collected taxes and conscripted labour for them in areas west of the Jinchi 金齒迤西, see DCJP, Vol.10, p. 20.

Places (*Jinchi dengchu xuanfusi* 金齒等處宣撫司) at Yongchang 永昌 in 1278.<sup>56</sup> This marked the culmination of a train of events dating back to the establishment of the first Pacification Commission (*anfu si* 安撫司) at an unknown location in 1261, and the separation of the Jinchi and the Baiyi into two East and West Route Pacification Commissions (*dong xi lianglu anfu si* 東西兩路安撫司) in 1271. The Mongol-Yuan converted the West Route into the Jianning Route 建寧路 and the East Route into the Zhenkang Route 鎮康路 in 1275, before setting up the six Route Commands (*Lu zongguanfu* 路總管府) in 1278 to oversee thoroughfares traversing former Dali kingdom territory to the Upper Ayeyarwaddy (YS, 61.1482).

To control newly conquered territories, the Mongol-Yuan frequently created Secretariats, which manifested strong military characteristics: some turned into permanent institutions, while others ended as transitory measures. The two Branch Secretariats inaugurated to vanquish the Mian were short-lived. The foundation date of the Branch Secretariat Inside the Mian (*Mianzhong xingzhong shusheng* 緬中行中書省) remains uncertain,<sup>57</sup> but after moving into Mian territory (location unknown) on 21 May 1288, it only functioned for two years before closure on 18 August 1290.<sup>58</sup> The Branch Secretariat for Conquering the Mian (*Zheng Mian xingzhong shusheng* 征緬行中書省) at Tagaung, lasted longer, for at least eighteen years, until 25 May 1303 (Dade 大德 7/5/ *bingshen*), when the army of 14,000 men returned to garrison in Yunnan (YS, 21.450–451; Luce, 1958. 163–164.). Despite its transitory existence, the Branch Secretariat for Conquering the Mian undoubtedly altered the balance of power in the Upper Ayeyarwaddy region.

<sup>56</sup> Yongchang came under Mongol-Yuan administration in 1274 when they established a prefecture (*zhou* 州); this prefecture was upgraded to a superior prefecture (*fu* 府) in 1278. It was subordinate to the Dali Route 大理路, and administered one county (*xian* 縣), Yongping county 永平縣, located east of the Mekong river, see YS, 61.1480. Note that Nasir ed-Din personally commanded punitive expeditions to the Upper Ayeyarwaddy in 1277 and 1279. The *Yuan History* recorded that Nasir ed-Din led a mixed force of more than 3,840 Mongol 蒙古, Cuan 犬, Bo 犛 and Mosuo 摩些 troops through the Jinchi area to reach Koncan / Kaungzin (Jiangtou), where he subdued numerous stockades and polities owing fealty to Xi An 細安, the leader of the Shenrou Route 深蹂酋首, sometime between 28 October and 26 November 1277 (Zhiyuan 14 tenth month), see YS, 210.4657. In 1279 (Zhiyuan 16), Nasir ed-Din “shifted his forces to Dali, and resisted (*di* 抵) the Jinchi, Pu 蒲, Piao 飄, Qula 曲蠟 and the Mian Kingdom 緬國 with the army. He summoned and pacified 300 barbarian villages, registered 120,200 households, fixed land taxes (*zufu* 租賦), set up post relay stages and garrison troops, and returned with twelve tame elephants which he submitted as tribute”, see the YS, 125.3067.

<sup>57</sup> Although the foundation dates remain unclear, the *Yuan History* confirms the existence of both Branch Secretariats. Wade (2009), pp. 31–32, pointed this out and cited YS, 210.4659. The first reference to the assignment of officials to the Mianzhong Branch Secretariat appeared in an entry for 3 April 1286 (Zhiyuan 23/2/ *jiachen*) in YS, 14.286, which recorded appointments as Left Grand Councillor (*Zuo chengxiang* 左丞相), Assistant Administrator (*Canzhi shengshi* 參知政事) and an Assistant Branch Secretariat (*Qian xing zhongshu sheng shi* 前行中書省事).

<sup>58</sup> The YS, 15.311 recorded: Imperial orders were issued “for setting up the Branch Secretariat inside Mian (*Mianzhong* 緬中 lit. inside Mian) under the control of the King of Yunnan to whom they had to report on 21 May 1288 (Zhiyuan 25/4/ *jiaxu*)”. According to the YS, 16.338: “the Branch Secretariat Inside Mian was abolished on 18 August 1290 (Zhiyuan 27/7/ *guichou*)”.

## Mongol-Yuan / Pagan wars and the Upper Ayeyarwaddy

For polities in the Upper Ayeyarwaddy region, 1277–1303 were troubled and difficult years. The entire period was blighted by intense political competition between the Mongol-Yuan and the Mian. Mongol-Yuan envoys first visited the Court at Pagan to demand submission in 1271, and accompanied Mian emissaries back to Yunnan sometime between 11 May and 8 June in the same year (YS, 210.4655). This occurred roughly seventeen years after Qubilai Qan toppled the Dali Kingdom. The very title of the Branch Secretariat, “Conquering the Mian (Zheng Mian 征緬)”, underscored the strong commitment of the Mongol-Yuan to invade the Pagan kingdom, the prominent power on the Ayeyarwaddy river, to secure safe passage to the Bay of Bengal.

The Mongol-Yuan waged two bloody wars with the Mian: the first in 1287/8 precipitated the decline of the Pagan dynasty, and the second from late January to early April 1301 ended as a debacle: Ava dynasty defenders repelled the invading Mongol-Yuan forces.<sup>59</sup> The commanders leading the defence of Ava in 1301 were ethnic Tai from central Burma, known to history as the Shan brothers. After the failure of the expeditionary force against Babai Xifu in early April 1303, Temür Qan (Chengzong 成宗, r. 1294–1307) decided to forsake Tagaung. According to Luce, the abandonment of Tagaung in April/May 1303 marked “the final triumph” for Ava because it loosened Mongol-Yuan control over the Upper Ayeyarwaddy.<sup>60</sup> It was the military prowess of the Tai in Central Burma and northern Thailand that compelled Mongol-Yuan forces to withdraw.

### Mongol-Yuan impact on polities at Tagaung, 1286–1303<sup>61</sup>

Tagaung was a place-name of quite wide application. Lying south of the junction of the Ayeyarwaddy and Maaw<sup>2</sup> မား (Shweli) rivers, it was conveniently located for shipping goods south, and offered excellent access to the Jinchi / Baiyi area (Moore, 2007, 188). Luce suggested that it probably controlled territory extending north to Koncan / Kaungzin and south to Nga Singu (Chinese: Anzheng Guo 安正國 / Azhengu 阿真谷) in the northern Mandalay district.<sup>62</sup> If so, Tagaung would have administered three, or four, of the so-called “five walled cities inside the Mian (*Mianzhong wucheng* 緬中五城)” scattered along the Ayeyarwaddy. It certainly administered Koncan / Kaungzin, Tagaung, Male (Chinese: Malai 馬來), and possibly Nga Singu.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Hsiao (1994), p. 501, interpreted the Mongol campaign against the Mian and Babai Xifu in 1301–3 during the reign of Temür Qan as not being for conquest, but for the punishment of the Mian for dethroning a king who had recognised Mongol-Yuan suzerainty, and Babai Xifu for their rapid expansion.

<sup>60</sup> Luce (1958), pp. 150–164, related these events based on Chinese and Burmese sources.

<sup>61</sup> I follow the Romanization system for Tai words set out in Shintani (2000), and use modern Dehong font to write Tai words for the Upper Ayeyarwaddy and Dehong areas.

<sup>62</sup> Luce (1959), p. 59, wrote that Tagaung extended from Male on the west bank of the Ayeyarwaddy in Shwebo district down to Ngasingu in the north of Mandalay district.

<sup>63</sup> Shao (2002), 42: 46a, p. 641, and Zhang (1995), 46, p. 1191, recorded the “five walled cities inside the Mian”. According to the 1510 edition of the *Yunnan Gazetteer*, the five cities in the

The year 1283 was an *annus mirabilis* for the Mongol-Yuan. They conquered the Mian city of Koncan / Kaungzin between 21 November and 19 December (Zhiyuan 20/11), killing over 10,000 people in the process. Next, Mongol-Yuan forces proceeded to attack the Tagaung city of the Kantū 建都太公城, leaving the Commander-in-Chief 都元帥, Yuan Shian 袁世安, to guard Koncan / Kaungzin with its grain and other provisions 糧餉 (YS, 210.4658). Yehandijin 也罕的斤, Assistant Administrator 參知政事 of Yunnan, attacked “the various rebellious barbarians 諸叛蠻” occupying Tagaung in retaliation for murdering monk emissaries sent to negotiate. Kantū, and the twelve cities of Jinchi and others (Jinchi *deng* shier cheng 金齒等十二城) eventually capitulated. Officials reported vanquishing the Kantū King 建都王, Wumeng 烏蒙, and twelve seats of the Jinchi to Qubilai Qan on 5 February 1284 (Zhiyuan 21/1/dingmao).<sup>64</sup> This train of events bore great significance for proto-Tai/Tai polities.

First, the conquest terminated Mian domination of the region. Tactically situated, Tagaung, known in Tai Chronicles as Weng<sup>2</sup> Taa<sup>4</sup> König<sup>1</sup> မြို့မြို့မြို့မြို့မြို့ (literally “drum ferry city”) lay west of two important Tai polities, Mäng<sup>2</sup> Mit<sup>6</sup> မြို့မြို့မြို့ (Chinese: Mengmi 蒙密<sup>65</sup>) and Mogok (Tay: Mäng<sup>2</sup> König<sup>2</sup> မြို့မြို့မြို့ Chinese: Meng Gong 孟拱). Tai scholars in Dehong have interpreted the term “drum ferry” to signify a river crossing point for the accumulation [of goods] (Dehongzhou daixue xuehui, 2005. 45). Its location facilitated trade with India via land routes connecting points west, and to the Indian ocean via the Ayeyarwaddy. Luce argued that Tagaung functioned as the centre of the Kantū (Kadu, Old Burmese Kantū, Chinese: Jiandu 建都) polity, which together with the Sak polity, once extended west to the Manipur Valley. Evidence for domination by Pagan comes from the *Dhammarājaka* inscription of 1196, which recorded that King Narapatisithu (1173-1210) claimed to rule as far north as Takon (Tagaung) and the fort of Na-chon-khyam (Ngahsaungchan, near Bhamo). Luce interpreted this to indicate that “the Kadus had, partially at least, submitted” to Pagan by 1196. The first appearance of the toponym, Koncan (Kaungzin), in inscriptions in 1236 led Luce to conclude that Burmese Mahāsaman, or governors, maintained firm control “down to Dec 9th 1283 when the Mongol-Yuan captured Koncan, including doubtless Na-chon-khyam mruiw or fortress” (Luce, 1959, 57-60; Luce, 1985, 38-46). The *Yuan History* corroborated his view; “though embracing the desire, Jiandu was unable to submit because the Mian controlled them” (YS, 13.263). The Mongol-Yuan conquest of 1283 ended over eighty years of overlordship by Mian.

Second, the conquest of Koncan / Kaungzin and the foundation of the Branch Secretariat for Conquering the Mian at Tagaung ruined the old Kadu polity beyond repair. The *Yuan History* recorded that the Kadu polity controlled the “twelve seats of the Jinchi”, so it must have encompassed a sizeable proto-Tai population. Luce,

former territory of the Miadian Military and Civilian Pacification Commissioner Office 緬甸軍民宣慰使司 included Pagan [*Pukam*] (Pugan guo 蒲甘國) as well as “Koncan / Kaungzin 江頭, Tagaung 太公, Male 馬采, and Anzheng guo 安正國”, see Peng Gang & Zhou Jifeng (1990), pp. 577-578.

<sup>64</sup> *YS*, 133.3227 and *YS*, 13.263.

<sup>65</sup> This Chinese term appeared in the *Baiyiguan Laiwen* 百夷館來文No. 15, see Izui (1949), pp. 276-277.

interpreted its annihilation as paving the way for proto-Tai (Jinchi / Baiyi) migration, thereby upsetting the power balance among non-Mian ethnic groups. In his own words, “the Shan torrent which swept westwards, drove the Chins from their old homes in the Chindwin valley (“Hole of the Chins”) back into the western hills” (Luce, 1958, 136).

Third, the Mongol-Yuan opened up three major communication routes to mainland Southeast Asia, all radiating out from the Jinchi stronghold at Yongchang 永昌, known as Wan<sup>2</sup> Sang<sup>1</sup> 𠀤𠀤 𠀤 in Tai Chronicles.<sup>66</sup> It had two toponyms in Yuan times: Jinchi and Yongchang. According to Marco Polo, Jinchi denoted the “province called Zardandan”, a Persian word meaning “gold teeth”, with its capital at Vochan, or Yongchang (Yule 2012, 204). Table 1 lists polities located along three thoroughfares linking Yongchang and Tagaung. The Tai polity of Mäng<sup>2</sup> Khä<sup>2</sup> 𠀤𠀤 𠀤 𠀤 emerged from ① Rouyuan Route, and straddling the Salween river, it controlled the vital crossing at the Lujiang 潞江 ferry.

The first thoroughfare passed through today’s Dehong 德宏 region, after crossing the Salween at ①. Travellers traversed Longling County 龍陵縣 (Tay: Mäng<sup>2</sup> Long<sup>4</sup> 𠀤 𠀤 𠀤) and then entered the Shan plateau from either Mangshi 芒市 (Tay: Mäng<sup>2</sup> Khön<sup>1</sup> 𠀤 𠀤 𠀤 𠀤), Zhefang 遮放 (Tay: Ce<sup>4</sup> Faang<sup>1</sup> 𠀤 𠀤 𠀤), Wanding 瞞町 (Tay: Wan<sup>2</sup> Teng<sup>4</sup> 𠀤 𠀤 𠀤) or the Ruili 瑞麗 basin (Tay: Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup> 𠀤 𠀤 𠀤 𠀤) before reaching the Ayeyarwaddy river. Polities located along this path included ② Mangshi Route, ⑤ Pingmian Route, ⑥ Luchuan Route, and ⑨ Tianbuma.

On the second itinerary, travellers arrived at Tengchong 謩衝 (Tay: Mäng<sup>2</sup> Mën<sup>2</sup> 𠀤 𠀤 𠀤 B: Momien) after crossing the Salween and heading west. They reached Bhamo (Tay: Maan<sup>5</sup> Mo<sup>3</sup> 𠀤 𠀤 𠀤) on the Ayeyarwaddy from Tengchong, by either continuing directly west via ④ Zhenxi Route, or by turning south and passing through Lianghe 梁河 (Tay: Mäng<sup>2</sup> Ti<sup>2</sup> 𠀤 𠀤 𠀤; Chinese: Nandian 南甸), Yingjiang 盈江 (Tay: Mäng<sup>2</sup> Naa<sup>5</sup> 𠀤 𠀤 𠀤; Chinese: Gan’ai 干崖). Polities located along this route included Nandian, ⑪ Gan’e, ⑥ Luchuan Route and ⑦ Nanshan. The Mongol-Yuan set out to subjugate polities along these thoroughfares sometime between 28 April and 26 May 1275 (Zhiyuan 12/4), when they learnt that the city of Koncan / Kaungzin could be accessed from the second and third thoroughfares by passing through Tianbuma 天部馬/天步馬, Piaodian 飄甸 and the territory of A Guo 阿郭.<sup>67</sup>

The third was the eastern thoroughfare via ③ Zhenkang Route, that passed southward through present day Yongde County 永德縣, and Maliba 麻栗壩 in the Shan State, thence to Laos and Northern Thailand by turning east, or to the Ayeyarwaddy river, by crossing the Salween and traversing the polity of Sën<sup>1</sup>wi<sup>2</sup> 𠀤 𠀤 𠀤 (Hsenwi; Chinese: Mubang 木邦, B: Theinni).

<sup>66</sup> The *Baiyiguan Zazi* 百夷館雜字, a Sino-Tai vocabulary of circa the late 16th century, listed Wan<sup>2</sup> Sang<sup>1</sup> as no. 65 wang c’ang 挽唱, giving the Chinese equivalent as Jinchi 金齒, see Izui (1949), 219. Wan<sup>2</sup> 𠀤 𠀤 means “day”, or “the sun”, and sang<sup>1</sup> 𠀤 𠀤 means “what”, so this toponym literally means “what day”?

<sup>67</sup> YS, 210.4656. The territory of A Guo probably included Nandian and ⑪ Gan’e.

## Jinchi / Baiyi polities c. 1260 –1303

A patchwork of quarrelsome, variously sized polities dotted the landscape from Yongchang down to Tagaung. The Mongol-Yuan went to great lengths to avoid overstepping supply lines southward by appointing local leaders as native officials. But allegiances pledged by Jinchi and Baiyi leaders, as early as 1260, by no means guaranteed prolonged peace. They attacked Mian and Mongol-Yuan alike, demonstrating that Jinchi and Baiyi sometimes briefly stopped warring among themselves to define a common enemy.<sup>68</sup> Mon-Khmer speakers, known as Pu 蒲 bandits, also blocked roads (Wade, 2009, 34.). Security could not always be guaranteed, and thoroughfares from Yongchang to Tagaung were fraught with danger. The Mongol-Yuan had to keep them open by coercion.

In this section, I identify the pro-Tai and Tai polities that lined the communication routes from Yongchang to Tagaung. Table 1 lists a total of eleven polities, and a breakdown by dominant ethnicity reveals four Jinchi, six Baiyi, and one unidentified polity. The Mongol-Yuan organised dominant local leaders and their regimes into Route Commands (*lu* 路), and I interpret Route Commands as representing larger polities.

The Jinchi controlled three of the six Route Commands set up in 1276: ① Rouyuan Route (Bo Barbarian), ② Mangshi Route (Mangshi Barbarian), and ③ Zhenkang Route (Black Bo Barbarian). Suzerainty over the fourth Jinchi polity, ⑪ Gan'e 千額,<sup>69</sup> became a bone of contention between the Mongol-Yuan and the Mian. Although the Jinchi polities of Gan'e and Nandian were originally feudatory to Mian, the native official of Gan'e, A He 阿禾, later switched allegiance to the Mongol-Yuan. Another Jinchi leader named A Bi 阿必, who guided the Mongol-Yuan envoy to Mian sometime between 31 March and 28 April 1272 (Zhiyuan 至元9/3), followed in his footsteps. Outraged by these acts of infidelity, the Mian retaliated by plundering Nandian in 1276, and even attacked A He with the intention of building stockades (*zhai* 寨) between Tengchong and Yongchang sometime between 5 April and 4 May 1277 (Zhiyuan 14/3).<sup>70</sup>

Baiyi dominated a total of six polities. Four fell under three of the Six Routes and one auxiliary territory (④ Zhenxi Route, ⑤ Pingmian Route, and ⑥ Luchuan Route, and ⑦ Nanshan). They shared ⑦ with the Echang 峨昌 (today's Achang 阿昌, Burmese: Maingtha), whom Luce identified as proto-Burmese speakers dwelling

<sup>68</sup> YS, 210.4659 recorded that plundering by the Jinchi prevented Mian envoys, dispatched by the three Shan Brothers between 2–30 April 1299 (Dade 3/ 3), from presenting gold and silk 金幣 to the Mongol-Yuan court. Also, Jinchi and Baiyi waylaid and obstructed the Mongol-Yuan army retreating from its abortive attack on Myinzaing in 1301. Casualties ran so high that Temür Qan ordered a punitive expedition against them (YS, 20.436–437).

<sup>69</sup> The original has Qian'e 千額, but, as Wade (2009), p. 25, pointed out, *qian* must be mistake for *gan* 千.

<sup>70</sup> Shiratori (1950), pp. 70–75. According to YS, 210.4656–4657, the Mongol-Yuan court ordered the subjugation of intractable Pu 蒲, Piao 飄, Achang 阿昌 and Jinchi 金齒 tribes around Tengyue. The force of 700 soldiers, stationed at Nandian 南甸, were outnumbered by the Mian, whose army had 40,000 to 50,000 men, 800 elephants and 10,000 horses.

Table 1 Polities Located Between Yongchang and Tagaung, 1260~1303

	<i>Polity Name</i>	<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Year of Submission</i>	<i>Year of Appointment</i>	<i>Location and Territory</i>	<i>Source</i>
①	Rouyuan Route 柔遠路	Bo Barbarians 僰人蠻	Abasi 阿八思 visited Yuan Court in 1260 (Zhongtong 中統1)	1276 (Zhi- yuan 至 元 13)	Lies South of Yongchang. Ter- ritory: Lujiang 潞 江, Puping jian 普 坪瞞, Shenjian Bozhai 申瞞僰蠻 寨, Wumo ping 烏 摩坪	YS, 61. 1482.
②	Mangshi Route 茫施路	Mangshi Barbarians 茫施蠻	1260 (Zhong- tong 1)	1276 (Zhi- yuan 至 元 13)	Lies South of Rouyuan Route 柔遠路 west of the Lu Jiang 潞江 (Salween River). Territory; Numou 怒謀, Da Kushan 大枯暎 and Xiao Kushan 小枯暎.	YS, 61. 1482.
③	Zhenkang Route 鎮康路	Occupied by Black Bo Barbarians 黑 僰人蠻 蠻	1260 (Zhong- tong 1)	1276 (Zhi- yuan 至 元 13)	Lies South of Rouyuan Route 柔 遠路 west of the Lan Jiang 蘭江 (Mekong River). Territory; Shishan 石暎	YS, 61. 1482~3.
④	Zhenxi Route 鎮西路	Occupied by Baiyi barbar- ians 白夷蠻.	1260 (Zhong- tong 1)	1276 (Zhi- yuan 至 元 13)	Lies directly west of Rouyuan Route 柔遠路 and adjoins Luchuan 麓川 on its eastern side. Ter- ritory; Yulaishan 于賴暎 and Qulan shan渠瀾暎	YS, 61. 1483.
⑤	Pingmian Route 平 緬路	Occupied by Baiyi 白夷.	1260 (Zhong- tong 1)	1276 (Zhi- yuan 至 元 13)	To the north it is close to Rouyuan Route 柔遠路. Territory: Piaoshan 驃暎, Luobi Sizhuang 羅必四庄, Xiao Shamong 小沙摩弄, and Piaoshantou 驃暎 頭	YS, 6. 1483.

	<i>Polity Name</i>	<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Year of Submission</i>	<i>Year of Appointment</i>	<i>Location and Territory</i>	<i>Source</i>
⑥	Luchuan Route 麓川路	All territory occupied by Baiyi 白夷	1260 (Zhongtong 1)	1276 (Zhiyuan 至元 13)	Lies west <sup>1</sup> of Mangshi Route 茫施路 Territory: Dabumang 大布茫, Shantou Fu Sai 眇頭附賽, Shanzhong Danji 眇中彈吉, Shanwei Fulupei 眇尾福祿培	YS, 61. 1483.
⑦	Nanshan 南睞	Occupied by the Baiyi 百夷 and Echang 峨昌.	Early Yuan	1278 (Zhiyuan 至元 15)	Lies northwest of Zhenxi Route 鎮西路 Territory: Asai Shan 阿賽睞, and Wuzhen Shan 午真睞,	YS, 61. 1483.
⑧	Piaodian 驃甸	According to Luce Pyū (Piao 驃) <sup>2</sup>				YS, 210. 4656.
⑨	Tianbuma 天部馬/天步馬	According to Wade p. 25, <sup>3</sup> probably Baiyi 白夷				YS, 210. 4656 gives 天步馬, while Zheng Mian Lu gives 天部馬
⑩	Mang Nai Dian 忙乃甸	Daise, 塞 (T:Tai <sup>2</sup> Sä <sup>1</sup> or Tiger Tai, headman of the Baiyi) 白衣頭目 塞				Wade (2009), p.37. Original in YS, 210. 4658.
⑪	Gan'e 千額 (original has qian 千 which is a mistake for gan 千)	Commander-General of Gan'e under the Jinchi 金齒 千額總管				Wade (2009), p. 25.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> The original has “east”, but I follow Luce (1958) p.179, endnote 41 in considering it as a mistake for “west”.

<sup>2</sup> Luce (1958), p. 128, endnote 29.

<sup>3</sup> Wade (2009), pp. 17-49.

in the mid-Taiping 太平 (Da Yingjiang 大盈江) river area.<sup>71</sup> Polity ⑨Tianbuma was located near Nam<sup>6</sup> Kham<sup>2</sup> မာ် ခမ် (Chinese: Nankan 南坎) in the Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup> basin,<sup>72</sup> on the thoroughfare that led to Koncan / Kaungzin; it may have been ruled by Baiyi. The Baiyi polity ⑩ Mang Nai Dian was ruled by a leader named Tai<sup>2</sup> Sä<sup>1</sup> တော် စာ္မာ (Chinese: Daise 塞, literally Tiger [lineage] Tai); there is no evidence indicating genealogical connection with the Sä<sup>1</sup> (tiger) dynasty of Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup>. Sometime between 28 November and 26 December 1285 (Zhiyuan 22/11), Tai<sup>2</sup> Sä<sup>1</sup> blocked the route from Tagaung, denying free passage to the senior salt-well official Abi lixiang 阿必立相, an envoy dispatched by the Mian King to submit tribute 納款 to the Mongol-Yuan (YS, 210.4658; Wade, 2009, 37). Evidently, Tai<sup>2</sup> Sä<sup>1</sup> ran a polity near this strategically located city by the 1280s, and he aligned his polity with the Mongol-Yuan sometime between 21 November and 19 December 1283 (Zhiyuan 20/11) after the conquest of Koncan / Kaungzin (YS, 210.4658). The Mongol-Yuan trusted Mang Nai Dian as sufficiently loyal to utilise it as a military base in February 1287.<sup>73</sup>

### The Piaodian polity

Situated on one of the three thoroughfares to the Mian city of Koncan / Kaungzin, ⑧ Piaodian (same as Piaoshan listed in route ⑤) was an important polity for Tai history due to its alleged association with the ancestors of Sä<sup>1</sup>Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>5</sup>, the founder of Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup> (route ⑥). Its site at the confluence of the Maaw<sup>2</sup> and Ayeyarwaddy rivers, downstream from the Sä<sup>1</sup> dynasty at Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup>, facilitated communication with the Mian as well as areas west of the Ayeyarwaddy. Geographical location must have contributed to the rise of ⑧ Piaodian.

The location of Piaodian has only been convincingly identified since the 1980s. In 1950, Shiratori Yoshiro (白鳥芳郎 positioned it in the Longchuan 隴川 (Tay: Mäng<sup>2</sup> Wan<sup>2</sup> မှံမာ် သမာ်) basin,<sup>74</sup> while in 1958, Luce, independent of Shiratori, situated it on the north bank of the Taiping River, somewhere in today's Yingjiang county. Luce classified it as a small Pyü polity on the basis of the similarity between the Chinese word Piao and Pyü, but no source lends credence to his suggestion that Piaodian was settled by escapees from among the 3,000 prisoners captured at the former Pyü capital while being conveyed to Tuodong 拓東, on the plain near today's Kunming, by the Nanzhao army in 832 (Luce, 1958, 176, note 29). The eminent historian of Yunnan, Fang Guoyu

<sup>71</sup> Luce (1958), p. 136 and Luce (1985) Vol. 1. 18 & 104. The toponym, Maingtha, is the Burmese reading of the Tay name for their polity, Mäng<sup>2</sup> Saa<sup>1</sup> မှံမာ် သမာ်.

<sup>72</sup> Shiratori (1950), p. 71. Wade (2009), p. 25, described Tianbuma as “a polity located between the Taiping and Shweli Rivers”, but this would situate it on the same route as Piaodian, which the YS and *Zheng Mian Lu* recorded as lying on different routes.

<sup>73</sup> Evidence for this confidence can be seen in the actions of the Mongol-Yuan army. Qielie 怯烈, the Commissioner for Pacifying the Mian 招緬使, reached Mang Nai Dian sometime between 15 January and 13 February 1287 (Zhiyuan 24/1), and left escort troops there before proceeding on by boat between 14 February and 15 March in the same year (YS, 210.4659; Wade, 2009, 38).

<sup>74</sup> Shiratori (1950), pp. 74–75.

方國瑜, has advanced a more plausible theory, without broaching the thorny issue of ethnic affiliation.

Fang put Piaodian on the Maaw<sup>2</sup> river at its confluence with the Ayeyarwaddy, probably around Mabein (Meng Bei 孟卑). He sited Piaodian south-east of Koncan / Kaungzin, but north-east of Tagaung, with the Baiyi polity ⑩ Mang Nai Dian lying to its south-east, and concluded: “Piaodian land lay southwest of Luchuan Route [⑥], and formed a relatively large city. There were numerous tribes (*buluo* 部落) in the vicinity, and Piaodian was the most renown” (Fang, 1987, 999–1000). He also notes that a Ming dynasty route from the Huju Pass 虎距關 to Koncan /Kaungzin and west to Mäng<sup>2</sup> Yaang<sup>2</sup> passed through Piaodian.<sup>75</sup>

Following Fang’s identification, the Dehong Tai Studies Association equated Piaodian with a polity known as Cun<sup>2</sup> Ko<sup>2</sup> 𢙢𢙢 𢙢𢙢 in Tai chronicles. According to the Association, when this polity’s ruler shifted capital from Mäng<sup>2</sup> Keng<sup>2</sup> Laaw<sup>2</sup> 𢙢𢙢 𢙢𢙢 𢙢𢙢 in Mäng<sup>2</sup> Mit<sup>6</sup> to Cun<sup>2</sup> Ko<sup>2</sup> in Culasakaraja 420 (1052 CE), its territory encompassed Mäng<sup>2</sup> Mit<sup>6</sup>, Mäng<sup>2</sup> Yaang<sup>2</sup>, Mäng<sup>2</sup> König<sup>2</sup> and other places (Dehongzhou daixue xuehui, 2005. 204–205). On the basis of this information, we can conclude that Piaodian straddled the east and west banks of the Ayeyarwaddy. To support the assertion that Cun<sup>2</sup> Ko<sup>2</sup> comprised an ethnic intermix of Tai and Mian, the Association cited a passage from the *Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup> Chronicle* in Chinese translation: “Cun<sup>2</sup> Ko<sup>2</sup> was a state composed of Tai and Man 曼 (Tay: *maan*<sup>4</sup> မာ် Ch; Mian 緬) ethnic groups” (Dehongzhou daixue xuehui. 2005. 204–205). This, however, is not a faithful translation of the original Tai text which reads: “In the tenth month of CS 1710 (1072 CE), a *päk*<sup>3</sup> *st*<sup>1</sup> (dragon) year in the Tay calendar, Caw<sup>5</sup> Nyi<sup>4</sup> of Cun<sup>2</sup> Ko<sup>2</sup> ruled several Tai and Mén<sup>2</sup> 𢙢𢙢 countries (*ce*<sup>4</sup> *nǖm*<sup>1</sup> *faa*<sup>6</sup> မာ် မြိုင် ဝဲဗ္ဗာ်)” (SMPTKMKC. 282–283). The Tai text clarified four points: First, Cun<sup>2</sup> Ko<sup>2</sup> constituted a conglomeration of political entities (number unspecified), some populated by Tai and others by Mian, or perhaps a mixture of both, but not a single unified polity. Second, the Chronicle did not employ the term *maan*<sup>4</sup>, the usual Tai word for Mian, but *mén*<sup>2</sup> (Tai orthography for Mian). It is unclear whether *mén*<sup>2</sup> referred exclusively to Burmans, or included other ethnic groups as well. Third, the Chronicle did not specify the ethnic affiliation of the paramount ruler, Caw<sup>5</sup> Nyi<sup>4</sup>. Fourth, this passage described the situation c. 1072 CE, so we cannot postulate that similar circumstances pertained during the 1280s. In short, available evidence does not substantiate Luce’s claim that Piaodian / Cun<sup>2</sup> Ko<sup>2</sup> was a Pyū polity in Mongol-Yuan times.

The prowess of Piaodian can be corroborated from its ability to muster more than 10,000 troops to resist forces led by the King of Yunnan and Ai Lu 愛魯 in 1268. The Mongol-Yuan decapitated over 1,000 of the “ten thousand barbarian troops who severed the route through Piaodian, thereby frightening the various tribes into submission” (YS, 122.3012). Despite bloodshed, the Mongol-Yuan failed to subjugate all of Piaodian because Ai Lu faced resistance when he returned the following year to impose taxes (*zufu* 租賦), forcing him to “pacify twenty-four palisaded stockades (*zhai* 塔) in Huoma

<sup>75</sup> Fang (1987), p. 999. According to Fang (1987), p. 1127, the Maaw<sup>2</sup> River was known as the Luchuan river 龍川江 and the Longchuan 隴川江 river in Ming sources.

火麻 and other [places]" (YS, 122.3012). In 1270, five tribes (*bu* 部) of Piaoguo 騞國 (Piaodian) still refused to surrender, and it was only after Mongol-Yuan forces defeated two tribes, that the other three tribal leaders, A Tefu 阿懸福, Le Ding 勒丁 and A Tegua 阿懸瓜, presented horses and elephants as tokens of capitulation (Su, 1987, 41: 50b. 1367–531). Mongol-Yuan troops went to vanquish Piaodian and Dabuma again in 1286 (Su, 1987, 41: 47a. 1367–529), probably due to dissatisfaction with the way Nisu 匿俗 handled the Piaodian native official's mistreatment of the Mian salt-well official, Abi Lixiang, in 1285.

Yet, Piaodian had not completely acquiesced in 1286. Exactly when the Mongol-Yuan appointed the Piaodian leader as a native official remains unclear because the *Yuan History* merely listed the title "Piaodian Tribal Office 縹甸軍民府", without divulging the date (YS, 60.1484). The *New Yuan History* recorded the establishment of the Piaodian Superior Prefecture 縹甸散府 "in the first year of Zhiyuan 至元" (Ke, 1956, 49: 23a). Since the Yuan had two Zhiyuan reign periods, it could have been either 1264 or 1335, but lack of corroborative evidence makes it difficult to assign a firm date.

### Jinchi / Baiyi polities and Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup>

The foregoing discussion substantiates the existence of numerous Jinchi / Baiyi polities in the Upper Ayeyarwaddy region long before 1260. In this section, I will clarify the features of Mongol-Yuan administration that aided the emergence of Tai polities.

Mountainous terrain shielded Jinchi / Baiyi polities from direct political control by the Dali Kingdom and its successor state, the Mongol-Yuan. Some received more exposure to Pagan than to the Dali Kingdom due to their proximity to Mian cities with troops in garrison along the Upper Ayeyarwaddy. Fear of the Mian and their formidable armies had probably salved political rifts throughout the area in the past. Evidence that the Mian patently regarded many Jinchi / Baiyi polities west of the Salween as feudatory to them can be found in the revengeful attacks against A Bi, A He, and other leaders for switching allegiance during the 1270s and 1280s. The Mongol-Yuan conquest of Koncan / Kaungzin in 1283, and the establishment of the Branch Secretariat for Conquering the Mian at Tagaung in 1286-7 upset the status quo by severely attenuating Mian authority. It marked the advent of Upper Ayeyarwaddy polities pledging allegiance to Chinese dynasties.

Mongol-Yuan control of thoroughfares and their military expeditions against the Mian inadvertently generated an administrative infrastructure that Jinchi / Baiyi leaders could utilise to expand their polities. John Deyell (1983, 220) holds that three overland trade routes to the Brahmaputra valley, Manipur and Bengal had functioned since at least the 7th century. Mongol-Yuan administration in the Upper Ayeyarwaddy region helped to keep trade routes open. Furthermore, new Tribal Commands set up at Mubang (Sën<sup>5</sup>wi<sup>1</sup>), Mengguang 蒙光 (Mäng König; Mogaung) and Yunyuan 雲遠 (Mäng<sup>2</sup> Yaang<sup>2</sup>) in 1295 (YS, 61.1463-1484) further facilitated communication and deployment of troops deep into areas where major Tai polities would emerge during the 14th and 15th centuries. Between 2-31 March 1310 (Zhida 至大 3/2), Daihan 犬 (Tai: Tai<sup>2</sup> Kham<sup>2</sup> ဓမ္မ အုန်), the native official of the Mengguang route divulged that his younger

brother, Sanlan 三瀾, stationed at Blue Fort (Lanzhai 藍寨) on the frontier with India (Xitian 西天), sometime between 31 January and 1 March 1310, notified him of a letter sent from the King of Xitian 西天 to the Baiyi declaring that, “places occupied by the Baiyi fall under the jurisdiction of the Great Yuan, and they have been tax submitting subjects (*wei min chufu* 為民出賦) for a long time”. The King declared:

I am lord of land that I have acquired, and you are the lord of your own land, so neither side shall invade nor plunder the other. Now my envoy comes to present arrows and golden satin damask (*jinduan* 金段) to Lantao 攬陶, the mother<sup>76</sup> of Sanlan. Since incidents have arisen at the boundary (*bianshi* 邊警), I do not dare not to report [yo you] (Su, 1987, 41: 65a. 1367–538).

Tai polities in the upper Ayeyarwaddy clearly controlled areas west to the vicinity of today’s border with India by the late 13th century, long before the foundation of Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup>. The Baiyi polity of Mengguang, lay somewhere near Tagaung, the seat from which the Kadu kingdom reputedly controlled territory west to Manipur. Sanlan, the name of the Baiyi leader stationed on this frontier could be a transcription of the Tai term Saam<sup>1</sup> laan<sup>1</sup> საამ ლაან, meaning third nephew or grandchild. Although Sanlan may not have been the biological brother, as stated in the above passage from the *Yuan Wenlei* 元文類 of 1334 (Yuantong 2), the term substantiates that Tai<sup>2</sup> Kham<sup>2</sup> had dispatched a trusted relative to administer this crucially important place for trade with India. By conquering Mengguang, the Mongol-Yuan extended their control to today’s Myanmar / Indian border.

The Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup> polity emerged in this broad landscape during the first half of the 14th century. Its contours were formed by disruptions to the balance of military power in the upper Ayeyarwaddy and the collisions of the Mongol-Yuan and Mian royal dynasties. The data presented allows us to delineate some features of the landscape. First, ⑥ Luchuan Route was a forerunner of the Sä<sup>1</sup> dynasty of Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup>, the centre of which lay either in the Ruili 瑞麗, or the Longchuan 隴川 basin. It’s exact position in 1276 defies identification, due to our dearth of knowledge about the present day location of its subordinate territories: Dabumang 大布茫, Shantou Fusai 眇頭附賽, Shanzhong Danji 眇中彈吉, and Shanwei Fulupei 眇尾福祿培. Second, it exhibited a high degree of Baiyi ethnic uniformity (“subordinate territories all occupied by Baiyi 白夷”). Scholars agree that many Tai polities emerged from multi-ethnic societies, particularly those originally dominated by autochthonous Mon-Khmer speakers; over time, Tai warriors overcame and integrated Mon-Khmer into new polities administered by Tai elites (Condominas, 1990. 29–91). A relatively large Baiyi population testified that Luchuan had attained some measure of ethnic integration as a Tai polity as early as 1276. Third, the distance from the seats of Mongol-Yuan and Duan power in Dali and Yongchang afforded Luchuan leeway to consolidate itself, especially following the decline of Mian authority.

<sup>76</sup> *Wu* 勿 in the original is a mistake for *mu* 母.

## Territorial expansion by Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup> in Yunnan

Exactly how the Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup> polity emerged from among the Jinchi / Baiyi remains unclear. All known Tai Chronicles concur that Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> (dates unknown) founded the polity, but their accounts of his birth, his parents and other vital facts differ significantly. Named Caw<sup>5</sup> Yi<sup>4</sup> (Second Lord), or “Khun<sup>1</sup> Yi<sup>4</sup> Khaang<sup>1</sup> Kham<sup>2</sup>” at birth, the founder only acquired the cognomen Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup>, by which he is known to posterity, after coronation. Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> means the ‘Tiger Clawed Lord’, and two Tai chronicles attribute its origin to claw marks left by a tiger that sprung onto his back, but, curiously, refrained from mauling him.<sup>77</sup> Potted biographies in chronicles are suffused with strong elements of such hagiography, which accentuate his courage, benevolence and integrity.

Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> surfaces in the *Yuan History* during to the 1340s, where his name is transliterated as Si Kefa, variously written as 死可伐 and 思可法, the latter becoming common in early Ming sources. The Mongol-Yuan court ordered the dispatch of expeditions to chastise him on four occasions during the 1340s: first, on 15 January 1342 (Zhizheng 至正 2/12/bingchen), and second, on 29 June 1346 (Zhizheng 6/6/dingsi). Si Kefa 死可伐 surrendered, acquiescing to an Imperial decree of 29 July 1346 (Zhizheng 6/7/ dinghai), but he soon failed to comply and the Mongol-Yuan sent punitive forces a third time in 1347 (Zhizheng 7), and a fourth time in 1348 (Zhizheng 8).<sup>78</sup> We can be certain that he was a warlike ruler.

Although no Chinese source lends credence to Tai Chronicle accounts, or helps sort out conflicting accession dates, a more coherent chronology may be compiled by postulating c. 1335 as the time of his rise to paramount rulership.<sup>79</sup> Up to that point, a number of individual regimes, each with their own ruler and aristocracy, may have existed concurrently within the Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup> and Mäng<sup>2</sup> Wan<sup>2</sup> basins.

Before Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> founded his polity, the Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup> basin had belonged to ⑥ Luchuan Route. The *Yuan History* did not record his appointment as a native official. It simply chronicled “Native officials from Luchuan and other places in Yunnan came to present tribute of local products” on an *yiyou* day, second lunar month of the first year of Zhishun 至順 1 [1330]”, and noted that the Luchuan Route Tribal Command 麓川路軍民總管府 was established on 27 October 1330 (Zhishun 1/9/guisi) (YS, 34.750; YS, 34.766). The first native official of Luchuan may not have been appointed until 21

<sup>77</sup> PSMKMLKC. 231. According to the *Sēn<sup>5</sup> Wi<sup>1</sup> [Hsienwi] Chronicle* (BMSW. 21), the protective spirit of the country (*phi<sup>1</sup> huk<sup>5</sup> kha<sup>1</sup> co<sup>2</sup> paü<sup>6</sup> maan<sup>5</sup> paü<sup>6</sup> mäng<sup>2</sup> ԱԱԾԱՐՎԱ ԱԼՎԱՐՎԱ ԱԼՎԱՐՎԱ ԱԼՎԱՐՎԱ*) transformed itself into a tiger and pounced on the back of Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup>, but could not bite him. Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> also found a seal of office (*cum<sup>5</sup> ԱԼՎԱ* Ch: guanyin 官印) beneath a rock in accordance with instructions given by the protective spirit of the country. His invulnerability against tigers and his possession of seals of office portend his impending coronation as ruler of Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>78</sup> YS, 40.865; YS, 41.875; YS, 186.4270; Jiang (1980), pp. 52–55.

<sup>79</sup> Chronicles give divergent years for the accession of Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> to the throne. The most plausible seems to be that given in SMPTKMKC, pp. 296–297, which dated his coronation as the “supreme ruler of mist cloaked Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup>” to a full moon day [15th] of the sixth month, a *kat<sup>1</sup> haw<sup>6</sup>* [己酉 chicken] year. According to Dehongzhou daixue xuehui (2005), p. 177 and p. 193, this cyclical date in the Tai calendar converts to 1335.

June 1331 (Zhishun 2/5/*gengyin*) when the *Yuan History* mentioned it again.<sup>80</sup> The first source to identify Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> as “the native official of Luchuan 麓川土官” was the *Baiyi Zhuan* of 1396 (Jiang, (1980). 52–55), so we cannot dismiss the possibility that the Mongol-Yuan issued him with a title, even though unrecorded by the *Yuan History*.

Similar uncertainty surrounds his association with the foundation of the Ping Mian Pacification Office 平緬宣慰司 (literally ‘Pacification Office for Pacifying the Mian’) in Luchuan, c. 1355. The *Yuan History* stated: “Si Kefa, the bandit of Yunnan, and others surrendered on the *wuyin* day of the eighth lunar month of Zhizheng 15 [1 October 1355], and [he] ordered his son, the heir apparent (*mansan* 滿三<sup>81</sup>) to come to present tribute of local products, and [we] established the Ping Mian Pacification Office 平緬宣慰司” (YS, 44.926). The *Yuan History* did not prefix his name with any official title, and sometimes simply referred to him as “Si Kefa, the bandit of Yunnan 雲南賊死可伐,” during the 1340s. If, perchance, the Mongol-Yuan did grant him an official title, it undoubtedly would have bolstered his prestige, and facilitated his elevation to paramount ruler.

By 1335–1340, Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> commanded sufficient military resources to embark on territorial expansion in today’s Yunnan. Chinese sources documented his occupation of four places: Moshale 摩沙勒 (Mosa 莫洒 in Xiping County 新平縣), Weiyuan 威遠 (Jinggu 景谷 T: Mäng<sup>2</sup> Kaa<sup>5</sup> မှံ်ကား and Mäng<sup>2</sup> Wö<sup>2</sup> မှံ်ဝ္ဗား),<sup>82</sup> Yuangan zhou 遠幹州 (Zhenyuan County 鎮沅縣) and Jingdong (景東 Tai: Keng<sup>2</sup> Tung<sup>1</sup> မြံ့တွေ့ကြံး).<sup>83</sup> According to the *Dushi Fangyu Jiyao* 讀史方輿紀要 of 1678 (Kangxi 17), during the during the Zhiyuan 至元 reign period (1335~1340), “Ping Mian [Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup>] rebelled, and set up stockades (*zhai* 寨) at Moshale in Malong Talang district 馬龍他郎甸. In 1388, the native leader of Ping Mian, Si Hunfa 思混法 [Sä<sup>1</sup> Hom<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>5</sup>, son of Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup>], invaded and built a

<sup>80</sup> YS, 35.785 recorded that the Mongol-Yuan: “established the Luchuan Route Tribal Command 蘆傳路軍民總管府 in Yunnan province, appointed native officials, and issued a gold tally to each *zhishou* 制授”. The characters for Luchuan 蘆傳 are different from the Luchuan 麓川 of later times. Collation note 8 in YS, 35.796 gives 蘆傳路 as a mistake for 麓川路.

<sup>81</sup> *Mansan* 滿三 is a Chinese transliteration of the Tai term *maang<sup>2</sup> saa<sup>2</sup>* မာံ့ဆား meaning prince or heir apparent, a Burmese loanword used frequently in Tai literature.

<sup>82</sup> According to Gong Suzheng 龔肅政 (d 2014), the doyen of Tai studies in Dehong, Jinggu 景谷 comprised not one mäng<sup>2</sup> but two, known respectively as Mäng<sup>2</sup> Kaa<sup>5</sup> မှံ်ကား and Mäng<sup>2</sup> Wö<sup>2</sup> မှံ်ဝ္ဗား (wö<sup>2</sup> means cattle), personal communication, 2000. Though Gong understood *kaa<sup>5</sup>* in its usual meaning as rice seedling, Dr David Wharton of Vientiane has informed me that both Jinggu informants and the Lik manuscript *Tham Ayong Moeng Lai*, give the meaning of *kaa* as ‘to dance’ specifically referring to the posturing dance (*kaa coeng*) performed before fighting (here *kaa* is the same tone as ‘seedling’). Dr Wharton also points out that ‘wo’ is a cognate of mö<sup>3</sup> မ္မား (a mine or quarry) which referred to the salt wells in Jinggu, though mö has no final ö in the local dialect, e-mail dated November 20, 2017.

<sup>83</sup> According to Gong Suzheng, *keng<sup>2</sup>* refers to a town or city and *tung<sup>1</sup>* တွေ့ကြံး means to congeal (*ninggu* 凝固 in Chinese), personal communication, 2000. According to Dehongzhou daixue xuehui (2005), p. 106, Jingdong is Menggu 勤谷 in Tai (no Tai script given), and its main city was “Jingdong 景東” meaning 銅城 or copper city, implying that it had city walls as sturdy as copper. If it meant copper city, then the Tai would be Keng<sup>2</sup> Töng<sup>2</sup> မြံ့တွေ့ကြံး.

stockade at Mashale” (Gu, 115: 10a). A report in the *Veritable Records of Taizu [Hongwu]* dated 27 July 1383 (Hongwu 16/6/yihai) aids dating the occupation of Weiyuan and Yuangan:

Recent enquiries have revealed that Sikefa’s territory has thirty-six routes. In former Yuan times, officials were appointed to administer them, but later barbarian people monopolized this territory, and it [has remained in their hands] for forty years. People successively invaded the two prefectures of Yuangan and Weiyuan lying southwest of Chuxiong 楚雄, and barbarians eventually claimed these places despite efforts by the [Mongol-Yuan] because the Liang Prince 梁王 was unable to control them. (*Taizu Shilu*, 2414–2415)

If the barbarians referred to the Baiyi, then Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> must have occupied Weiyuan and Yuangan around 1343. Moreover, if we accept the dates of 1335–1340 given by Gu Zuyu 顧祖禹 in the *Dushi Fangyu Jiyao*, then he must have occupied all three places earlier than 1343 because his armies had to pass through Weiyuan and Yuangan in order to arrive at Moshale, situated on the west bank of the Red River.<sup>84</sup> This marked the easternmost extent of territory held by Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup>.

The domains of Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> stretched north to Jingdong. He annexed Jingdong at the time of his eastward expedition between 1335–1340, only years after the Yuan had established it as a prefecture in 1331. His descendants governed Jingdong until the Thaaw<sup>5</sup> Mäng<sup>2</sup> **ᠮᠠᠩ** **ᠮᠤᠩ**, E Tao 俄陶 surrendered to the Ming in 1382. The Ming rewarded E Tao by appointing him as Native Prefect 土知府 in 1384, and Sä<sup>1</sup> Hom<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>5</sup> (Si Lunfa 思倫發), the incumbent ruler of Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup>, attacked Jingdong the following year to chastise him for infidelity, compelling E Tao to flee for his life to Baiyachuan 白崖川 (today’s Hongyan 紅岩) in Midu county 彌渡縣, near Dali (*Tuguan Dibu*, Shang: 81a; *Taizu Shilu*. 2673; Dehongzhou daixue xuehui, 2005, 106).

Both versions of the *Baiyi Zhuan* make it abundantly clear that Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> administered the populace of his territory. The Qian Guxun 錢古訓 version recorded:<sup>85</sup>

Seizing the opportunity afforded by victory, [Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup>] annexed various Routes (*lu* 路) and possessed them. Then, [he] withdrew the native official titles [of captured rulers], and rewarded those who had rendered meritorious service with districts (*dian* 甸). But fearing the dispatch of another punitive expedition, [he] sent his son, the heir apparent (*mansan* 滿散), to Court to convey his sentiments and submit allegiance. [The Court] turned a blind eye, and did not make enquiries. While submitting tribute and accepting the calendar of the [Mongol-Yuan] court, [he] exceeded normal regulations in the use of regalia, dining utensils and paraphernalia, but the Yuan was unable to control him. This marked the beginning of the Baiyi becoming resolutely unreasonable (*qiang* 強).

<sup>84</sup> The upper reaches of the Red River (Honghe 紅河) are known as the Yuan river 元江.

<sup>85</sup> Jiang (1980), p. 55. The Li Sicong 李思聰 version in Jiang (1980), pp. 52–55, gives a similar account with different wording.

Table 2 Native official appointments to polities in Babai Xifu (Lan Na Polity Region), 1327 to 1347.

Date	Title of native official in Chinese	Polity's indigenous name	Name of native official	Name of officials aiding native official	Source
Nov. 13 1327 the Baibai barbarians requested appointment	Mengqing xuanwei si du yuanshuai fu 蒙慶宣慰司都元帥 Pacification Office and Chief Military Command at Mengqing	Chiang Saen	Vice-Pacification Commissioner of Wusa 烏撒 who served Ni Chugong 你出公 and the Native Official Zhao Nantong 招南通 both served jointly as Chief Military Commanders in the Pacification Office. Zhao Nantong may have been appointed as a Native Official before the main appointment.	Renmide 人米德 served as an Associate Administrator to Pacification Commission in the capacity of a Vice Commander in Chief 同知宣慰司事副元帥	YS, 30. 682
Nov. 13, 1327 the Baibai barbarians requested appointment	Mu'an prefecture 木安府	Chiang Khong	Zhao Sanjin 招三斤 (son of Zhao Nantong)	No mention	YS, 30. 682
Nov. 13, 1327 the Baibai barbarians requested appointment	Meng Jie prefecture 孟傑府	Müang Cae Sak	Hun Pen 混盆 (nephew of Zhao Nantong)	No mention	YS 30. 682
June 20, 1331	Pacification Office and Chief Military Command of Babai and other places 八百等處宣慰司都元帥	Lan Na polity	The native official Zhao Lian 昭練 (Cao Saen [Phu]) was appointed as Commissioner and Commander-in-chief 宣慰使都元帥	No mention	YS,35. 785
June 20, 1331	Meng Yuan Route 孟胥路 converted into a Tribal Command 軍民總管府	Chiang Mai	No mention	No mention	YS, 35. 785
June 20, 1331	Zhexian Tribal Office 者線軍民府	Chiang Saen	No mention	No mention	YS,35. 785
June 20, 1331	Mengqing Dian Tribal Office 蒙慶甸軍民府	Chiang Saen	No mention	No mention	YS,35. 785
Feb. 1, 1347	Babai Pacification Office was re-instated 復立八百宣慰司	Chiang Saen	The native official Han Bu 韓部 (Phayu, r, 1337-1355)	No mention	YS 41. 876.

After annexing Mongol-Yuan governed territory, Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> annulled native official titles. He returned domains to native officials who submitted to him, and apportioned districts (*dian* 甸), probably confiscated from non-compliant native officials, to those who had distinguished themselves with meritorious service on the battlefield. Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> stationed Tai nobles in the new territories from the 1340s onwards, and exacted labour services and taxes. The Qian version recorded him “collecting gold and silver by enumerating houses (*ji fangwu zheng jinyin* 計房屋征金銀)” in each district in autumn every year, each house paying one to three *liang* of silver (Jiang, 1980, 79). Unlike Tai raiding of Central Burma, Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> sought territory, not plunder. Here, he may have striven to emulate Mongol-Yuan administration.

Although Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> acknowledged the Yuan court as his overlord by acquiescing to a tributary relationship, he flouted their authority by invading, occupying and governing parts of Yunnan formerly administered by the Dali Kingdom. True allegiance required conformity to rules laid down by the court; to profess one without the other hardly made sense to imperial officials. Hence both versions of the *Baiyi Zhuan* condemned his feigned profession of submission, remarking; “while he accepted the Court’s calendar and submitted tribute, in norms he imitated the costume and paraphernalia of a King” (Li Sicong 李思聰 version in Jiang, 1980, 55). A peculiar combination of factors, deceitful cunning, and the decline of Mongol-Yuan authority in Yunnan after the 1340s, allowed Sä<sup>1</sup> Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup> to expand his territory as far east as the Red River.

### Pacification Offices in Lan Na territory

We must first understand the ramifications of the administrative term, Pacification Office (*xuanweisi* 宣慰司), to gauge the extent of Mongol-Yuan influence on Tai polities. Pacification Offices are well known as one of the highest ranking native offices for state control of ethnic groups in south-west China during the Ming and Qing periods, but they performed far broader functions during the Mongol-Yuan period. I will begin by briefly explaining the evolution of Pacification Offices during the Mongol-Yuan period, and their configuration within Lan Na territory.

The Chinese historian Lu Ren 陸勦, building on the studies of Shi Weimin 史衛民 and Li Zhi'an 李治安, has emphasised their role as units of military occupation during and immediately following the Mongol-Yuan conquest of China proper. Lu classified Pacification Offices into four types, according to period and function: first, those set up to supervise and control the Surveillance Commissions (*Jiansi* 監司) of hereditary Commanders in Han Chinese areas of North China, 1262-64; second, military offices to administer occupied areas in former Southern Song territory south of the Yangzi river, 1264-78; third, ordinary Pacification Commissions, which acted as intermediaries for administration between Prefectures 府, Brigades 萬戶府 and provincial Branch Secretariats 行中書省, 1278-1367; and fourth, Pacification Offices in frontier areas, which performed military functions in addition to the duties of ordinary Pacification

Commissions, 1278-1367.<sup>86</sup> The Pacification Office in Lan Na belonged to the frontier type.

Commissioners in Pacification Offices concurrently served as Commander-in-Chiefs 都元帥. Past studies have overlooked the dual function of Pacification Offices in Yunnan as both agencies of military government and organs for native official administration. The *Yuan History* clearly stated: “during military campaigns in distant frontier areas”, they “concurrently served as the Chief Military Command”, and “there are also *zhaotao* 招討, *anfu* 安撫, *xuanfu* 宣撫 and other commissions in even more remote areas” (YS, 91.2308). Among Commissioners concurrently serving as Commander-in-Chiefs in the Dali Pacification Office 大理宣慰司, one was a notable Mongol, and one a Duan family member. Joint military administration by local rulers and Mongols prevailed in Yunnan until the fall of the Mongol-Yuan.<sup>87</sup>

The title Pacification Office and Chief Military Command 宣慰司都元帥 itself attests to the strong military function of the two Pacification Offices established within Lan Na territory in 1327 and 1331, both at rank 2b. The normal quota was twelve officials, but the allocation for Mengqing Pacification Office was capped at five: “Two Commissioners 使, one Associate Administrator 同知, one Vice Commissioner 副使, and either one Registrar 經歷, or one Office Manager 都事”.<sup>88</sup> Table 2 catalogues appointments at Mengqing and Babai over the twenty-year period, 1327–1347, listing indigenous rulers who served as Commissioners and Commanders-in-chief. The source, the *Yuan History*, omits the names of the Mongol Commissioners, even though presumably they served. Interestingly, Table 2 documents the 1327 appointment of a local Vice Commander-in-Chief, named Renmide 人米德 (ethnicity unknown), recruited through “summoning and instruction (*zhaoyu* 招諭)”. The Mongol-Yuan aimed to utilise Renmide’s authority and power to assist the local commissioner Zhao Nantong 招南通 (Cao Nam Thuam, d. 1328), a ruler of the Mangrai dynasty. The Mongol-Yuan sought further stability by ordering Zhao Nantong’s son, Zhao Sanjin 招三斤, to head Mu’an prefecture 木安府 (Chiang Khong), and his nephew, Hun Pen 混盆,<sup>89</sup> to administer Meng Jie prefecture 孟傑府 (Müang Cae Sak). Manifestly, the Mongol-Yuan paid attention to local power politics when assigning duties.<sup>90</sup> The last reference to the Babai Pacification Office appeared in

<sup>86</sup> Lu Ren (2012), pp. 25-27. I follow Hucker (1985), p. 251, in translating the fourth type of *Xuanwei Si* 宣慰司 as Pacification Office, and the other three types as Pacification Commission.

<sup>87</sup> Lu Ren (2012), p. 28. Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Wichasin (2012) did not mention joint administration in Lan Na during the Mongol-Yuan period.

<sup>88</sup> YS, 91.2309. According to YS, 41.2308, the stipulated quota for officials in Pacification Commissioner Offices and Chief Military Commands of Commissioners 宣慰使司都元帥府 of rank 2b was twelve: three Commissioners 使; two Associate Administrators 同知; two vice-Commissioners 副使; two Registrars 經歷; two Administrative Clerks 知事; and one Record Keeper and Clerk-store keeper 照磨兼架閣管勾.

<sup>89</sup> Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Wichienkeeo (2008) did not identify Hun Pen 混盆. Hun is probably a transliteration of Khun<sup>1</sup> 𠂇.

<sup>90</sup> According to the *Chiang Mai Chronicle*, Cao Nam Thuam was exiled to Chiang Tung in 1324, which is three years before his appointment as Commissioner of the Pacification Office and Chief

the *Yuan History* at the time of its re-opening on 1 February 1347 (Zhizheng 6/ 12/ *jiawu*), which may suggest closure sometime between 1331-1347. This bespeaks the impermanent nature of the Babai Pacification Office in its early years, and may reflect the instability of contemporary relations between different parts of Lan Na.

Based on close readings of Tai chronicles, historians in Thailand generally agree that Lan Na was split into two contending centres of political power between 1311 and 1340: one in the north-east (Chiang Rai/Chiang Saen area), and another in the south-west (Chiang Mai/Lamphun area). Cao Saen Phu (Ch: Zhao Lian 昭練 d. 1334), a Mangrai dynasty ruler in the north-east power centre, constructed the walled city (*wiang*) of Chiang Saen on the west bank of the Mekong River on 3 March 1329. The name literally means “Royal City of [King] Saen [Phu]”, and it roughly equalled in size the city of Chiang Mai, built by King Mangrai in 1296 (Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Wichasin (2012), p. 54; pp. 43-44). If Cao Saen Phu resided at the new city of Chiang Saen when appointed to head the Pacification Office and Chief Military Command of Babai and other places on 20 June 1331,<sup>91</sup> the “Royal City” could not have housed the Mengqing Pacification Office and Chief Military Command at the time of its inception in 1327, so it must have been located elsewhere.<sup>92</sup> The Mongol-Yuan also set up the Mengqing Dian Tribal Office 蒙慶甸軍民府 and Zhexian Tribal Office 者線軍民府 in the Chiang Saen area in 1331. If we take Zhexian 者線 as a transliteration of the Tai term Ce<sup>3</sup> Sén<sup>1</sup> (literally, town of Saen), then this term may have referred to the “Royal City”, or another fortified city at Chiang Saen.

The north-east power centre, undoubtedly “a distant frontier area” for the Mongol-Yuan, was where they created the Pacification Office and Chief Military Command of Mengqing and Babai. Their choice of the Chiang Saen area may have stemmed from its strategic location in the north-east zone: Chiang Saen afforded access to northern Thailand and northern Laos, and provided a base for controlling the south-west power centre. Babai, in the title of the appointment on 30 June 1331, seems to refer to the “Royal City of [King] Saen [Phu]”, while “other places” included other fortified cities in the Chiang Saen area and Muan (Chiang Kong?) in the north-east power zone, and Moeng Yuan 孟冑 (Chiang Mai) and Müang Cae Sak (Mengjie), located between Fang and Chiang Mai near the centre of the south-west zone (see Table 2).<sup>93</sup> The *Yuan History* fails to specify the location of the Tribal Command of Moeng Yuan 孟冑路軍民總官府, but its higher standing (rank 3b) than the other two Chiang Saen agencies at Zhexian and Mengqing dian (both rank 4b) bespeak its importance in the south-west zone; the Mongol-Yuan identified the western half of Babai as the stronghold of the Tai Yuan, the ruling ethnic group. The ranking of native officials reflected a hierarchy of power politics within Lan Na. The Ming court initially recognised

Military Command of Mengqing, see Wyatt and Wichienkeo (1995), pp. 56–57.

<sup>91</sup> According to Wyatt and Wichienkeo, (1995), pp. 57–60, Cao Saen Phu assigned his son to rule Chiang Mai, and constructed the city of Chiang Saen sometime between 1327-1329; Cao Saen Phu died at Chiang Saen c. 1336.

<sup>92</sup> Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Wichienkeo (2008), p. 86, identified Mengqing as Chiang Saen.

<sup>93</sup> For identification of place names, see Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Wichienkeo (2008), pp. 52-53.

the Tribal Command of Moeng Yuan in 1382 (Hongwu 15), but abolished it later (Zhang, 1995. 46.1192).

Political organisation within Babai only became clearer to the Mongol-Yuan after 13 November 1327 (Taiding 4 / intercalary 9/ *jiawu*) when, reputedly, their ruler requested protection (*guanshou* 官守). Fresh information about local power politics led them to establish native officials at four strategic places between 1327 and 1331: namely Chiang Saen, Chiang Mai, possibly Chiang Kong, and Müang Cae Sak. In addition to Babai, other Tai polities issued with appointments during the 1330s grew into larger political entities later as well. For instance, the first native official of Luchuan, the forerunner of Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup>, received his appointment in 1330-1331, as mentioned earlier, and the Laogao Tribal Command 老告軍民總管府 was established on 6 September 1338 (Zhiyuan 4/8 *jiashen*). The *Yuan History* documented Laogao once only (YS, 39.845), and it probably referred to the Lansang polity at Luang Prabang in Northern Laos, renamed Laowo 老撾 by the Ming. The Mongol-Yuan now oversaw affairs over most of the Tai world, from the Ayeyarwaddy to the Mekong, through native officials.

### Kang Min, a low ranking official or supernumerary?

How did Kang Min come to be assigned as the “nominal office of Pacifier”? What were his responsibilities? Failure of the *Yuan History* and other sources to mention this appointment implies that it was filled by low ranking officials, or supernumeraries. Kang Min may have been a low ranking, or unranked, official when serving as the “nominal office of Pacifier” in Lan Na, performing secretarial or clerical duties for native officials in the Babai region on a seasonal basis; assuming duty during the dry season (winter) reduced the chances of contracting malaria and other diseases. Native officials required staff proficient in Chinese for communication with the Mongol-Yuan, and it is highly likely that Kang Min had some degree of education because his eldest son served as the Confucian mentor to sons of the Duan family. We cannot rule out the possibility that Kang Min may have served at the low rank of Registrar 經歷, or Office Manager 都事, as recorded by the *Yuan History* for Mengqing, or possibly assisted as an unranked clerk. The *Inscription* narrates that Kang males filled such positions in Yunnan over several generations; his second son served as the Record Keeper of Qingdian county, and his eldest grandson as the Administrative Clerk of the Tengchong Route.

Estimates from figures in the *Da-Yuan Shengzheng Guochao Dianzhang* 大元聖政國朝典章 (compiled 1320–1322) reveal that offices without “rank and title” comprised 15.7 percent of civilian officials in the Mongol-Yuan period (Endicott-West. 1989, 13). An entry in the *Yuan History* dated 24 January 1320 (Yanyou 延祐 6/12/ *jiazi*) confirmed that such officials served in Sipsong Panna. It chronicled a reduction of “one hundred and twenty four officials such as Associate Administrators 同知, Assistants 相副官, and Confucian School 儒學 and Mongolian Instructors 蒙古教授 and other officials in Yunnan, Dali, Greater and Lesser Cheli 大小徹里 and other places” (YS, 26.593). Kang Min may have served in such a capacity. If the Duan family bore responsibility for providing clerical staff for native officials, then they would have recruited men from

families closely associated with them. By the Zhizheng 至正 (1341-1367) era, the Duan Family General Administrator had attained some degree of autonomy from the Liang Prince in distant Kunming. The case of Kang Min and his descendants suggests that the Duan may have been responsible for providing personnel from Yunnan to fill the positions of officials and clerks in the yamens of native officials at the southern edge of the Mongol-Yuan world.

Staffing the yamens of native officials with personnel from Yunnan testifies to close association between Duan and Mongol-Yuan administration. Yet, we have little evidence to prove that non-local personnel influenced proto-Tai/Tai polity building. No instances of local rulers adopting Chinese ideals of statecraft and customs have been documented for the Upper Mekong and Upper Ayeyarwaddy. Non-local personnel were mere sojourners, assuming office in the dry season, and scurrying for the high ground before the onset of the rains. The portrait is one of the Mongol-Yuan superimposing administrative units on loosely structured Southeast Asian polities, bolstering the authority of Tai rulers, without directly participating in everyday administration of the local populace.

## Conclusion

Gradual consolidation of territory lying at the southern fringes of the fallen Dali kingdom from the 1260s, particularly the conquest of Tagaung, ousting of Mian political power, and the destruction of Kantū and proto-Tai polities by the Mongol-Yuan during the 1280s, caused a reconfiguration of polities on both sides of the Upper Ayeyarwaddy river. Evidence furnished by this study demonstrates that Tai polities emerged in the upper Ayeyarwaddy area during the 1270s, roughly as early as in the upper Mekong region. The political power of some Tai polities even stretched along trade routes to the Indian border, possibly reaching the Brahmaputra valley, or Manipur. In the past, historians have neglected polities in this region because they did not play a role in the formation of charter states that spawned modern states in Southeast Asia, but this study demonstrates that numerous Mon-Khmer and proto-Tai/Tai polities, both small and large, functioned to connect the Yun-Gui plateau with mainland Southeast Asia before the Ming period. From the perspectives of political and social organisation, ethnic configuration and material culture, it is clear that northern mainland Southeast Asia encompassed much of today's Yunnan.

The Mongol-Yuan relied heavily on the authority and influence of the Duan Family General Administrator to claim possession of former Dali kingdom territories in the upper Ayeyarwaddy and upper Mekong river regions. Therefore, with northern mainland Southeast Asia well within its orbit, the Dali kingdom functioned as an interchange on communication routes; it interconnected Pagan /Angkor in the south with the Tibetan and the Chinese worlds in the north. The restoration of the Duan family ensured the continuation of this arrangement, but the obliteration of the Duan by the Ming gradually eroded traditional links between the Yun-Gui plateau and Southeast Asian style polities, thereby ushering in a new era of indirect administration by the Chinese dynastic state based solely on the native official system. Ming governance of Tai polities without aid

from local intermediaries like the Duan, coupled with the Burmese conquest of western mainland Southeast Asia during the mid-16th century, further distanced Tai polities in the Upper Ayeyarwaddy and Upper Mekong from Yunnan province.

How great an influence did the Mongol-Yuan exert on Tai polity building? Appointment as native officials turned powerful local rulers into tributary vassals of the Mongol-Yuan. For some local rulers this arrangement merely meant transferring feudatory ties from the Dali kingdom to new masters, while for others it entailed switching allegiance from the Mian to the Mongol-Yuan. The positioning of native officials at strategic points along major thoroughfares facilitated trade and communication with Southeast Asia and the Indian ocean. Evidence from the case of the Pacification Offices in the Lan Na region does not substantiate Lieberman's hypothesis that the Mongol-Yuan "encouraged the creation of Tai client states" in the upper Mekong by providing them with "new military and administrative models" through their status as native officials (Lieberman, 2003, 241). Acceptance of appointments signified token, rather than real acquiescence to Mongol-Yuan overlordship, and never guaranteed blind compliance. As Volker Grabowsky (2010, 203–204) has argued, despite having submitted tribute since 1312, Lan Na did not agree to the establishment of Pacification Offices within its territory until much later, in 1327. At the southern edge of the Mongol-Yuan world, the constraints of distance, terrain and climate enabled local rulers to retain autonomy. If the Mongol-Yuan were patrons, then the Tai of Lan Na and Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup> were reluctant "clients", who always put their own interests first. The cases of Kang Min and his descendants attest that the Mongol-Yuan assigned high and low ranking officials to "client states" in the upper Mekong and south-west Yunnan. Although we cannot dismiss the possibility of some emulation by Tai rulers, the evidence does not validate the claim that Mongol-Yuan personnel provided Tai native officials with new military and administrative models, or blueprints, for constructing polities. Their duties remained secretarial and clerical in nature, and neither included counselling Tai rulers on statecraft, nor directly administering local communities. The Mongol-Yuan did not set out to encourage the Tai to strengthen their polities, their principal concern lay in subordinating them.

It was the disruption caused by the Mongol-Yuan conquest of the Dali kingdom that created an environment conducive to political change among the proto-Tai/Tai after 1260. Evidence demonstrates wide distribution of proto-Tai/Tai polities in the upper Ayeyarwaddy before c. 1260, and their extension west towards the border with India in the post-1260 period before the emergence of large Tai polities, such as Mäng<sup>2</sup> Maaw<sup>2</sup>. Expulsion of Mian power from the Upper Ayeyarwaddy following the conquest of Tagaung and the start of administration c. 1286, and the shrinkage of Mongol-Yuan influence after the withdrawal of troops in 1303 afforded proto-Tai/Tai leaders with the opportunity to reorganise and expand existing political organisations; now, local leaders in the Upper Ayeyarwaddy could manoeuvre more freely, war amongst themselves, and build new polities with less outside interference.

Evidently, different ethnic groups already operated polities before 1260, and as actors in the drama of power struggles, some politically seasoned leaders smoothed over the transition from allegiance to the Dali kingdom to Mongol-Yuan overlords, while

those who refused to comply met with annihilation. Tai leaders, emerging from the political turmoil, did not consent to close supervision easily; bear in mind that it was the military prowess of the Tai in Central Myanmar and Northern Thailand that compelled the Mongol-Yuan to withdraw from Tagaung. Tai-polity building had a corrosive impact on Mongol-Yuan territory, as manifested in the conquests east of the Mekong river in Yunnan by Sä<sup>1</sup>Khaan<sup>3</sup> Faa<sup>6</sup>; they lost territory inherited from the Dali Kingdom to an upstart Tai ruler.

Notions of “patronage” and “client states” are misleading because they downplay the centrality of the Tai as agents navigating themselves along the path to polity building. Tai rulers ambitiously consolidated their polities by acquiring new material cultures, especially skills and technology from the outside world during the 13th and 14th centuries. They utilised new agrarian and water management techniques, and procured craftsmen through warfare and migration, and adopted writing systems for administrative purposes (Lieberman and Buckley, 2012, 1075–1076; Daniels, 2000, 82–90). The Tai writing system used in the Upper Ayeyarwaddy region during the late 14th century derived from Burmese script (Daniels, 2012), and may have been borrowed as early as the 13th century when they owed fealty to the Mian. Superior technology and material culture attracted other ethnic groups to their polities, thereby rapidly increasing Tai populations. Rather than benevolent patronage, Tai aspirations for self-strengthening motivated them to take advantage of the new political environment created by the Mongol-Yuan.

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