The Muslim Sultans of Singora in the 17th Century

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Abstract—This article interrogates the rise and demise of the three Muslim rulers of Singora (present-day Songkhla) in the 17th century, who preceded Songkhla's Hokkien "Rayas" recently described by Bisalputra and Sng (2020). In addition to taking a "connected histories" approach to these political developments, we demonstrate the utility of a multidisciplinary methodology, which combines ethnographic fieldwork with interactions with a range of primary and secondary sources. We reveal that the rise and demise of the political fortunes of Datuk Mogul (r. [?]–1620), Sultan Suleiman (r. 1620–1676) and Sultan Mustapha (r. 1676–1685) are linked to commercial competition between Singora and Pattani over decades in which Dutch and English commercial interests were expanded in this portion of the Siamese-Malay Peninsula.

Introduction

The recent publication of the "The Hokkien Rayas of Songkhla" by Pimpraphai Bisalputra and Jeffery Sng (2020) provided the initial impetus for analyzing the legacies of Singora's three Muslim sultans in the 17th century, namely Datuk Mogul (r. [?]–1620), Sultan Suleiman (r. 1620–1676) and Sultan Mustapha (r. 1676–1685).[1] Although Bisalputra and Sng briefly mention Muslim rule in Singora, there are other reasons for writing about this chapter of Muslim rule.[2] The most important of these is contributing to recent social histories dealing with this portion of the "plural peninsula" that we refer to as the Siamese-Malay Peninsula.[3] While conscious of writing in the wake of the portrayals of Ayutthaya and Pattani, based on 17th century sources, by a mixture of Thai, Malay and foreign scholars, we argue that more work on this period is

[1] Datuk Mogul appears in the following sources as Dato Mogol, Dato Mogul and Datoe Mogoll (Anonymous 1915b, 137; Farrington and Na Pombejra 2006a, 289; Lukas 2016, 139; Terpstra 1938, 78). Correspondence between Sultan Mustapha and the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in Batavia (Jakarta) are included in the encyclopedic website of Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia https://sejarah-nusantara.anri.go.id/ here https://sejarah-nusantara.anri.go.id/media/userdefined/pdf/_report_rulerdetails_geochronological_20151124.pdf (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia 2015, 177). These specific letters have been translated and analyzed by Benjamin J.Q. Khoo.

[2] For references to Muslim rule in Singora, see Bisalputra and Sng 2020, 44..

[3] Scholars who have recently written on Thailand's Upper South include Andaya, 2017; Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014, 2017; Na Pombejra, 2002; Montesano and Jory, 2008; Reid, 2008; Reynolds 2019, 63–84.

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Figure 1. Section of John McCarthy's "Map of the Kingdom of Siam and its Dependencies" providing the locations of Siamese and Malay polities on the Siamese-Malay Peninsula (McCarthy, 1900, 1)

long overdue.[4] This article is part of a wider project that seeks to strengthen perceived weaknesses in the local field of Muslim studies. In other words, *how* the subject is studied is as important as *what* is studied. We contend that more synergy between Malay and Thai studies specialists, who have historically stuck to separate scholarly silos, is overdue, and that almost two decades of conflict in Thailand's three Malay-dominated southern provinces has had the unintentional effect of sucking scholarly attention away from other parts of Thailand's Muslim kaleidoscope.

We have set ourselves the task of demonstrating the utility of combining multisite fieldwork between Ayutthaya and the Malaysian border with archival research. We are social anthropologists persuaded by the utility of historical anthropology.[5] Our expertise in Thai and Pattani Malay (rather than European languages) has limited us to English

[4] See Chamoraman, 1988; Choungsakul, 2006; Jansaeng, 2010; King, 2009; Thanin Salam, 2004.

[5] Axel, 2002; Lindholm, 1996.

sources,[6] and English translations of relevant Chinese,[7] Japanese,[8] French[9] and Dutch electronic archival material.[10] Other aspects of our multidisciplinary methodology and approach to historiography include rigorously interacting with the recent secondary literature through which we uncovered new sources, and which alerted us to alternative lines of analysis; and analyzing maps produced by a range of Asian and European cartographers. Readers will discern our interest in exploring the utility of approaches to historiography associated with what Sanjay Subrahmanyan referred to as "connected histories," attentive to the wide contexts in which historical processes occurred. Rather than treating different parts of Asia as discrete entities, Subrahmanyan focused on circulations, exchanges, and interactions through which Asian history could be globally contextualized.[11]

This article dovetails with Bisalputra and Sng's portrayal of Chinese rule in Singora in the late 18th century by describing the political and commercial background to the emergence of Muslim rule in the early 17th century. Our analysis of Arab, Chinese and European cartography permits us to date when Singora first (literally) appears on the map, at a time when Pattani was already widely known. We also provide relevant details about the arrival of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Dutch East India Company, hereafter VOC) and the English East India Company (hereafter EIC) in this portion of the Siamese-Malay Peninsula. The substantive sections that follow introduce and interrogate the individual legacies of Datuk Mogul, Sultan Suleiman and Sultan Mustapha, who emerged in the decades when the important Siamese rulers were King Song Tham (r. 1610–1628), King Prasat Thong (r. 1630–1656) and King Narai (r. 1656–1688). Readers not familiar with the reigns of a range of Siamese and Malay monarchs between Ayutthaya and Pattani in the 17th century will presumably appreciate our brief summary in the form of a synoptic table. Over and above exploring how political developments (in Ayutthaya and Pattani) and commercial maneuverings (with Ayutthaya, the VOC and the EIC) impacted these Muslim rulers, we pay attention to what the background of the actors, aspects of local material culture such as the presence of "Persians" in Southeast Asia, and the cultural capital of Singora's cannon reveal about its connections with the context in which these emerged. Muslims ruled Singora over decades when this port polity was sandwiched between a range of Siamese kings in Ayutthaya and Malay Rajahs in Pattani and Kedah when local Dutch and English commercial interests were at their height. We argue that the rise of Datuk Mogul and the demise of Sultan Mustapha cannot be understood without adequate attention to both these political and commercial rivalries.

[6] Farrington and Na Pombejra, 2006a, 2006b; Foster, 1896, 1897, 1899, 1900, 1901, 1902; Sainsbury, 1870, 1878.

[7] Wade, 2012.

[8] Ishii, 1998.

[9] Chaumont, Choisy, and Smithies, 1997; De Choisy and Smithies, 1993; Desfarges, De La, Vollant Des Verquains, and Smithies, 2002; Forbin and Smithies, 1997; Gervaise, 1989, 51; Smithies, 1998, 2004; Tachard, 1688; Van Der Cruysse, 1992.

[10] Anonymous, 1915a; Borschberg, 2015a, 2014.

[11] Subrahmanyam, 1997. For more on connected histories, see Ali, 2009; Koh and Bonate, 2017.

The political and commercial world in which Singora emerged

Both Thai and foreign scholars appear oblivious to their anachronistic references to this port city as "Songkhla." Notwithstanding the most common toponyms for present-day Songkhla being Sangora, Singora and Singgora, our interaction with sources dating to the 17th century has revealed a large number of variant spellings. These are: Cingor, Saingor,[12] Sangor,[13] Sangorah,[14] Saugore,[15] Segora,[16] Senggora,[17] Sengora,[18] Sengorah,[19] Sengura,[20] Singor,[21] Soungor,[22] Sungkla[23] and Sungora.[24] Other sources refer to Singur (Arabic),[25] Sun-Gu-Na (Chinese)[26] and Song-ju-lao (Japanese).[27] The first occurrence of a toponym resembling Singora in maps of the Siamese-Malay Peninsula is in the Wubei zhi (武备志), connected to the voyages of Zheng He, that Geoff Wade dates from the early 15th century (see Figure 2).



Figure 2. Portion of one of the maps from the *Wubei zhi* (武备志) dating to the early 15th century (Wade, 2012, 62)

Wheatley's analysis of this map (which he transcribed as *Wu-pei-chih*) contains a transcription of the toponym, *Mao-shu-hsu*, i.e. Cat and Rat Islands (Pulau Kuching and Pulau Tikus).[28] One of the navigation guides, attributed to Sulaimān bin Ahmad al-Mahrī, is *Kitab al-Manhaj al-Fakhir fi'ilm al-Bahr al-Zakhir* (MS. 2559), which describes sea routes around Bengal, Siam and Malacca. Between Folio 67 recto, line 9 and Folio 71 recto, line 6 (dated by Wheatley to 1511) is the toponym

[12] Hutchinson, 1968 177; Ishii 1998, 143.

[13] Coolhaas, 1968, 56, 110.

[14] Osborn, 1861, 156, 160.

[15] Burney, 1912.

[16] Anderson, 1890, 58; Foster, 1897, 39.

[17] Annandale and Robinson, 1903; Keane, 1892; Skinner, 1985; Swettenham, 1929.

[18] Anonymous, 1915d 186; Bartholemew, 1900, 214; Norman, 1895, 35, 525, 554.

[19] Anonymous, 1915a, 17–18.

[20] Tengku Ismail Chik Denudom and Hoadley, 2011, 28.

[21] Bowring, 1857, 356; Smithies, 2004, 111.

[22] Farrington and Na Pombejra, 2006b, 142; Foster, 1897, 123.

[23] McCarthy, 1900, 9; Smyth, 1898, 477.

[24] Burney, 1912; Crawfurd, 1856, 423; Foster, 1897; Wheatley, 1961, 240.

[25] Wheatley 1961, 240. This is part of Wheatley's analysis of the Arabic source, *Kitab al-Manhaj al-Fakhir fi'ilm al-Bahr al-Zakhir* (MS. 2559), by Sulaiman bin Ahmad al-Mahr).

[26] Wade 2012, 62. This toponym is from a map in the *Wubei zhi* (武备志), which Wade suggests is from the early 15th century.

[27] Ishii, 1998, 105,141.

[28] Wheatley, 1961, 97.

"Singur."[29] On the basis that Pattani is not mentioned in either Sulaimān bin Ahmad al-Mahrī or Shihāb al-Dīn Ahmad ibn Mājid, Wade suggests that "the name itself, or Patani as the center of the polity," might have emerged in the 16th century.[30]

The depicted cartographic collage (Figures 3–6) is based on our analysis of European cartography between 1588 and 1612. These are interesting for a number of reasons. First, these were produced at a time when Pattani was well known. Second, while Singora is absent from these maps, one of the two islands located at the mouth of Songkhla's harbour, called Pulau Tikus (Rat Island), is mentioned. The first reference to Singora in European cartography is in Jansson's *Indiae Orientalis Nova Descriptio* (1630), a portion of which we have reproduced in Figure 6. It is worth noting that some European maps later in the 17th century name Pattani and Pulau Tikus without referring to Singora. Others provide no information about either the physical or political geography of the Siamese-Malay Peninsula between Pattani and Ligor (Nakhon Si Thammarat).[31] Finally, by the 17th century, most maps name and place "Singora" (and/or its variants).

Figure 3. Homem, D. 1558. Atlas nautique portugais

Figure 4. Bartolomeu V. 1560. Indochina and East Indies



Figure 5. Van Linschoten et al. 1596. Exacta & accurata delineatio cùm orarum maritimdrum



Figure 6. Langenes, B. 1612. *Malacca*

Peter Borschberg has recently analyzed maps produced by Manuel Godinho de Erédia (1563–1623) in his *Atlas Miscelânea* (Miscellany Atlas, 1616–1622) (Figure 8). According to Borschberg, Phatthalung represents the "northern point indicated by

[29] Wheatley, 1961, 233–240.

[30] Wade, 2009, 62.

[31] See Willem Janszoon Blaeu's *Asia noviter delineate* (1635), and Alberna's *Carte de l'Océan Indien, des cotes de l'Afrique et de l'Asie depuis le cap de Bonne-Espérance jusqu'au Japon* (1649).

Figure 7. The first appearance of Singora in Jansson's *Indiae Orientalis Nova Descriptio* (1630)

Erédia," the "nodal point in a trading ecosystem on the isthmus where long-distance overland and maritime trading routes converged over centuries," attracting traders from both the East and the West. Erédia produced the maps at a time when the Isthmus of Kra was under the suzerainty of Siam and when trade in Siam was experiencing a revival under Kings Naresuan and Ekathotsarot. In addition to the "overland portage routes between Tenasserim-Mergui and Ayutthaya," other "ancient trading towns located on the Isthmus of Kra" including Phatthalung, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Songkhla and Trang also "benefited from the peace through a revival of trade."[32]

What conclusions can be reached from this cartographic evidence from the 16th and 17th centuries? First, although an island off present-day Songkhla was "on the map," the port of Singora did not appear until 1631. Second, during this period, Pattani regularly was on the map, which indicates its high profile among European traders. Third, Erédia's map confirms that around the time when Sultan Suleiman succeeded his father, trading networks along the Siamese-Malay Peninsula expanded north of Pattani.

The following summary of the presence of both the VOC and EIC are in order. According to Barend Terwiel, one of the first port cities in Southeast Asia in which the VOC established a presence was Pattani. Peter Borschberg relates the arrival of Jacob van Neck, the Dutch admiral, at Pattani in 1602 (Figure 9). This was where the VOC sourced pepper, but the "annual arrival of a fleet of Chinese junks on the northeast monsoon" also meant that Pattani could open access to the "inter-Asian trade."[33] At the beginning of the 17th century, Pattani and Bantam (Banten) were both proposed as principal trading establishments, replete with a "chief merchant, twelve assistants and a minister."[34] Borschberg relates that in late December 1606, Victor Sprinckel arrived in the western Javanese port-city of Banten after scouting (at the behest of the Dutch admiral Cornelis Matelief de Jonge) "opportunities for trading at Patani."

As we describe below, Sprinckel reported that the situation there was "difficult in

[32] Borschberg, 2019, 5.

[33] Borschberg, 2016.

[34] Frey (2011, 169) summarizes that details of Dutch interests in Siam are provided in the journals of the VOC's factory directors, the most important of whom were Cornelis van Nijenrode (1617–1621), Joost Schouten (1633–1636) (Caron and Schouten, 1986), and Jeremias van Vliet (1636–1641) (Baker, Pombejra, Kraan, and Wyatt, 2005; Van Ravenswaay, 1910; Vliet, Wyatt, and Siam Society, 1975).

Figure 8. Portion of Manuel Godinho de Erédia's economic map of the Malay Peninsula in *Miscellany Atlas* (From Borschberg, 2019, 5)

every respect." Even after "dishing out one thousand guilders worth of gifts to senior officials in Patani and at the court there," he procured a "meagre one *bahar* of pepper." This was one aspect of the "poor trading conditions" brought about by Chinese merchants, who manipulated the market; by the queen, Rajah Hijau (r. 1584–1616), who was "powerless"; and by local "*menteri* and *orang kaya*," all of whom "behaved as they pleased" toward foreign merchants. Soon afterwards, Sprinckel became the head the Dutch factory in Pattani.[35] A general report penned in January 1614 mentions Dutch traders having been sent from Pattani to Ligor, Bordelongh (Phattalung) and Singora so as to "gain access to the lucrative Chinese junk trade," although without "having to pay the excessive duties in Patani." Following its conquest of Batavia (in 1619), the VOC changed strategy by constructing what Terwiel refers to as a "major fortress" from where the VOC's trading network could be "supervised and controlled." Although the Dutch did not close their office in Pattani until 1623, they set up "minor trade offices" in Ligor, Bordelongh and Singora. Terwiel interestingly adds that the VOC office established in Ayutthaya in 1608 was subordinate to Pattani until 1623.[36]

The EIC arrived in Ayutthaya (via Pattani) in 1612. Although the English trader, Peter Floris, was based in Pattani from 1611 to 1615, he worked for the VOC.[37] Dhiravat na Pombejra claims that although the EIC opened a factory at Ayutthaya hoping to establish a lucrative Japan-Siam trade, results were disappointing. It withdrew in 1623, re-establishing its Siam factory much later, in 1675. Christoph Carl Fernberger arrived in Pattani in 1623, but Helmut Lukas points out that he was an independent trader.[38] The EIC was still unsuccessful, and closed (in Ayutthaya) in 1684. Dhiravat na Pombejra adds that Anglo-Siamese relations were complicated by the roles of "interlopers," many

[35] Borschberg, 2015a, 96.

[36] Terwiel, 2019, 26.

[37] Moreland, 1934.

[38] Lukas, 2016, 7.

Figure 9. The landing of Admiral Jacob van Neck at Pattani in 1602 (Borschberg, 2014, 169)

of whom had previously been employed by the EIC and were now undercutting or even obstructing the company's own trade. As we describe below, one of these was Singora-based Samuel Potts.[39]

Through our analysis of the cartographic evidence, we have dated Singora being placed on the maps of European mappers in the 1630s, a century after Chinese maps. We have also provided a brief sketch of the arrival of the VOC and EIC in this portion of the Siamese-Malay Peninsula. All these orientate readers to some of the actors involved in the emergence of Muslim rule in Singora. The following table of Muslim and Siamese rulers, between the late 16th century and 1680, chronicles when some of the events, to which we refer below, occurred.

Datuk Mogul and Muslim rule in Song Tham's Siam

Although Yoneo Ishii does not cite his source, he claims that by 1593, Singora was subject to Naresuan's Siam, and that in the early 17th century, a number of (unnamed) foreign traders had established warehouses in Singora, where they stored local products.[40] Apiradee Jansaeng refers to Singora's political status at this time as "rather ambiguous."

[39] Na Pombejra, 2007, 1017.

[40] Ishii, 1998, 143, citing Smith, 1977, 8.

Table 1: Synoptic Table of Muslim and Siamese rulers during the time of Singora's Muslim sultans, and major events

Date	Singora	Pattani	Ayutthaya	Events
	Datuk Mogul (r. [?]–1620)	Rajah Hijau (r. 1584–1616)	Naresuan (d. 1605)	1602: Dutch establish factory in Pattani[41]
			Ekathotsarot (1608–1610)[46]	1612: English establish factory in Pattani[42]
			Song Tham (r. 1610-1628)[47]	
		Rajah Biru (r. 1616–1624)		
1620	Sultan Sulaiman Shah (r. 1620–1676)	Rajah Ungu (r. 1624–1635)		1623: British abandon factory in Pattani 1623: Casting of cannon in Singora
			Prasat Thong (r. 1630–1656)	Wars with Ayutthaya: 1630, 1642, 1648, 1655 1636–1640: Jeremias van Vliet
		Rajah Kuning (r. 1635–1651)		
		Rajah Bahar (r. 1651–1670)		1642: Songkhla declares independence from Ayutthaya[43]
			Narai (r. 1656–1688)	Wars with Pattani: 1669, 1671, 1674
		Rajah Mas Kelantan (r. 1670–1698)		
1676	Sultan Mustapha (r. 1676–1685)			1676: Royal envoy from Singora sent to Batavia;[44] Sultan Mustapha seeks Narai's endorsement in Ayutthaya.[45] 1679: Wars with Ayutthaya 1685: Singora defeated by Ayutthaya

Singora's first Muslim ruler offered himself to the "Ayutthaya court as a dependent of the kingdom," but to foreign traders he both "presented himself differently" and was "perceived differently by them." Most importantly, he was called the Rajah of Singora. He dealt "independently with foreigners," the first being the Dutch, who were invited in 1613. Jansaeng claims that King Song Tham (r. 1611–1628) made no objections to any of these maneuverings, and that with more foreign merchants trading locally,

[41] Wagenaar, 2014, 294.

[42] Anderson, 1890, 44.

[43] The date for this claim is from the tomb of Sultan Suleiman, on Khaw Daeng.

[44] Van Papendrecht, 1914, 60.

[45] Baker and Phongpaichit, 2017, 138.

[46] Between Ekathotsarot and Song Tham, Si Saowaphak briefly reigned.

[47] Between Song Tham and Prasat Thong, Chettha reigned from December 1628 to August 1629, followed by the reign of Athittayawong, August–September 1629.

Singora grew, and became increasingly fortified so as to protect it from "pirates and other aggressors."[48]

While we might quibble with anachronistically employing ethnonyms such as "Malay," Jansaeng claims that Dutch, French and British traders all recognized Songkhla as a "Malay" Muslim kingdom. Its first ruler was Datuk Mogul, who appears in a number of British and Dutch sources from this period. He is referred to as a "Persian" trader, who arrived in 1602 from central Java (specifically north of present-day Yogyakarta). Along with "his family and followers," he had escaped the Dutch invasion.[49] Julispong Chularatana has recently offered the following timely comments about the notoriously imprecise ethnonym "Mugal" or "Mughal" in Thai historiography. The ethnonyms locally employed, to denote Thai Muslim communities originating from Persian, Indian and Indo-Persian (from present-day Hyderabad) descent, include k*haek chaozen, khaek yai, khaek thet* and *khaek ma-ngon. Khaek chaozen* constituted the "largest group during the Ayutthaya era" and is derived from Imam Hussein, revered in Shia Islam. *Khaek ma-ngon* has been employed by Thai historians. Chularatana suggests that these conventions derive from local assumptions that this community was descended from Mugals/Mughal, a term that Persians employed when referring Shia Muslims from India. He notes that in *The Ship of Sulaiman,* written during a Persian diplomatic mission to Siam between 1666 and 1694, "Mahols" were Shia Muslims from Golconda, in present-day India.[50]

Datuk Mogul is mentioned in an English description of Pattani contained in *Records of the Relations between Siam and Foreign Countries in the 17th Century*, published by the Vajiranana National Library. There is doubt whether this was written in 1622—two years into the reign of Sultan Suleiman. Was this referring to Singora in the preceding decade, or was the writer unaware of the succession in 1620 (described below)? This fascinating English description of Pattani begins with the reminder that it was an "ancient kingdom" that pays tribute to Ayutthaya. Although not specifically referring to Rajah Biru (r. 1616–1624), the ruler was an "old woman." The mischievously misogynistic comment is made that despite this, the government is "reasonably good." The Pattani-based servants of the EIC suggested that they should "bridle this people" by constructing a "strong house in Singora." Located only "twenty-four leagues northward of Patani," Singora was under the government of Datuk Mogul, who was "vassal to the King of Siam." The following reasons are given for exploiting Singora's potential. First and foremost, Singora could conceivably function as a place where goods could be brought together and gathered for the "Factories of Siam, Cochin China, Borneo, and partly our Factory in Japan." This would achieve the consolidation of "all such wares as we shall gather from the aforesaid places to be sent to Bantam or Jaccatra."[51]

Why was this proposed house in Singora necessary? Not only were the charges in Pattani too high, but there were other "inconveniences" that would be avoided in Singora.

[48] Jansaeng, 2010, 20.

[49] Jansaeng, 2010, 20.

[50] Muhammad Rabi Ibn Muhammad Ibrahim, 1979; Chularatana, 2017, 11–12.

[51] Anonymous, 1915b, 137–138.

In lieu of customs payments, only a "small gift to Datoe Mogoll" was required. After a reminder that the Dutch had already done so, he adds that Pattani and Singora could be compared to "Bantam and Jaccatra." Notwithstanding the traffic in Pattani being reasonable, it yielded "no special matters of itself," as wares are "brought in from other places." These included China wares, "by reason of the nearness of the countries," as well as "painted and woven" cloth from India ("which must be of the finest of Pellicatt"), and fine cloth from Bengal. All of these would be brought if there were buyers.[52]

We note that this was far from the first time the EIC had complained about their treatment in Pattani, a topic about which John Jourdain had written in 1621.[53] At this juncture, it is also important to point out that fourteen years earlier, the Dutch had made similar complaints about trading in Pattani. Among the many sources that Borschberg has analyzed and translated is a letter exploring trade possibilities for the VOC and the management of its factories, written in November 1608 by Admiral Matelieff (mentioned above), after returning to Europe during the reign of Rajah Hijau (r. 1584–1616).[54] He claimed that the VOC's factory at Pattani "should be moved." Like the EIC, he was of the opinion that "no goods are produced there," and that its pepper was imported from "Jambi and Indragiri, and other parts of Sumatra". While the people in Pattani were friendly, there was no king, meaning that the "mandarins, or *orang kaya*," were able to "do what they want." They had no desire for a king, "in order to keep their government as it is." He continued:

> There is no law or justice there; indeed, our capital is not safe there. If the Company could make a tiny profit, the *orang kaya* will come and forbid our trade, saying that the queen needs the goods, and once we have bought them, we have to let them make a profit on these goods. In short, as far as trade is concerned, we are treated like slaves there, and there is no end or bound to the presents we have to give to all the unscrupulous mandarins, or *orang kaya*, because there are so many of them. This matter should be dealt with, for that factory is useful to us for the Company, even if it does not pay back the expenses.[55]

Returning to the English in Pattani and Singora—where they set up factories in 1613 and 1615 respectively—Jansaeng refers to these relative latecomers "[v]ying for a share in the Portuguese and Dutch Eastern trade monopoly." Foreign companies operating in Siam during the 1600s were required to display the *tra* (an official royal stamp) when operating in its dependencies. In Songkhla, however, this rule did not strictly apply. Laus Deo, an English merchant in Pattani, wrote of the advantages of doing business in Songkhla without using the *tra* of the king of Siam. He implored anyone with cash to come to Singora and purchase "without the king of Siam's *tra*". He bemoaned that the

[52] Anonymous, 1915b, 137–139.

[53] See Anderson, 1890, 63–64,82–83; Anonymous, 1915b, 104–105.

[54] For more about Rajah Hijau/Ijau, see Amirell, 2011, 308–316; Ibrahim Syukri, 1985, 28–39.

[55] Borschberg, 2015b, 289–290.

Netherlanders "prevent us," with "many presents and lies."[56]

Jansaeng interprets this as evidence that in Singora, Datuk Mogul was "acting autonomously in conducting international trade and foreign affairs." Through a combination of "determination and confidence," he established Singora into a "strong and secure port."[57] The arrival of this "Persian" entrepreneur on the Siamese-Malay Peninsula is interesting for a number of reasons. It strikes us as more than mildly ironic that, having escaped the Dutch in Java and after completing political negotiations with Ayutthaya, Datuk Mogul made commercial alliances with the VOC. On a more serious note, Datuk Mogul is but one of many "Persians" appearing in local historiographies. Readers should not interpret his alleged Persian—and perhaps Shia—background as indicating that he was born in present-day Iran.[58] Furthermore, he is but one example of the Muslims who moved east and west between Arabia, southern India, and both littoral and mainland Southeast Asia, whom Torsten Tschacher has referred to as "circulating Islam."[59] Like countless other circulating Muslims during the 17th century, the speed with which he became involved in local politics and commerce suggest that he spoke Malay. This was not only the most important regional lingua franca—including in Ayutthaya—but also the language through which the Dutch and Siamese conducted all official communication.[60]

The death of Datuk Mogul and rise of Sultan Suleiman (1620)

Local tradition dates the passing of Datuk Mogul in 1620, and claims that he was succeeded by his eldest son, Suleiman. Among the claims made in the P*hongsawadan Mueang Songkhla* (*Songkhla Chronicle*) about Sultan Suleiman was that he was a "Malay Muslim" based at "Khao Daeng Mount."[61] Sultan Suleiman continued to build a "fortress and canals" to defend the town. Like his father, Sultan Suleiman exerted "strong leadership in the area" by developing the port and forming a well-trained army, without which the fort would be useless.[62] Jansaeng claims that while Singora, Kedah, Pattani, and Ligor all resisted Ayutthaya in 1630, only Singora avoided coming under Ayutthaya's control—a status it maintained for approximately forty years. As we describe below, this is corroborated by a range of Siamese and European sources that mention Singora's Muslim rajah resisting Ayutthaya.

Above the fort at Khao Daeng, another remarkable piece of material evidence, that has not appeared as even a blip on the radar in the secondary literature, is the cannon that was cast in Singora (Figure 10). This was captured by the Siamese and taken to Ayutthaya—presumably in 1685. Following Ayutthaya's sacking by the Burmese in

[56] Farrington and Na Pombejra, 2006a, 286.

[57] Jansaeng, 2010, 20–21.

[58] Petrů, 2016. Readers looking for an analysis of Persian and, specifically, Shia Muslim communities in Southeast Asia should consult Formichi and Feener, 2015.

[59] Tschacher, 2009.

[60] Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia and The Corts Foundation, 2016.

[61] Wichiankhiri, 1976 [2519].

[62] Bisalputra and Sng, 2020, 40; Jansaeng, 2010, 21.

1767, this cannon was used by Burmese artillery until the end of the Third Burmese War (1885–1887). It eventually made its way to England, where it is on display—alongside other cannons captured by the British Army in various campaigns—on the grounds of the Chelsea Hospital.[63]

Figure 10. Inscriptions on a cannon forged in Singora in the 17th century (Source: Bisalputra & Sng, 2020, 45)

Although the cannon contains inscriptions added by the Burmese, Scrivener provides the following description of the Arabic and Malay inscriptions, which predate the Burmese:

1. Oh Lord of the Flag and the Standard/Oh Lord of Bounty and Favours/ Oh Lord of Grace and Beneficence/ Oh Lord of Might and Vengeance (Arabic).
2. The Lord Ahmad, an Arab by descent, to the Lord, whose essence is wondrous, with his speech, wisdom, and courtesy, says in the Arab tongue (Jawi).
3. Oh Thou who art forgiving and pardoning/Oh Thou who art grateful and the conceder of faults/Oh Alas for the bodies!/Glory be to God! God is most great (Arabic).
4. The gun is made, is made, it is finished, give thanks to God, to be a sign to drop down favours, for the slaughter of the Unbeliever, a curse upon him (Jawi).
5. Remember thou, Oh stranger, to earth we must return. Pursue valour in War. The promise of the Lord that we shall come to Paradise (Arabic).
6. Remember, remember thou Oh stranger/to earth we must return/Pursue victory in warfare/God's pledge to enter Paradise.
7. A Land of Peace is Paradise, Paradise is a place of mercy, too, and full of delights also; we dwell there everlastingly in bliss.
8. The King, a Prince of noble and ancient family, who has been in possession of this Kingdom and the neighbouring provinces, many hundreds of years (Jawi, dated 1636).
9. The King was named Phra-chao-Pra-Thong.
10. The Sign of Sultan Sulayman Shah, the Victorious King (Arabic, dated 26 September 1623).[64]

[63] Blagden, 1941.

[64] Scrivener, 1981, 170.

Barbara Watson Andaya makes the important point that in littoral Southeast Asia, there was widespread conviction that "sacralised state objects" were linked to the political community, and that their presence strengthened the "spiritual power" of the *negeri*. Furthermore, size and weight indicated "spiritual strength," so that firing cannons represented a "speech act" linking owners to "cosmically charged sounds such as thunder."[65] She quotes a Dutch report from Pattani in 1602 that Pattani's cannon was larger than "any found in Amsterdam."[66] We suggest that although it could safely be assumed that Sultan Suleiman had many motivations, these would have included his desire to make a (late) start on competing with the prestige of Pattani's military arsenal.

To summarize, although Sultan Suleiman continued Datuk Mogul's policy of encouraging trade and developing Singora's civil infrastructure and military capacity, he was not able to maintain his father's cordial relationship with Ayutthaya. Notwithstanding the local construction of a cannon being connected with Sultan Suleiman's desire to avail himself of artillery, we also argue that this indicated his desire to compete with the cultural capital of his southern neighbour in Pattani.

Central to explaining Singora's relationship with Ayutthaya during the reign of Prasat Thong (r. 1630–1656) is that by 1630, Singora possessed both a burgeoning economy and powerful foreign allies. According to Jansaeng, rumours about the circumstances surrounding the rise of Prasat Thong played a pivotal part in Sultan Suleiman's changing attitudes toward Ayutthaya, which led to the waging of at least six wars between them from 1630 to 1685. This was despite claims that all had been instigated by Ayutthaya, and none were successful. Hung-Guk Cho disagrees, mentioning that in 1632, Ligor requested military assistance from Ayutthaya against Pattani. Two years later, this campaign ended in failure, but as the Siamese retreated, they attacked and destroyed Singora. Others attribute this to Sultan Suleiman's support for fellow adversary of Ayutthaya, Rajah Ungu.[67]

Bhawan Ruangsilp relates that in 1633, the VOC returned to Siam. In addition to marking the beginning of a period of commercial expansion and stabilization, the VOC became involved in conflicts with Ayutthaya's southern vassals. For instance, in 1634, Batavia granted Prasat Thong's request for naval assistance for Siamese troops in its attack against Pattani. By doing so, Dutch Batavia stood to benefit from access to the (recent) resurgence in trade between Siam and Japan. Peace would also bring an end to disruptions in company business. Local Portuguese influence might also be contained. Joost Schouten in Ayutthaya received a formal request from the court for naval assistance in its campaign to "bring Patani back under [the court's] suzerainty."[68] Despite being "strongly pressured," Schouten attempted to "ward off" these requests by sailing to Batavia, where he put his case to his superiors. Over and above profiting from Japan, securing peace in Pattani, and landing a blow to Portuguese interests, the VOC might also have been permitted a representative at official councils in Ayutthaya.

[65] B. Andaya, 2012, 41–42.

[66] J.W. Ijzerman, 1926, 88.

[67] Na Pombejra, 1984, 177–180.

[68] Caron, Schouten, and Manley, 167).

Ruangsilp suggests that some of Schouten's motivations might not have corresponded with the "interests of his superiors in Batavia"; he held firm opinions about Siamese kingship, the legitimacy of Ayutthaya's rule over Pattani, and the nature of Dutch-Siamese diplomatic relations, all of which we summarize below. First, Schouten viewed Siamese monarchs as exercising a legitimate right to rule over Pattani, whose rulers were obliged to "show him obeisance annually by presenting the tributary flowers, and to aid him in war by sending […] troops." In return, Ayutthaya confirmed the person whom the "council of the Sultanate" had chosen as their new monarch. In other words, Pattani had "no legitimate reasons for its rebellion," and its new ruler had received "bad advice from her First Minister"—specifically, that no tribute should be paid to Prasat Thong, as he had "usurped the throne and murdered the rightful heirs." Pattani had also attacked (fellow southern vassals) Phatthalung and Ligor and seized royal junks on their way to Batavia. While these were Schouten's reasons for supporting Ayutthaya, Ruangsilp suggests that he viewed diplomatic relations between Batavia and Ayutthaya as obliging Batavia to fight Siam's enemies. As such, while in Batavia, Schouten cautioned against actions that could call into question Dutch "diplomatic credibility."[69]

Batavia provided Schouten with "a few armed ships," but in Ruangsilp's reconstruction of events, the Dutch arrived in Pattani to find that the Siamese had failed to take the city. Schouten sailed to Ayutthaya with some Malay captives, which would confirm that the Dutch had come from Pattani. Schouten was ultimately rewarded by Prasat Thong in a number of ways. He was offered a personal audience, the barricade around the VOC lodge in Ayutthaya was lifted, a good piece of land for a new lodge was offered, requests for concessions to export animal skins were accepted, and the VOC received the right to attend the council of officials. In sum, the prestige of the Dutch in Siam was "substantially enhanced." By 1636, King Prasat Thong had consolidated his power by making peace with his vassals and "eliminating almost all of Song Tham's heirs." Furthermore, one of the reasons the Siamese did not require Dutch assistance in subjugating Pattani was fear of an imminent attack from resurgent Aceh. Now that Ayutthaya was less dependent on Dutch assistance in the south, it feared Dutch influence and requests for more concessions. A maneuver employed by Ayutthaya was hastening to "reconcile […] with the Portuguese and the Spanish." Nevertheless, trade with (Portuguese) Macao and (Spanish) Manila was not profitable, and—more importantly—the Dutch captured Malacca (from the Portuguese) in 1641. Therefore, the Dutch were able to maintain their position as the major foreign ally of the Siamese king for a few more decades.

Before introducing and critically interacting with European sources and analysis in the relevant secondary literature, we offer the following brief comments. We anticipate concerns that, with this consideration of Pattani, we have lost sight of our interest in Singora. In line with our interest in taking a "connected history" approach to local historiography, we argue that the legacy of Singora's Muslim sultans is best understood by mapping political and commercial developments in Ayutthaya, Pattani and Batavia. In other words, the fortunes of Singora were intimately connected with those of its

[69] Ruangsilp, 2007, 102.

southern Malay neighbour. Let us now consider the circumstances through which Singora achieved "independence" from Ayutthaya.

Independent Singora under Sultan Suleiman and changing relations with King Narai

1642 is widely cited as the year when Sultan Suleiman declared his independence from Ayutthaya.[70] Much later, in 1685, François-Timoléon de Choisy (retrospectively) referred to a Muslim having seized power in Singora in 1642, after which he pursued anti-Siamese policies. These strengthened local "economic potential," through a combination of promoting foreign trade and (further) reinforcing the fortifications of Khaw Daeng.[71] Other evidence of Singora's independence is found in a report by Van Vliet, who arrived on the naval yacht, *Heemskerch*, on 28 May 1642. He related that the "governor of Songkhla" had expressed anger at a letter from the Siamese minister for the treasury department (*phra klang*) that his country (namely Singora) was open to the Netherlanders without Siamese introduction. He insisted that the letter had not been necessary. Jansaeng interprets this as evidence of the Singoran rulers jealously guarding their "territory, politics, and economics" and that they rejected "control by Siamese rulers."[72]

Cho describes new waves of rebellions sweeping the Siamese-Malay Peninsula in the mid-1640s, in which Singora played a central role.[73] While sources are silent about specific grievances, Dhiravat na Pombejra opines that Singora's "Malay/Muslim identity" began to assert itself against its "Siamese/Buddhist" overlords. Developments in Singora influenced neighbouring Kedah, whose sultan had replaced his father—without seeking the permission of the king of Siam. In 1643, Kedah ceased recognizing Siamese suzerainty. Three years later, it joined Singora's rebellion against Ayutthaya. Prasat Thong's attacks against Singora in 1646 and 1648 failed. Between these, Kedah again invaded Phatthalung. The Dutch sought to secure the lucrative tin trade by sending their navy to Kedah, after which it resumed sending tribute to Ayutthaya. Nonetheless, Singora's rebellion continued, and none of the Siamese campaigns that continued until 1655 were successful.[74]

Ruangsilp describes the VOC having "reluctantly assisted" requests from Ayutthaya in its campaigns against "rebellious Songkhla" in 1647 and 1649.[75] A request received by the Dutch in 1655 was refused, but for what reasons? These included having successfully established good relations in Singora, that this Muslim stronghold had proven to be a "profitable site for Dutch warehouses and a boon to their maritime

[70] Thanin Salam, 2004, 10).

[71] De Choisy, 1687, 307 cited in Cho, 1999, 59.

[72] Jansaeng, 2010, 33.

[73] Cho, 1999, 58.

[74] Na Pombejra, 1984, 227–230, 231–240.

[75] Ruangsilp, 2007, 27.

trade.[76] A letter from Batavia to the VOC in Ayutthaya, penned on 8 January 1655, made a number of comments about the conflict between Ayutthaya and Singora. In addition to noting that the Siamese court still hoped to receive military assistance from the Dutch, it alludes to the "expected and partially promised" assistance against what are referred to as the "rebels of Sangora [Songkhla]." Indeed, a merchant by the name of Hendrich Craijer Zalr had promised twenty ships, a proposal the letter describes as a "very rash proceeding on his part." The letter points out that, should Dutch support not materialize, the Siamese would "return unsuccessful and with shame and dishonour to the crown." Nevertheless, the Dutch persisted in their refusal to assist Ayutthaya's campaigns, which—as predicted—failed. Another Dutch letter explains that Ayutthaya was fully cognizant that without Dutch support, armies recruited by Ligor would not be able to capture Khao Daeng. Nevertheless, the king avoided disgrace by blaming his commanders, who upon their return to Ayutthaya were "very cruelly put into irons." Along with "Mandarins and other great men who had been with [them] in Ligor," they were "kept in the open air for some days until on the intercession of the King's sons," while others were released.[77]

What were the continuities and discontinuities in relations between Ayutthaya and Singora during the reign of King Narai (r. 1656–1688)? A number of historians have commented on Siamese-Malay relations after 1656. Cho suggests that the generally submissive attitude in the South is explained by Malay monarchs accepting Narai's legitimacy, which had not been the case with his predecessor, who had violently "usurped" the throne. Dhiravat na Pombejra cites Dutch accounts by Jan van Rijck that, almost immediately after Narai's succession, Malay vessels from Pattani, Johor, Pahang and "other Malay regions" arrived in Ayutthaya with a range of "low-value goods." These vessels also brought ambassadors bearing the tribute of bunga mas dan perak.[78] In January 1657, Singora also sent a tribute mission to Ayutthaya, although Narai requested that Sultan Suleiman personally come to render the "homage of vassalage." A second delegation from Singora left for Ayutthaya in 1658, but was again refused due to another no-show by Singora's rajah. Another embassy from Singora was sent in 1659, whose bunga mas was received.[79] Ishii claims that it was in 1658 that Sultan Suleiman sent an "envoy to the Siamese court," which marked the end of opposition on the Siamese-Malay Peninsula.[80]

Nevertheless, peaceful relations between Singora and Ayutthaya were relatively short-lived. In 1662, Singora revolted by attacking Ligor, an action against which Narai was unable to retaliate due to concurrent conflicts with Burma and Laos. Although the specific period to which he was referring is unclear, Nicolas Gervaise, a French member of the Société des Missions Étrangères de Paris, penned a description of the eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula in 1686. He claimed that the "only other important town

[76] Jansaeng, 2010, 23.

[77] Jansaeng, 2010, 24.

[78] Na Pombejra, 1984, 276–277; Smith, 1977.

[79] Cited in Na Pombejra, 1984, 277, 282.

[80] Ishii, 1998, 144.

belonging to the Siamese on this coast is Soncourat or Cingor." He added that Singora was "less well known" in Siam for its "size and beauty" than for the "temerity it showed some years ago in revolting against its prince," an undertaking that had been inspired by Pattani's "spirit of rebellion."[81] From the late 1660s (specifically 1669, 1671, and 1674), there were a number of altercations between Singora and Pattani, which Jansaeng suggests were motivated by competition over "trade and politics" on the east coast. In addition to external political difficulties over a five-year period between Pattani and both Siam and Singora from 1669, Pattani experienced a range of "internal political difficulties." Jansaeng claims that the rise of Sultan Suleiman challenged Pattani's position on the east coast. Writing from Kedah in February 1671, George Davis and John Portman reported the ongoing war between "the Queen of Patani and the King of Singora," mentioning that as long as hostilities between them persisted, no cloth could be safely "carried up" or elephants "brought down." In other words, the conflict represented a "great hindrance to this trade." Davis and Portman added that Pattani's refusal to make peace was explained by their confidence in their superior numbers. While possessing a quarter of Pattani's forces, Singora had "stout and experienced soldiers," acquainted with the use of guns "both great and small."[82] This presumably refers to Singora's cannon, described above.

A letter from Joshua Burroughs in Kedah in October 1674 contains the following report on Siamese relations with British and Dutch traders. After reporting that the Siamese had captured Pattani, he describes Sultan Suleiman pretending "great kindness to the English." Nevertheless, he refused either to "let us go" or "pay our debts." The English had attempted to leave, but the sultan answered that they had been sent to him by the president (of the English trading company) and that if they left without written orders from the president, they would be taken prisoner by the Dutch. The English had "just occasion" to be "angry with him," but Sultan Suleiman appeared oblivious by reiterating his desire to "further trade with us." If the English could secure enough money, they should attempt to escape. Centuries before the advent of posting unflattering reviews on social media, Burroughs advocated giving both Sultan Suleiman and Singora an "ill report." He concluded by reporting that in January 1674, the Siamese had taken Pattani, which had "much hindered the trade of this place this last year."[83]

The reign of Singora's longest-reigning Muslim ruler, which we have described above, spanned the reigns of a number of Siamese kings, the most important of whom were Song Tham (r. 1610–1628), Prasat Thong (r. 1630–1656), and Narai (r. 1656–1688).[84] Although Datuk Mogul's rise occurred at a time when Ayutthaya enjoyed relatively congenial relations with its southern Malay vassals and sought to expand commercial relations with more European trading companies, the early years of Prasat Thong's reign were controversial and tumultuous. Following his rise in 1620, Sultan Suleiman continued not only to consolidate his father's diplomatic and commercial

[81] Gervaise, 1989, 51.

[82] Jansaeng, 2010, 26.

[83] Anonymous, 1915c, 111.

[84] For details of Ayutthaya during the 17th century, see Baker and Phongpaichit, 2017.

initiatives, but to fortify Khao Daeng and increase its firepower and military capacity—including the installation of a cannon. Over and above its symbolic potency, the cannon would be used against Siamese, Europeans (co-opted by Ayutthaya), and troops from Pattani. Although initially pursuing diplomatic solutions to appease Narai, Suleiman successfully repelled Siamese aggression. As we describe below, this was a feat that his son and successor was not able to maintain for long.

The rise of Sultan Mustapha (1676–1685) and the demise of Muslim rule in Singora

Sultan Mustapha succeeded his father, Suleiman, following his death in 1676. Partly motivated by protests to his succession from his brothers, he sailed to Ayutthaya to seek Narai's endorsement. Ruangsilp claimed that the king was "very pleased with his request, crowned him with the title of 'Oja Sasultan,' and showered him with many presents." The Dutch visited Singora soon afterward "with proper gifts." The sultan reciprocated by offering the VOC "all the tin from Songkhla," which could be sent to its residents in Ligor. Now that Singora and Patani had resubmitted themselves, the VOC hoped that the situation would be "favorable to their tin trade in the south."[85]

In the early years of Sultan Mustapha's reign, Singora both achieved a military victory over Pattani and challenged its southern neighbour's reputation as the "major eastern port on the Gulf."[86] Central to Singora's plans to gain political and economic control over the eastern seaboard was the undermining of Pattani's trading power. Among the strategies it employed was the pursual of alliances with the VOC, who were encouraged to construct warehouses in Singora. A letter by the Englishman Samuel Potts (who fits the description of a rogue gun-runner), written in Singora in September 1678, claims that there was local support for the Dutch to carry on their local commercial activities. He recounts leaving a minister in Pattani "to the fortune of the wars," after which he set course for Singora just before the arrival of the monsoon.[87] The morning after Potts arrived in Singora, the harbour master "came off and conducted [him] to the King's presence." After enquiring about the "welfare of their [English] Captain in Siam" and commenting on the "high esteem [the] Captain had of the crisis", he was given a "very kind reception." Apparently, Sultan Mustapha had been informed of Potts's arrival and that he intended to settle in Pattani. Potts describes that Sultan Mustapha promised his protection, but that the English would be comfortably accommodated at a house for which he would pay. Furthermore, in order to encourage trade, he would "make this a free port, which in a short time, by our residence, would be furnished with all foreign commodities," rivalling those in Pattani. Sultan Mustapha reminded the English that while in Pattani, "great duties are imposed on all goods brought thither." However, in Singora he would grant "all the freedom that could reasonably be desired and what he had promised would signify by the Mervah to our Captain under his own hand." Potts

[85] Ruangsilp, 2007, 131.

[86] Jansaeng, 2010, 27.

[87] Anonymous, 1915c, 179.

explains that, "taking into consideration his large promise and the great benefit," he landed his goods in Singora.[88]

Another letter from Siam addressed to the EIC in Penang, dated 18 November 1678, reiterates that conflicts with Pattani represented a major obstacle to advancing English control of trade in the region, and that Singora benefited from chaos in Pattani. Potts reports planning to return to Ayutthaya via Singora so as to "endeavor the disposal of the cargo he had with him." He was "received and treated by the King with exceeding kindness and earnestly invited to a residence that he adventured to land the goods and dispatch away the vessel with large advices of the great encouragement he found for the settlement of a factory there." Potts reports a "profitable vend of goods proper for that country," and the procurement of a "considerable quantity of excellent pepper at very moderate rates" was accompanied by a letter from Sultan Mustapha. This confirmed both his "great desire of a correspondence" with the English, and an invitation to trade with "promise of great favors and immunities." Advice was sought from Bantam, but in the interim a vessel of "50 tons was sent to Mr. Potts to be laden with pepper and dispatched to Bantam so as to get thither before the departure of the ships for Europe."[89]

Dutch records from this period claim that Samuel Potts worked for the EIC, which assisted the rajah of Singora to construct earthworks against the Siamese in 1679. Potts wrote from Singora to Richard Burnaby in Ayutthaya on 22 January 1679, describing the local (unnamed) Muslim sultan having "[f]ortified his city, armed his forts with guns upon the hills, making all the preparations he can for his defense, not knowing how soon the King of Siam will oppose him." He adds that he had received several local assurances that this disturbance would "not in the least obstruct our trade, but rather augment it." At this juncture, we note that the first two (of three) Anglo-Dutch Wars (1665–1667 and 1672–1674) occurred during the reign of King Narai, and that Narai attempted to check Dutch power by pursuing alliances with both the French and the English. However, Anglo-Siamese relations were strained by some large debts owed by English traders in Ayutthaya, and by English assistance to Singora, presumably in reference to interlopers such as Potts. Particularly disturbing was the discovery of a damning Dutch letter sent to Batavia in March 1680 that documented British support for Singora, earlier in 1680.

> The English had nevertheless established a factory at Sangora [Songkhla] and assisted that King with men and the throwing up of fortifications against the Siamese monarch. [*sic*] which is taken very ill here. [*sic*] and may probably be the cause of their not remaining long in Siam. I mean the servants of the English company and not individual traders, who would not be here at all if they were not agreeable to the King and the great men. Meanwhile the Siamese are still besieging the town of Sangora, but it is believed with little prospect of becoming masters of it.[90]

Nevertheless, by the end of 1685, King Narai had managed to conquer Songkhla by

[88] Jansaeng, 2010, 28.

[89] Jansaeng, 2010, 29.

[90] Anonymous, 1915c, 267 cited in Jansaeng, 2010, 25.

persuading troops manning Singora's fortress to betray their ruler. This ruse permitted troops from Ayutthaya to enter the town, after which they "ransacked and burned the ruler's palace and destroyed the town's fortifications, gates, towers, and dwellings." This may have been the incident to which De La Loubere refers in his account of Siam, which claims that the siege of Singora had been broken by a "French mercenary named Cyprian," who "slipped behind the defensive line and abducted and brought the Raja to the Ayutthayan General."[91]

Conclusion

By documenting the rise and demise during the 17th century of Datuk Mogul, Sultan Suleiman and Sultan Mustapha, we have sought to maintain the momentum of studies that explore overlooked aspects in the social history of this portion of the Siamese-Malay Peninsula and strengthen weaknesses in Muslim studies in Thailand. There is much more to Muslim studies in Thailand than Thai-Malay relations in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, and more attention needs to be paid to other parts of Thailand's Muslim kaleidoscope. Our connected histories approach has sought to synergize Malay and Thai studies, which we argue have too often been stuck in separate scholarly silos. While much work has been done on what sources reveal about Pattani in the 17th century, Singora appears in these works as nothing more than a postscript. Without downgrading the importance of Pattani during this period, a consideration of the rise of Singora under its three 17th century Muslim rajahs offers fresh perspectives on Pattani's political demise, including its inability to compete in the conditions under which commerce was conducted at that time.

We have also demonstrated the utility of multidisciplinary approaches by interacting with both a wide range of primary and secondary literature, and cartographic material increasingly available in a range of digital archives. Our connected history of Muslim rule in Singora has revealed the tips of multiple icebergs. These include the appearance of a "Persian" entrepreneur in this part of the Malay world, anachronistic references to Malay-speaking immigrants as "Malays," and the forging of brass cannons as cultural capital. We have demonstrated that Singora's sultans negotiated their way out of being relegated to serving as the meat in the sandwich between a series of (often unpredictable) Siamese monarchs and Malay rulers to its south. There was more than one "Siamese" policy toward Ayutthaya's southern vassals, and the historical record reveals that southern Muslim rulers never functioned as a unitary block. Without downplaying the pivotal role that politics played in the rise and demise of Singora's sultans in the 17th century, we have pointed out that commercial maneuvering with the VOC and the EIC was central to the success of this sultanate. While this article dovetails with the insightful analysis of Chinese rule by Bisalputra and Sng, another chapter in the story of Muslim rule between Ligor and Singora needs to be written, beginning with Sultan Mustapha's banishment into exile to Chaiya, and his sons' placement in powerful positions in Phatthalung and Ayutthaya.

[91] Kijangmas Perkasa, 2010, 14.

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