Romantic Organicism and the Concept of *Home* as Exhibited through both P.B. Shelley's and S.T. Coleridge's Troping of Mont Blanc

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Received: February 3, 2023
Revised: June 6, 2023
Accepted: June 7, 2023

Abstract

In this paper I examine the large philosophical territory of organicism through a conceptualization of the human subject's *Home* in the world, after the post-Kantian, de-worlded understanding of our place in the world. In the first section of the paper, I examine this joint-concept as an interpretive rubric though which to read both the *Frühromantik* and the German Idealists, arguing that their arguments are also responded to in kind by the latter romantic hermeneutics of Heidegger, with his own *ecological* sense of *home* and his own response to Kantian representationalism. In the final section of the paper, I explicate two seminal *philosophical romantic* poems by S.T. Coleridge and P.B. Shelley, situating my reading of these two poems within the wider rubric of the romantic response to the various organicist conceptualizations of home adumbrated here as characterized by their responses to Mont Blanc. Coleridge's response is characteristically more *theistic*, whereas Shelley's is more proto-Heideggerian and phenomenological.

Keywords: Organicism, Home, Shelley, Coleridge, Hermeneutics, Heidegger

"What if man's homelessness consisted in this, that man still does not even think of the *real* plight of dwelling as *the* plight? Yet as soon as man *gives thought* to his homelessness, it is a misery no longer. Rightly considered and kept well in mind, it is the sole summons that *calls* mortals into their dwelling."

-Martin Heidegger "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1971, p. 161)

In what follows I develop a critical assessment of the organic ontological worldview that was most fully articulated at the dawn of the romantic period, roughly taken here to be between 1780-1850. Developing an ecological notion of home, whether within a landscape, a vista, or a mountain-top, I contend that this selfsame ecocritical narrative becomes a philosophical sub-plot in the works

of a number of canonical poets from the English romantic tradition. In so doing, I hope to illustrate the growing sanctity of a spiritual and ecological home in an industrialized age when the human subject has become, as Jay Bernstein has termed it, "de-worlded."[1] In my assessment, the human subject's putative post Kantian and post-industrial *homelessness*, is an idea interfused with the concomitant ecological concept of romantic organicism, which was in turn a notion developed out of the essentially mechanistic physics that had dominated philosophy and the natural sciences since the epoch of Newton and Descartes. I frame my argument in an examination of two corresponding poems from arguably the most philosophical of the English romantic poets: S.T. Coleridge and P.B. Shelley—two poets who also come from very polar intellectual stances, yet upon my reading, grapple with this selfsame ecological relationship—of the human subject searching for home within an unfolded natural landscape. I assess their varying responses to a particular mountain landscape, Mont Blanc, as deictic markers for their respective philosophical notions of an organic home.

I will begin by broadly defining what I term 'romantic organicism' in two ways through which we can discern a *change* in ontological sensibility, partly as a response to the post-Kantian aporia; the first of these organic notions positing the human subject as a transcendental subject, hypostatized at the apex of the natural world, whilst the other is a form of *hermeneutics*, that posits the subject as subsumed within the world-at-large: a *proto-Heideggerian* notion. I use this ecological way of thinking about our relationship with the notion of an organic home as a concomitant tool for rereading the poetry of the English romantics. Given the limitations of space afforded by this paper, my bald argument is to propose that there are two broad kinds of organicism attendant in the poetics of Shelley and Coleridge and instanced in their respective responses to *Mont Blanc*. Shelley's organic response to nature comes close to a proto-Heideggerian stance, where the human subject remains hermetically enclosed *within* the world, or the great chain of Being, that is experienced thorough a particular form of "world disclosure;" whereas Coleridge's theistic response to nature, coming from his Christian standpoint, seeks out an organic home with humankind in a proposed hierarchical location in relation to God and nature. Moreover, I locate these opposing organic sensibilities alongside several differing views of an organic-ecological conceptualization of *home* that both can be discerned and were teased out in the perambulations of the romantic tradition, as instanced for example by Wordsworth in *Home at Grasmere* through the marital troping of his seminal 'high romantic argument.'

Romantic Organicism and Visions of Home for a De-Worlded Subject

After Immanuel Kant (2008) responded to the epistemic limits of the mechanistic worldview as promulgated by Newton, Descartes and Spinoza, with his regulatory organicism, as expounded in *The Critique of Judgment* (1790), a succession of philosophers including Fichte, Schelling and the *Frühromantik* had developed models of the organic in ways to describe the world and the universe in a post-Kantian praxis, and in order to find a back door around Kant's divisive dualistic model of the phenomenal and the noumenal world.[2] Critical reactions such as those of Jacobi, Reinhold, Hölderlin and eventually the absolute idealism of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, culminated in a worldview that combined Spinoza's logical monism and Leibniz' internal entelechy.[3] However, even though an organic worldview had been ushered in under the aegis of these philosophers, this view itself had differing variants and epistemological implications.

Kant's regulatory organism was devised based upon his critical philosophy and his transcendental idealism, which retained a logical dualism between the subject and the object. The organic explored in an aesthetic, rather than in a more psychological manner, utilized the scholastic principles of *compositum* and *totum* to delineate the organic in his critical and aesthetic philosophy. However, this *regulatory* model of the organic, premised upon the dualistic separation of the realms between the noumenal and the phenomenal world, leaving the subject in a dualistic state where they remain in a sense disembodied from the ultimately unknowable noumenal world. His main reasons for holding his organicism as regulative (as opposed to apophantic), were firstly that we cannot extrapolate from the transcendental nature of human knowledge and cannot project aspects such as purpose and will onto the natural world—something strongly disputed by Schopenhauer and the tradition that traced this philosophical path. Secondly, we only have true cognition of things we can create ourselves through use of our transcendental categories—a notion that, if correct, means that with the twentieth century development of genetic engineering and modification, we therefore now *can have fully privileged access to the realm of the natural world*; and finally, Kant's attack on hylozoism, which stems from his post-Newtonian notion of inertia—where a change in matter must have an external cause, which is in effect a rejection of Leibniz' metaphysical theory of monadology and by extension his metaphysics of entelechy. This, however, is also a notion that had been not only challenged by the then-contemporary empirical science of epigenesis, as practiced by thinkers such as Blumenbach, but more recently by current developments in epigenetics.[4]

The major organicist response to Kant's regulative organicism was that promulgated originally by Schelling: his theory of *Naturphilosophie*. Schelling's theory involved the postulation that the differences between aspects such as the ideal and material or the subject and object were differences only in *degree* but not in *kind*. This led to his famous dictum that "Nature should be visible spirit

and spirit invisible nature." (Beiser, 2006, p. 223). In essence, this is tantamount to a new epistemic epoch, which posits *Naturphilosophie* as a transcendental epistemic foundation. This culminated in Schelling's famous "identity philosophy" which was in turn posited as an answer to the absolute ego of J. G. Fichte, itself ultimately a choice between the positing of the *absolute ego* on the world or a dogmatic realism—*a fortiori* implying a stark form of dualism—as well as Kant's dualistic ontology. This new system of romantic metaphysics, which was in part an answer to new questions that were being raised in the new sciences, produced an intoxicating cocktail of Fichtean idealism, Leibnizean pluralism and even Spinozist realism. As Frederick Beiser claims:

> It is fair to say that, by organizing Spinoza's universe, the romantics reinterpreted it along Leibnizian lines. Their reinterpretation of Spinoza was essentially a synthesis of Spinoza and Leibniz. The romantics fused Leibniz's *vis viva* with Spinoza's single infinite substance, creating a vitalistic pantheism or pantheistic vitalism. If they accepted Spinoza's monism, they rejected his mechanism; if they rejected Leibniz's pluralism, they accepted his vitalism, his organic concept of nature implicit within his dynamics. It was with this remarkable fusion of Leibniz and Spinoza—the two greatest dogmatic metaphysicians of the seventeenth century—that the romantics would attempt to solve the *aporia* of the post-Kantian age. (Beiser, 2006, p. 228)

Paradoxically, this organic idea of *differences of degree* also had a strong connection to Spinoza's (1949) mechanistic model, which viewed everything as part of a single substance, of which all of the universe was an attribute—Spinoza's famous pantheism or *Deus sive Natura*. However, Spinoza's universe was frozen and did not entail any ontological economy of degree—in effect a human subject is on the same ontological footing as a rock. While this brand of determinism was an anodyne in terms of ethics; Sartre's "man is condemned to be free" becomes, in light of Spinoza's *Ethics* (1677), replaced by another more limited sense of freedom, whereby one might also paradoxically contest that *we are free to feel limited by fate*; this limitation means that we are not haunted by the existential sense of angst and abandonment posited by Sartre—less choice gives us a more ethical approach to our everyday existence, resulting in *fortitudo* (strength of mind) and *generositas* (nobility). The only element of freedom in Spinoza's is the *sui generis* God, who manifests his freedom through the attribute of *Natura Naturans*: God as the self-creating cause exhibits his freedom in nature—thus there is vitalism in nature—nature *is* vitalism. This active capacity of nature is also deconstructed in Spinoza to its passive counterpart: *Natura Naturata*. God can be conceived as nature and as nature as the concretization of God's will. Hence, Spinoza leaves the space open for both

a deistic element in his philosophy as *Natura Naturans* and a scientific element, inviting the possibility of measurement and observation, *Natura Naturata*.

Significantly, Spinoza has to be understood in the context of the contemporaneous Cartesian, mechanistic aura and one sees that his pantheism opens the door to the new natural sciences, whilst preserving space for a pantheistic manifestation of God. This Spinozist monism and *realism* were to have a significant influence on both the later idealists and romantics. However, the notion of a frozen universe was one in which the latter thinkers were disinclined to find themselves. Both the romantics and the idealists valued the role of freedom in the world, perhaps more so after the French Revolution of 1789. They therefore took Spinoza's monistic realism as their hammer to shatter the dualistic impasse—or de-worlded subjectivity—left in the wake of Kant. The equally de-worlded egoism of Fichte was married with immanent teleology to produce a *monistic* organicism that reinstalled the human subject *back home in the world*. This in turn retained a unique position for the human subject as the gnostic head of this organic universe because of a teleology that allowed for an economy of naturalistic realism, culminating in the human mind as the configuration of this single substance. For both the romantics and the idealists this was the sphere of reason and aesthetics.

In light of this newly perceived need for an organic aesthetic mythology, back in England two major poets were also planning a revolutionary aesthetics in the form of *poesy*, in order to move philosophy towards a more organic view of the powers of the imagination, as opposed to the more mechanistic view in which they discerned modern society and art, particularly poetry. Having been tasked by Coleridge to write the philosophical epic, *The Recluse*, Wordsworth wrote *Home at Grasmere* as the section of the epic—subsequent to *The Prelude*—that would announce his new sense of organic home and hearth, within the Vale of Grasmere. Wordsworth fell short of Coleridge's expectations in terms of what he expected his much-lauded philosophical poet to accomplish, although he certainly appealed to the organic sensibility, touted in Coleridgean philosophy and poetics.[5] In his critical response to the nine books of *The Recluse* that Wordsworth published in 1814 as *The Excursion*, Coleridge claimed:

> I supposed you to have meditated on the faculties of Man in the abstract, in their correspondence with his Sphere of action, and first, in the Feeling, Touch, and Taste, then in the Eye, & last in the Ear, to have laid a solid and immovable foundation for the Edifice by removing the sandy Sophisms of Locke, and the Mechanic Dogmatists, and demonstrating that the Senses were living growths and developments of the Mind and Spirit in a much juster as well as higher sense, than the mind can be said to be formed by the senses—. (Wordsworth, 1977, p. 7)

Wordsworth's actual poem does not lay out the philosophical form of a *propria persona*, and as such is formulated in a biographical register, and this is the same for the crisis autobiography of *The Prelude* and *Home at Grasmere*, which functions in much the same fashion of "The Glad Preamble" of the former poem. However, the poem clearly sets the poet within a home, both figurative and literal, in the Vale of Grasmere, addressing the organic notions evinced by Coleridge in the letter cited above:

> Embrace me then, ye Hills, and close me in;
> Now in the clear and open day I feel
> Your guardianship; I take it to my heart;
> 'Tis like the solemn shelter of the night.
> But I would call thee beautiful, for mild
> And soft and gay and beautiful thou art,
> Dear Valley, having in thy face a smile
> Though peaceful, full of gladness. (Wordsworth, 1977, pp. 45-46)

The vale is personified by and punctuated by phrases such as "guardianship" and "shelter," evincing a deep and organic attraction interfused in the poet's relationship with the surrounding landscape. It is further descried as forming a sort of *heterocosm* for the poet, or a self-sustained locale in which no reliance is induced upon any other metaphysical or empirical entity, whether Christian or associationist in its nature:

> A Centre, come from wheresoe'er you will,
> A Whole without dependence or defect,
> Made for itself and happy in itself,
> Perfect Contentment, Unity entire. (Wordsworth, 1977, p. 48)

Wordsworth goes on to end the poem with the famous "high romantic" argument, which posits that both mind and external world are "exquisitely" (Wordsworth, 1977, p. 104) fitted. Wordsworth has no problem writing into his poetry itself, in its very tone and prosody, the organicism celebrated by Coleridge in his *Biographia Literaria* (1817). However, Coleridge himself, to whom I shall turn shortly, it seems required a sort of similar biographical propadeutic in *The Recluse*. Moreover, Coleridge situates his organic encounter in the Vale of Chamouny, within a *hierarchy* which does not entail a fitting of the mind to the natural world. In so doing, he problematizes the organic troping he himself desires both in his own work and in the work of his close friend.

In examining the philology of organicism, and in light of its current use, one clearly sees that, given current environmental, farming and climate concerns, this type of Wordsworthian or 'high romantic' organicism in some

sense feels highly anthropocentric, with its positioning of the human subject at the *apex* of the organic family tree. Spinoza's own original mechanistic ontology was *also* a reaction against the then prevailing theological dogma of his time, which he also felt was too *anthropocentric*. Spinoza's model of the universe became the great leveler of the time; here was a system where man was not at the center of the picture. However, it did, importantly, allow the natural sciences program to explore a whole logical picture that was waiting to be discovered in the *Natura Naturata*. Furthermore, even though the picture was self-evidently mechanistic, in light of the Cartesian physics to which it responded, a sense of the organic was preserved in the symbiotic notion of the *Natura Naturans*. The freedom was of a metaphysical agency and was attributable to a pantheistic God and in this universe also corresponds to Schelling's notion of nature as visible spirit and spirit as visible nature—although without the anthropocentric agency or teleological implications of Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800). The main anachronistic concern with the romantic form of idealism is the fact that it may have culminated in a relationship with the planet that has borne dire ecological consequences, whether foreseen or not.

Home is where the Organic Hearth Is?

The concept of "home" that I posit here, which was explored in Wordsworth's crisis autobiography and evidenced in *Home at Grasmere*, is one that is linked closely to a critical idea of modernity—the philosophical idea of organicism.[6] The concept of the organic itself is of course as old as the concept of home *and not of necessity linked to home*. My argument, however, entails the idea that the romantics sought to "re-home" themselves within the natural framework of an ontology that after Kant had *alienated* the human subject from its place in the natural world—or at least problematized this relationship. The organicist *Naturphilosophie* developed by Schelling and his close friend Hegel was in turn a direct response to Kant's third *Critique* and was instantiated in order to *re-home* the putative human subject of a *de-worlded* subjectivity, thus providing a firm bedrock for the new natural and logical sciences.

This new sense of romantic homelessness in the world arose in part as a reaction to the privileging of the transcendental subject in modernity. This had been a move that abstracted humanity from the more communitarian locale in which it had arguably dwelled in the classical and pre-Enlightenment ages, which also led to the original romantic longing for a bygone classical 'golden age.' Furthermore, it inculcated a longing for a medieval world, from which the early modern subject had been jettisoned. This particularly new sense of homelessness had also led to novel conceptions of human migrancy and even a new sense of boundaries and borders—both physical and psychological. On the one hand, this would lead to a new cosmopolitanism, whilst on the other, a sense of romantic primitivism and yearning for connection to the culture, traditions,

language, and soil of one's homeland. This sense of primitivist organicism was famously developed in various guises by Prussian thinkers such as Hamann, Herder and Hegel.

The romantics themselves, both in Germany and Britain, heeded the drive towards a sense of place and home within the natural world, whether in the conservative primitivism of Robert Burns or the millenarian promise of an earthly home for the imaginative poet as expressed in Wordsworth's unfinished *The Recluse*. There were also more proto-cosmopolitan theories of home, such as that expounded by Novalis, who with the characteristic German sense of *Sehnsucht,* identified home in philosophical terms as *Gefühl*, or the sense that philosophy is "really homesickness, *the drive to be at home everywhere*." (Novalis, 1978, p. 675 as cited in Bowie, 2003, p. 96). The philosopher is in this sense paradoxically at home in not being at home—this is his natural dwelling. Thus, even when we hearken back 200 hundred years or so, we can still discern the sense of both *oikophilia* (the parochial love of one's home) in Burns, Wordsworth and Coleridge and a more *cosmopolitan* sense of home in the work of a poet such as Novalis, through his aesthetic of the poetic *Monolog*, the fragment and his exploration of *Gefühl*.[7]

However, the organic vision of the universe, and *a fortiori* our home within it, soon became bifurcated and one can discern a romantic version of the organic and a more strictly idealist view of the organic universe. This is arguably a vital source of the troping of home in English romantic poetry that I will discuss below; a trope that answers to the post-Kantian aporia and the dislocation from the Spinozist sense of home within *the great chain of being*.

Whilst the path to organicism can be traced on the selfsame genealogical path displayed above, the response of the *Frühromantik* differed in very different ways from that of idealists such as Schelling, Hölderlin and Hegel. The German romantics initially postulated a similar vision for an organic view of the world as was adumbrated in "*The So-Called Oldest System Program of German Idealism" (SP),* which flagged the prominence of a new religious mythology of aesthetics and reason; "People without aesthetic sense are our pedantic philosophers [BuchstabenPhilosophen]. The philosophy of spirit is an aesthetic philosophy. One cannot be spiritual [geistreich] in anything, one cannot even reason spiritually over history—without aesthetic sense" (Bowie, 2003, p. 334). The idealists and romantics therefore *both* endorsed the view originally postulated by Schiller[8] about the philosophical importance of aesthetics. They also agreed that the new ideas would be "aesthetic i.e. mythological". Friedrich Schlegel, the high-priest of the *Frühromantik*, also prognosticated this new aesthetic-mythological discourse and wrote his own *Discourse on Mythology* (1800); however, this vision of mythology was destined to be tied to concepts such as *parabasis*, *transcendental buffoonery*, *allegory*, *wit* and *irony*—a new form of particularly modern mythology—rather than a mythology linked to the

realm of public reason, as expounded by the idealists. Schlegel characteristically packs this idea of a new religion and mythology of art into one of his fragmentary *Ideas*, whilst also resembling the *SP* and Schelling's putative synthesis of Fichtean idealism and realism:

> All philosophy is idealism, and there exists no true realism except that of poetry. But poetry and philosophy are only extremes. If one were to say that some people are pure idealists and others very definitely realists, then that remark would be quite true. Stated differently, it means that there exists as yet no wholly cultivated human beings, that there is still no religion. (Schlegel, 1971, p. 250)

This fragment points to the perhaps forever unattainable synthesis of idealism with the only highest form of realism—poetry—a newly organicist form of Spinozist realism; here it seems that Schlegel is indeed concurring with Schelling's notion that the highest human creative art form, poetry, needs to become the *realist* organ of idealist philosophy in order for there to become a new mythology or religion. Poetry, and the poet as tolerating "no law above himself." (Schlegel, 1971, p. 175) needs to supersede previous notions of realism. However, as we have seen, the romantic notion of poesy and its ascent to the infinite is necessarily partial and ironic—this is the *new realism* that faces the newly crowned romantic philosophers, who have *poesy* as their new philosophical apparatus. The new religion is always yet to come and is of necessity bound by an ultimately unattainable sense of idealism that had been posited by Hegel, Schlegel's old sparring partner.

The new realism of poetry however, is the sense that the poet truly senses the in *media res* nature of human experience of the world at large; the only partial (and in this sense Spinozist), sense of the infinite; partial because we can cultivate *an intellectual love of God*, we can partake in the infinite mind of God, but can never stake an Olympian claim to absolute knowledge as this is only available to the infinite mind of God, which is beyond the temporality of our grammar, and hence poetry.

As Andrew Bowie has claimed:

> For Schlegel, then, one is left with the alternative between the evanescent transcending of the sensuous in wit and a failure to represent a transcendent unity in allegory, rather than a way of seeing art as the sensuous manifestation of the infinite. The aptness of these ideas is already evident in the extent to which they become preoccupations of so much modernist art from this time forwards. (Bowie, 2003, p. 65)

In this sense of romantic allegory or irony, the organic metaphysics at work in romantic art is in some sense *less organic* than Spinoza's system. Spinoza's sense of the human subject as in *media res*, means that one is within a single substance system and, although not granted the same human freedom as what is instantiated in the romantic/idealist systems, at least has a definite place *within* a *chain of being*; in one sense this Spinozist location provides us with an awareness of a system that is higher than the subjective needs of our wants and desires, and one that, as outlined above, requires a noble adherence to higher preestablished rules that provide us with access to Aristotle's more communitarian notions of *the good life* or *magnificence*; as long as they are adjusted to in good faith.

Moreover, the fact that anything in Spinoza's system is of necessity no more valued on an economic scale than anything else, points to an ethical system whereby our *place within the Natura Naturata* means that we are ourselves determined and therefore struggle for mastery in vain—in the philosophical long run. There is no admittance of the infinite *Sehnsucht* of romanticism, as in this ethical system, one faces life with dignity and resolve in the face of predetermined necessity. Furthermore, even in the idealist program of *Naturphilosophie,* there are unanswered philosophical problems, which may themselves point to a species of dogmatism lying just under the surface, because of the hypostasis of the transcendental Ego *over and above* the natural world on the ontological economic scale. This is the fundamental reason for the *romantic irony* that pervades the oeuvre not only of German Romanticism but also some areas of English Romanticism, as most clearly elaborated upon by Ann K. Mellor (1980). These selfsame tensions also give rise to the uncertainty about home and hearth, as signaled in certain areas of the romantic tradition.

In summary, the idea of home I have spelled out hitherto is a philosophical notion off the human subject reconnecting to the external world; either in a Spinozist sense of a Great Chain of Being, or in the sense configured in idealism of a hypostasis of the transcendental ego onto the external world, and hence configured as its gnostic spirit head. Coleridge's own sense of an emotional home is interrogated in canonical poems such as "Frost at Midnight" and "Dejection: An Ode" and his romantic organicism, formulated in his own *Logic* and *Opus Maximus*. However, it's perhaps most famously elaborated upon in his famous Chapter 13 of his *Biographia Literaria*. His famously ambiguous reference to the "Infinite I AM" itself a reference to Exodus 3. 14: "I AM; that is who I AM" with Exodus' own diasporic and spiritual reference to the requirement of a *Home* within the world. His theory of the primary and secondary imagination and the mechanical fancy and organic imagination are testament to his own organicism, with the primary imagination reinstating the human subject as gnostic spirit head of the *natura naturans*. However, Coleridge himself problematized his own notions and finally broke rank with Schelling on

his notion of an intellectual intuition, as expressed in *The Letters to* Green (1815-1819), whereby he questions Schelling's intellectual intuition that ostensibly both derives *from experience* and is at the same time responsible *for* experience.[9] In the wake of this philosophical aporia, his later turn from Unitarian to Trinitarian Christianity ultimately supersedes his philosophical system and posits God or *Yaweh* in in the ultimate ontological position. This is something that was not instantiated in absolute idealist systems such as those of Fichte or Hegel. As Deakin writes:

> I believe this is mainly because of Coleridge's position as a Unitarian minister, in consequence of which Coleridge could not allow reason to subvert his Christian topography. Hegel's conceptualization of reason and philosophy allows his stratification of art-religion-philosophy; this in turn enables Hegel to dispense with any foundationalist metaphysics because reason (or *Spirit*) itself as the monistic *Ousia* displaces religion as a mere stage within the overall system. (Deakin, 2015, p. 41).

This theistic positioning enables Coleridge to call upon The Lord as creator, in the hymn which I discuss below, abandoning any problematic philosophically organic notion of the human subject within the world, or as gnostic spirit head of the world—one can ultimately call on faith in order to recognize the theodicy of the landscape; the genre of the hymn giving Coleridge one of his examples of poetics where he finds consolation within a created landscape and by extension his faith within a monistic Deity. This is a different conception of the human subject as organic homemaker in Wordsworth's *Home at Grasmere*.

There is, I would argue, a form of *hermeneutical organicism,* inherent in Heidegger's work after the *Kehre*, to which I will turn next. This, I contend, can be used as a tool in rereading a number of the second-generation romantic poets, in the case presented here, P.B. Shelley, who in many ways prefigures this organicism, as a proto-Heideggerian thinker.

Heidegger's Organic Language of Home and 'Dwelling'

Heidegger's hermeneutics followed Husserl's call for a 'return to the things in themselves' in the form of his hermeneutics of Being. If Husserl's transcendental phenomenology had once again produced a transcendental subjectivity, Heidegger placed the subject right back into the prepositional *being-towards-which* and the *Geworfenheit* (thrownness) of his philosophical hermeneutics of Being. Although Heidegger's broader treatment of, for example, twentieth-century technology, is of no great interest for the purposes of this paper, his anti-metaphysical system does share some interesting organic similarities to the systems assessed above. For one, it shares a monistic ontology, whilst placing the subject firmly back *into* world, and moreover a

desire to challenge the representationalism of the Kantian system, whilst concurrently challenging the absolute Ego of Fichte's idealism. Heidegger's placing of the subject back into *Weltheit* (worldhood) enables another Spinozean instantiation of organicism, which gives us an interesting vista through which to reread the poems under discussion below, whilst helping us reframe the ideas of organicism in the early nineteenth century. Heidegger introduces, through verbal actions, a reduced distance between the world and the subject lodged into (or thrown into this world), who can't have a privileged ontological position, whether it be theological or metaphysical, in a world into which they are thrown. This is the position within which I will argue below P.B. Shelley finds himself as poet when I analyze his poetic toping of his experience of Mont Blanc.

In a number of seminal later essays, after the *kehre*, Heidegger develops the notions first elaborated upon in *Being and Time* (1927) to new linguistic heights as he developed his notions of poetic dwelling within the world. He posits in these latter works the notion that poetry is much more than an aesthetic, and in the romantic tradition of Schlegel, and importantly for this paper Shelley, places the poet in the upper echelons of philosophy. In the self-same tradition, poetry becomes for Heidegger (as it would later for other philosophical romantics such as Richard Rorty), the supreme act of both aesthetic and philosophical creation. This is because poetic thinking arrests or stills Being, enabling one to partake in Being at its deepest level. It is both this privileging of the poetics of higher hermeneutics and the organicism entailed in this situating the human subject in the world—but also in the world of a *non-representational* ontology—which make Heidegger such a romantic and organic thinker. In *The Origin of the Work of Art* (1935-6) he writes:

> Projective saying is poetry: the saying of the world and earth, the saying of the arena of their conflict and thus of the place of all nearness and remoteness of the gods. Poetry is the saying of the unconcealdness of what is. Actual language at any given moment is the happening of this saying, in which a people's world historically arises for it and the earth is preserved as that which remains closed. (Heidegger, 1971, p. 74)

Heidegger thus sees language not as representing the world but as bringing the world 'as worldhood' into phenomenological existence for humanity. In other words—and in one respect, *pace* the primitivism of previous thinkers such as Herder and Hamann—poetry itself is organic and discloses our worldhood—whilst at the same time closing off the earth to us. Language presences the world for us and without this presencing, there would not even be the requirement for philosophical correspondence to something "other". There would in fact be no earth which is closed to us, without it being in the first-place history arising out

of language, or as he says elsewhere, "Language is the house of Being." (Heidegger, 2000, p. 275)

Thus, in Heideggerian organicism, the *organic and mechanical* are borne of language, language which is ultimately a linguistic concrete universal or *totum* that is not abstracted *mechanically* out of the various parts of the preexisting world (which would be language as *compositum* or abstract universal), but in fact precedes them and concretizes them in human consciousness—thus it is organic in both the scholastic and the latter idealist sense.

It is strangely paradoxical in that if we reread the romantics through this philosophical romantic framework, we ascertain that we see in them the origin of—on the one hand—the Heideggerian twentieth-century action of *Gestell* (framing) the world and thus removing ourselves from a more organic involvement with the world to a more mechanical one, whilst also poeticizing the world in such a way as to actually *Wohnen* (dwell) in the world of Being. One of Heidegger's poetic heroes is indeed the German romantic poet Hölderlin, from whom he borrows the phrase "man dwells poetically" *dichterisch, wohnet der Mensch*. (Heidegger, 1971, p. 213) Dwelling in the world is an active verbal process of doing. In contrast, framing reduces the world by disclosing it in new technological ways that take us further away from a more organic connection or "clearing" of the world. Therefore, the romantic organicism of Schlegel is a long way from *dwelling in Being* as Heidegger would have it, because it dislocates us from authentic Being by actually disclosing it in such a way as to promote a *playful and allegorical distance from it*. Whereas Heidegger would have it that authentic poetic thought or writing is organic in such a way as to open Being up to us rather than close it off—even if the earth is in some sense closed to us—because worldhood is opened to us through authentic, poetic and organic language.

Heidegger also reestablishes the post-Husserlian epistemic concept of *aletheia* (disclosure) in the sense that certain artifacts open up a world for us, or disclose our world, which is however not the same as *representationalism*, transcendental idealism or the empirical realism as postulated by Kant. The post-kantians responded to this challenge by formulating organic tropes that remained bound to a subject-object relationship, culminating in absolute idealism in the case of Fichte and Hegel, the open-ended and infinitely open dialectics of the *Frühromantik*, or the theological hierarchy of Coleridge, placing religion as myth back above reason as *Ousia.* However, this ontology is one that both Husserl and Heidegger wished to move beyond and so Heidegger's postulation of poetry as "sounding" truth gives the subject a less mediated experience of the external world.

Theoretically, the four-fold nature of Heidegger's sense of clearing is revealed *through* poetic thinking, not *to* or *by* poetic thinking; the poet thinker or

philosopher takes part in the four-fold ecological process, which includes our worldhood of: *earth, sky, mortals* and *gods*, all functioning in a collective mirroring, all symbiotically *thinging* together. In examining his concept of "thinging" in the essay, *The Thing* (1951), he recalls the original German meaning of the word: "gathering" and contests that through the philological twists and turns of context-riven history, we have arrived at the modern etymology of "anything that exists, in any sense", which is not only an extremely ambiguous meaning but one that has become central to everyday parlance. He sees this as endemic of our new representational disclosure of Being, or our technological sense of the world, from the Greek root of *Tikto*: to bring forth or to produce.

In the four-fold of earth, sky, mortals and gods being produced symbiotically, and through language, there is a *clearing*, roughly translated as *ereignen*, whereby the fourfold are *gathered up* in the old verbal sense of "thing" which thus conjugates to form the verb "thinging." This symbiotic and verb-al event horizon is key to Heidegger's answer to Husserl's call to return to the things themselves; indeed, the *things-in-themselves* mystification instantiated by Kant is symptomatic of the fact that the verb-al and actionable processes that genuinely open up or presence Being for us have become mystified or, in grammatical terms, *nominalized* and turned into a series of frozen noun phrases, taking us further than ever away from the originary, actionable nature of language-as-Being—so treasured by the romantics.

> Because the word *thing* as used in Western metaphysics denotes that which is at all and is something in some way or other, the meaning of the name "thing" varies with the interpretation of that which is—of entities. Kant talks about things in the same way as Meister Eckhart and means by this term something that is. But for Kant, that which is becomes the object of a representing that runs its course in the self-consciousness of the human ego. The thing-in-itself means for Kant: the object-in-itself. To Kant, the character of the "in-itself" signifies that the object is an object in itself without reference to the human act of representing it, that is, without the opposing "ob-" by which it is first of all put before this representing act. "Thing-in-itself," thought in a rigorously Kantian way, means an object that is no object for us, because it is supposed to stand, stay put, without a possible before: for the human representational act that encounters it. (Heidegger, 1971, pp. 176-177)

Thus, things *thinging* have become nominalized in our mental grammar and are thus waiting to be *re-presented* through poetic thought; in actual fact, more than ever in our modern world of *techne*, whereby representationalism has taken such a firm hold and has reduced things to this gallery of modern *Gestell*.

Consequently, Heidegger's ecological organicism is verbal, however verbal in the sense of linguistic *performativity*, gathering the fourfold up for the lighting up or clearing in which we may truly dwell poetically and in which things are thinging and thus mutually illuminating their specular presencing. Heidegger's sense is one of "letting be"—of clearing—in the sense that it does not direct us to a relationship with the products of nature; in authentic "worldhood" the world "worlding' signifies the relationship of a mutually acknowledged ontological mirroring, or a "ringing." However, the ringing is not a *ringing-of some-thing*, because this is in fact the world ecologically *worlding*. As Heidegger writes "Therefore, the round dance does not encompass the four like a hoop. The round dance is the ring that joins while it plays as mirroring." (Heidegger, 1971, p. 180) The very verbal process of poetic gathering discloses a world without a sense of ontological distance for us. It is with this sense of ecological organicism in mind, that I will finally examine the two most philosophical of the English romantic poets, Coleridge and Shelley, and their particular organic encounters of the Vale of Chamonix.

Bearing in mind Heidegger's four-folding poetic response to the world, we see that Coleridge's organic poetics are draped in a Paleyan theodicy of the landscape, searching for theistic signs within the landscape itself. The mountain symbolizes a theological cipher to eternal reason for Coleridge, and as we shall see in the reading below, it's his metaphysical quietism and *faith* that is reinforced through his experience of the sublime. On the other hand, the proto-Heideggerian notions of Shelley, who experiences world-disclosure in the existential encounter of *Mont Blanc*, resists the Coleridgean and transcendental notion, of a divine-Logos as author of this experience. Likewise, Shelley resists the Wordsworthian egotistical sublime of *Home at Grasmere*, instead he finds his subjective agency *dwelling* in the world of ecologically *ringing* relations. There is neither a dualistic nor a monistic ontology for Shelley, as he dwells within the four-folding ontology of what I read as his proto-Heideggerian sublime mountain encounter.

Organic encounters in the Vale of Chamonix

S.T. Coleridge's credentials as a poet were never really in question, his reputation already well on the way towards being fully secured after his conversational poems with Wordsworth during the Alfoxden period and the ensuing revolutionary volume of *The Lyrical Ballads* (1798).[10] He recognized Wordsworth's technical superiority as a poet and thus charged his friend with writing the philosophical epic, *The Recluse*. Indeed, Wordsworth in this project articulated the romantic organicism I adumbrated above, placing the poet-as-philosopher back into a natural home in Grasmere. As a philosopher in his own right however, Coleridge was hugely successful. In his book *Coleridge's Contemplative Philosophy* Peter Cheyne (2020) has more than restored his

reputation amongst the great British philosophers of the nineteenth century.[11] His heady and eclectic combination of Platonic noesis, Neoplatonism, Behemenism, idealism and his formal logical system of pentads and tetrads all work in the service of a novel system of Coleridgean Ideas that involves a multi-level structure crossed by a chiastic centre, ultimately enabling experience through inchoate contemplation that is approximate in many ways to Heidegger's later organic notion of the "dwelling in Being", or in Coleridgean terminology his *ideal realism*.

Shelley's own philosophical preoccupations were equally diverse, drawing on the deterministic French materialism of thinkers such as Baron d' Holbach, whilst emanating from an atheist centre, which only complicated his youthful thoughts on Godwinian perfectibility, which were cased in a rationalist and free conception of history; these fulminations are further complicated by Shelley's interest in the British empirical tradition and the Humean scepticism in which this logically culminates. Moreover, his Platonic faith in the transcendental notion of *The One*, expressed poetically in the Demogorgon's claim in *Prometheus Unbound* that "the deep truth is imageless" (Shelley, 2002, p. 250) in some respects mirrors Coleridge's faith in inchoate contemplation and aesthetics providing a hieroglyphic cipher to the deeper logos—or for Shelley, *The One*. These elements are what informs Shelley's *sceptical idealism*. It can certainly be concluded that of the British romantics, these poets were the most philosophically committed, and were both seeking ascent to the logos or a transcendental signified—however using different tributaries—through aesthetics. Therefore, it is of interest to explicate, in a philosophical light, their related poetic excursions in the Vale of Chamonix.

Coleridge's poem "Chamouny; the Hour Before Sunrise. A Hymn" (1802), was in fact written about an experience he had on Scafell Peak, in the British Lake District. In his introductory preamble to the poem in the Morning Post, 11th September, 1802, he had asked "Who *would* be, who *could* be an atheist in this alley of wonders?" [12] A clear challenge to the militantly atheist Shelley, who with what I see as his proto-Heideggerian ontology, is opening his experiential present up to a certain phenomenological epoche (bracketing) of the mountain that will ultimately allow the experience (and the mountain wilderness) to *speak to his mind*, whilst producing an experience that also *rings fourfold* and to a more complex precis than the Coleridgean experience. Coleridge had not even seen Chamouny at the time this poem was written, which begs obvious questions about the purported tenor of the poem; a poem that was also adopted in part from an earlier poem written by Friederike Brun. However, New Historicist assumptions aside, there are clear Christian and philosophical denotations in Coleridge's depiction of the landscape in moving the poet's contemplative horizon. Crucially, one has to acknowledge that Coleridge has as his goal a celebration of Christain theodicy as discovered

within his purported experience of Mont Blanc. Indeed, the horizon structure of Coleridge's organic connection to the mountain is framed within the experience of the great Father of Being or Logos. In characterizing the peak of the mountain, both Shelley and Coleridge remark the sense of sublime limits placed upon their reason when looking towards the apex—the analogon of the *apeiron*—of the mountain; Coleridge exclaims:

> Deep is the sky, and black—transpicuous, deep,
> An ebon mass. Methinks thou piercest it
> As with a wedge! But when I look again,
> It seems thy own calm home, thy crystal shrine,
> Thy habituation from eternity.
> Oh dread and silent form! I gazed upon thee
> Till thou, still present to my bodily eye,
> Didst vanish from my thought. Entranced in pray'r,
> I worshipped the invisible alone.
> Yet thou, meantime, wast working on my soul,
> E'en like some deep enchanting melody,
> So sweet, we know not we are list'ning to it.
> But I awake, and with a busier mind
> And active will self-conscious, offer now,
> Not, as before, involuntary pray'r
> And passive adoration. (Coleridge, 2001, pp. 926-927)

The lyric poet moves from an associationist connection of imagery to a more organic troping; far from the imagery of the peak assuming the traditional and mechanical *penetration* metaphor of the deep sky, the sky becomes an organic "home" for the mountain top—and this has been the case "for eternity". Moreover, as the speaker experiences the sublime "Oh dread and silent form!" which begins to work "on my soul' the poet moves, through inchoate contemplation to a purer idea, and as with a palimpsest the original sensory sensation is written upon his soul. However, upon rising from his meditative state, in a move similar to the call for a visionary return in "Kubla Khan", he calls through his active and "self-conscious" *secondary imagination* upon the scene to *awaken for him,* as the objective correlative to his numinous imaginative state.

By way of a series of imperatives he raises the numinous question of creation, "Awake, awake! And thou, my heart, awake!" (Coleridge, 2001, p. 927). Before answering his own call "Who with lovely flow'rs/ Of living blue spread garlands at your feet?/ 'God, God! The torrents, like a shout of nations, Utter…(Coleridge, 2001, pp. 928-929). With this theological move, Coleridge takes a more *passive* stance towards his experience of the landscape. Whilst it

commences similarly to Wordsworth in poems such as "Tintern Abbey" and *Home at Grasmere* by moving from a physical landscape centripetally to the deeper recesses of the poet's mind and soul, it signally refuses to subsequently move in a centrifugal fashion back out *towards* the landscape, which would utilize devices such as Keats' *egotistical sublime*. Coleridge adopts a position of active calling *out towards* the theodicy of the landscape, starting from his very corporeality, as a consequence he does not imaginatively infuse the world with the imaginative organic tool of poetics that will reflect the creativity of the *Natura Naturans*; instead, Coleridge calls upon the *Natura Naturata* of the landscape and in reality produces a poem that from its inception is restricted to the formal limits of a hymn. The elements that are often taken up and create a *ringing* and a *mirroring* in Wordsworth's vistas, producing a symbolic marriage of the mind and nature in *Grasmere*, often fail to reach beyond the state of a summons in much of Coleridge's conversation poems with Wordsworth, and perhaps Coleridge realized this when asking Wordsworth to write the philosophic and imaginative answer to the Milton's earlier epic, *Paradise Lost*; realized perhaps also in his own characteristic failure to complete his own purported philosophical epic, *The Brook.*

The poem's final section slows the tone down to a canter and produces Coleridge's *reprise* and arguably the best lines of the poem. He once again addresses the sublime mountain-scape itself, after listing the preceding metonymic and picturesque elements of the mountain such as "meadow streams" (Coleridge, 2001, p. 929), "silent snow mass" (Coleridge, 2001, p. 929), "dreadless flow'rs" (Coleridge, 2001, p. 929), "ye wild goats" (Coleridge, 2001, p. 929). He says "Rise like a cloud of incense from the earth!/ Thou kingly spirit throned among the hills." (Coleridge, 2001, pp. 929-930). His tone switches to one of adulation and reverence for the organic sublimity of the *whole*, over and above the *compositum* of its metonymic parts. His final lines bring us once again close to a gathering of the fourfold as he finds his poetic footing in an organic *totum*. However, the elements are actually called together in these final four lines but there is still a sense of lack, perhaps because we sense the lyric speaker still standing in a sense apart from the *thing itself*; the authentic *fouring* as Heidegger in his theory of philosophical poetics would phrase it, is not quite instantiated by Coleridge:

> Thou dread ambassador from earth to heav'n—
> Great hierarch, tell thou the silent sky,
> And tell the stars, and tell the rising sun,
> Earth with her thousand voices calls on God! (Coleridge, 2001, p. 930)

The earthly mountain is connected to heaven by the sky and the stars and the sun are also *ringing* in these lines, however perhaps the fact that the mountain is

instructed to call on God signifies in a sense that this is a *depiction* and *not a mirroring*. The use of prosopopoeia in calling the mountain "dread ambassador" is perhaps why the best lines seem to fall short of the power of the final lines of Shelley's poem. The theological sublimity of the landscape itself is enough to transport the lyric speaker and bring the fourfold together, the very dwelling in this poetic landscape, even for Coleridge the philosopher, in an inchoate manner, is perhaps enough to disclose an organic cipher to the eternal Reason as Logos—and in the final instance through his generic turn through his hymn, to God the father-as-Logos. I turn now to Shelley's very different depiction of the same (this time authentic) landscape, 14 years later.

Shelley's encounter with Mont Blanc in the Vale of Chamonix concludes Mary Shelley's travelogue *History of a Six Week's Tour* (1817). Upon the proto-Heideggerian anti-representationalist notion of romantic organicism I offer here, Shelley's sceptical idealism produces fertile ground in this (at least in part) response to Coleridge's poem. The address to the power of the imagination as a tool is key to understanding the first part of the poem, as Shelley reflects upon some Coleridgean images, drawn mainly from Coleridge's seminal poem about both the power and the ironic and fragmentary limits of the secondary poetic imagination: *Kubla Khan* (1817). Shelley's lines include "Thy caverns echoing to the Arve's commotion" (Shelley, 2002, p. 98), "the still cave of the witch poesy" (Shelley, 2002, p. 98), "vast caves/ Shine in the rushing torrents' restless gleam,/ Which from those secret chasms in tumult welling" (Shelley, 2002, p. 100). Coleridge's underground and unconscious rivers and caverns, that are *measureless to man* are metonymically framed by Shelley as the mountainous tributaries of the Arve—roaring forth from an uncertain source at the top of the mountain—which for Coleridge is the region of eternity—also the symbolic *home* of the mountain. Concomitantly, for Shelley the cloud-shrouded peak of Mont Blanc is "Where Power in likeness of the Arve comes down/ From the ice gulfs that gird his secret throne,/ Bursting through these dark mountains like the flame/ Of lightning through the tempest; thou dost lie." (Shelley, 2002, p. 97). The simile of lightening hints at a possible Promethean allusion, and a possible allusion to Shakespeare's *The Tempest*; both allusions potentially humanize the power of the imagination instead of attributing the experience to God. Shelley further seems to contradict Coleridge in humanist terms by claiming that

> -when I gaze on thee
> I seem as in a trance sublime and strange
> To muse on my own separate fantasy,
> My own, my human mind, which passively
> Now renders and receives fast influencings,
> Holding an unremitting interchange
> With the clear universe of things around; (Shelley, 2002, p. 98)

For Coleridge the trance he falls into whilst in contemplation is signified by the perceptual condition of becoming "Entranced in pray'r,/ I worshipped the invisible alone." Whereas Shelley's empiricist and rationalist tendencies refer him back to his mind's dialogue with the external world, Coleridge takes refuge and makes the intuitive leap to theism and to "passive adoration". Shelley's mind is far from made up, given his atheism and philosophical influences, about the deeper meaning of this experience of the sublime. This is the reason that Coleridge's poem, in Heideggerian terms, does not thoroughly gather up the fourfold of worldhood; it *doesn't require this gathering* as God is posited as the author of this Paleyan theodicy of the landscape. Shelley is *gathering up* more and more of this experience and thus not setting himself up in a *passive* relationship with an omnipotent deity, which would mean not allowing the fourfold to properly *thing* in the first place. Moreover, an unremitting interchange is precisely the verbal way to keep one in the ringing and mirroring exchange of *Being*, to dwell in the sublimity of the house of Being.

The trope of an organic interchange or positive dialogue with the mirroring elements is further elaborated upon in one of the most famous sections of the poem, where Shelley elaborates upon the truly ambiguous nature of encounters with the sublime:

> The wilderness has a mysterious tongue
> Which teaches awful doubt, or faith so mild,
> So solemn, so serene, that man may be
> But for such faith with nature reconciled.
> Thou hast a voice, great mountain, to repeal
> Large codes of fraud and woe—not understood
> By all, but which the wise, and great, and good
> Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel. (Shelley, 2002, p. 99)

However, this anthropomorphism is not of the exact nature as Coleridge's previous personification. It frames a roughly human aspect but takes an ambiguous turn; there is something of an exchange, a *sounding*, and it may indeed produce the "faith so mild" of Wordsworth in *Tintern Abbey*; or it may equally be registered as "awful doubt" which is produced by the overall *unheimlich* (uncanny) effect of a natural event that dislodges us from a "homely" feeling, but in so doing produces an effect of organically re-housing the human subject. This is in either sense an exchange, a 'lesson' and in whichever way we disclose the experience of the sublime, whether in the Wordsworthian praxis of the egotistical sublime, or the more Burkean sense of terror and the uncanny, we partake in an exchange, where our subjectivity is interrogated from both within and without and thus placed within an organic web of relations. We are dwelling in the world or *ringing* relations either way,

and not in the passively theistic sense adumbrated by Coleridge in his ventriliquized 'Chamouny' experience.

The poem's final lines, notoriously ambiguous, are also perhaps, as with Coleridge, the most organic of the poem, but produce the most explicit statement of the interchange either previously sought for…or intimated by Shelley.

> …The secret strength of things
> Which governs thought, and to the infinite dome
> Of heaven is as a law, inhabits thee!
> And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea,
> If to the human mind's imaginings
> Silence and solitude were vacancy? (Shelley, 2002, pp. 100-101)

These lines are often read as perfect examples of Shelleyan scepticism, with a retention of the romantic idealism of the aesthetic imagination and its *hermeneutic* force. This reading couches the poem in the then prevailing ideas of organicism of the romantic period, incorporating the epistemically delimiting romantic irony or scepticism of the *Frühromantik*, or the positive *Naturphilosophie* of the post-Kantian German idealists—or even the transcendental idealism of Kant himself. However, on my more proto-Heideggerian romantic reading, *the rhetorical question indicates that there is a constant interchange that provides us a home* in the world, allowing us to dwell both organically and poetically in the world—both phrases amount to the same thing. The ringing and mirroring of things *thinging* in the world, this "secret law" of course inhabits a sublime mountain such as Mont Blanc. However, it is also a law that "governs all thought" and of necessity "the infinite dome of heaven". Crucially, even though Shelley is a self-avowed atheist, the ringing or mutual disclosure of worldhood necessarily entails *fourfolding*, *thinging*, *worlding* to bring the world fully and comprehensively into existence for us. There could be *no actual vacancy*, or actually no "world" without the worlding that includes mortals as well as the gods. These elements in effect have a phenomenologically geometrical essence—that call us back to our true home in *worldhood*. Shelley in effect catalogues world-disclosure in the experiential present at Mont Blanc, while removing transcendental assumptions such as the Coleridgean proclamation of a divine being or Logos to which this world disclosure can be attributed and the Wordsworthian egotistical sublime of *Home at Grasmere* that postulates an ecological marriage between the human mind and the external world.

Conclusion

To conclude, when considering the notions of organicism and of our home in the world, one can find strong evidence that both S.T. Coleridge's and P.B. Shelley's poetic treatment of Mont Blanc speak to their differing philosophical commitments. It can moreover be discerned that Shelley's troping of his relationship to the sublime encounter of Mont Blanc can be read as proto-Heideggerian and thus a phenomenological response, in answer to Coleridge's more theological response to this putative experience of the sublime. As a final thought, the contested philosophical romanticisms that I posit here, in light of the organicism, aestheticism, idealism and theology of the nineteenth-century provide at least possible keys to what I purport to be a stronger and more resilient claim to a *home* in the world for the human subject. This, in spite of the *Gestell*, or advance of technology and its attendant aporias, which have not only potentially de-historicized our Being-in-the-World but also possibly atomized our sense of home in the world. This romantic question about our home within the world that we inhabit still speaks to current debates about our ecological relationship with the world in which we inhabit and it seems to me holds continued relevance today as much as it does in the post-Kantian landscape of the early 1800s. Perhaps in the future it may be possible that ecological reengagement may be implemented through timely aesthetic, philosophical and theological activity, that provides, at least in some measure, for a new aesthetic education of humanity.

Notes

1. Jay Bernstein comprehensively outlines this post-Kantian view in his essay "Poesy and the Arbitrariness of the Sign: Notes for a critique of Jena romanticism" (Kompridis, 2006, pp. 143-172).
2. The idea of organicism can be traced right back to Plato's dialogue on *Timaeus* and the transcendent Demiurge and also in Aristotle's biological teleology of the *formal-final* cause—traced contingently to his doctrine of *the unmoved mover*. The idea of *anima mundi* in various guises in the Stoics, the Neoplatonic *Emanation* theory of Plotinus, Giordano Bruno, (and other renaissance thinkers); it also crucially appears in the work of the 17th century Cambridge Platonists, More, Cudworth, Whichcote, et al., in their implicit defense of amongst many other things, Origen, and their equally implicit critique of the naturalism of Spinoza (whom I hold here to be, upon a philological reading, an organic thinker) and Hobbes. Crucially, Cudworth's *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (1678) was studied in Latin at Tübingen University by Hegel, Schelling and Hölderlin. Hedley, *Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion*, 40-2, citing Michael Franz, *Schellings Tübinger Platon-Studien*, ch. 3. In Hedley's writing Coleridge's identification with Anglican Platonism is discussed at length and this identification of the role of Cudworth's book brings into sharp relief the question of the influence of Anglican Platonism on the German Idealists before their earlier *"The so-called oldest system programme of German Idealism"* (*SP*) of 1796. Thus, one may discern more than just a response to Kant's regulative organicism in the call for a *new form of religion*.
   In addition, Goethe (1998) himself, like Aristotle, was trained as a biologist (as well as a theorist of aesthetics) and one clearly discerns this in his work both before and after his *Italian Journey* (1816-1817), in which he develops a botanic theory of artistic creation. Back in England, in the eighteenth century, both Shaftesbury (2000) and Alexander Gerard (2015) also Developed psychological and aesthetic organic theories that predated the latter German development of organicism, in both Gerard's *Essay on Genius* (1774) and Shaftesbury's earlier *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1711), which includes the influential essay "Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author" (1710). Shaftesbury was immensely influential at the time and exerted an influence throughout France and the then German States. His influence only waned along with the idealism of Bradley and others, after the development of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This particular philosophical plot also includes the important *Pantheismusstreit* controversy, in the wake of Spinoza's work—a discussion of some gravity and beyond the parameters of the current paper.

3. In one sense it is not only Spinoza that can be deconstructed and read as both mechanistic and organic, as I outline here, but also even Newton himself, whose mechanistic view of the universe was the target of much of the critique of the organic thinkers. Newton hypothesized a ubiquitous God with free agency to "within his boundless uniform sensorium," vitalise all living things in the *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (1687). Kant had to respond to the aspect of Newton's physics that posited a non-direct causality between objects at a distance, which ironically prompted his views on inertia and his entertainment of organicism as a regulatory principle. See M.H. Abrams (1953), chapters 7, 8 and 9.

4. Epigenesis was the theory that cells and eggs develop through stages into organs and eventually the mature body and one can see the connection made to all of life in general by Aristotle, first outlined in his *On the Generation of Animals.* The formal-final cause is also related to the theory of epigenesis, where we can clearly discern the influence of Aristotle's training in biology. In the modern scientific paradigm, there have been more recent challenges made by the meta-theory of *epigenetics*. Therefore, we can now discern a new living idea of the organic in the form of epigenetics, which posits that cells essentially read genetic code like a script to be interpreted rather than a blueprint that produces the same result each time. This new area of biology promises interesting cross-disciplinary philosophical discussions in the near future—something that has already commenced with new discoveries in neuroscience. Anil K, Seth, for example, runs the Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science at Sussex University in the UK, which collaborates with neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, psychiatrists, brain imagers, VR technicians and philosophers. There will undoubtedly be more such interdisciplinary centres in the near future that will be localised around the idea of epigenetics. For more discussion of the recent discoveries in epigenetics, see the recent account by Nessa Carey (2012).
5. As noted by in the "Introduction" to the Cornell edition of *Home at Grassmere*, pp. 3-7, Coleridge's expectations of Wordsworth for this project were immense and would not have been accomplished by any poet, under any circumstances.
6. There are of course a number of varying approaches to the concept of home, many of which differ from the ontological/epistemological rendering I offer here in the context of Romanticism. Other signal representations of this concept at differing points in modern intellectual history have been made by Thoreau in *Walden* (1854), Marx (in terms of the economic labour theory of value) in concepts such as of alienation and private property, in many works but for example the *Grundrisse* (1973), Freud in terms of *unheimlichkeit* [the uncanny] (1919); and in their overall oeuvre, Kafka and Kierkegaard in terms of existentialism; significant contributions have more recently been

made by George (1996), Rouner (1996), Nussbaum (1996), Ignatieff (1993), Homi K Bhabha (1990) and bell hooks (1990). Novalis also responds to the irony of his *Frühromantik* peers by offering *music* as another type of response to the homelessness, or aporia, of modernity. His theory of the musicality of language as an echo of the infinite play of the universe, leads him to trace a more non-conceptual and aesthetic response to the philosophical drive of *Gefühl,* by positing music as offering an at least occasional sense of 'home' for the mind. This type of argument for the non-conceptual significance of music, was also articulated in a different form connected to *the will,* by Arthur Schopenhauer and others that followed in his tradition.

7. More recently, and at the more parochial end of the scale, Roger Scruton has also expounded the theory of *Oikophilia*; the love of one's home—as a natural aspect of the human condition. From Scruton's conservative perspective, there are inherent dangers to this sense of *Oikophilia* that are inevitably bound up with many aspects of the cosmopolitan environmental movement, which for Scruton entail a loss of local character and identity—he goes as far as to use Milan Kundera's term *uglification* in respect to things such as wind turbines off the UK coast, which he contends needlessly destroy the aesthetics of the landscape—an aesthetics partly spawned from a cultural primitivism itself so celebrated by the romantics. Scruton argues that a return of power and decision making to local communities and parishes would itself produce a more organic green political response to a very mechanical problem. He writes,

> French environmentalism is the child of pays réel conservatives like Gustave Thibon and Jean Giono, while the German Greens have inherited some of the romanticism of the early twentieth-century *Wandervogel* movement, as well as the vision of home and settlement so beautifully expressed by the German Romantic poets and taken up in our time both by the ex-Nazi Martin Heidegger and, in a more lucid and liberal vein, by his Jewish student Hans Jonas. (Scruton, 2013, pp. 15-16)

It appears that in whatever direction one faces—whether the cosmopolitan or the more parochial—and upon whichever bent your political sympathies lie—one of the major dilemmas of modernity is our spiritual and territorial sense of our home on earth—a sense of home which has become challenged by both the industrial and the Kantian 'Copernican revolution' in philosophy.

Moreover, on an individual—and by extension cultural level—the sense of home has also become politically embroiled within the precarious

postmodern realm of identarianism. Bonnie Honig has written of contested subjectivities and identities that, in light of a postmodern critique, are far more complex than the post-Kantian binary position as outlined by thinkers like Derrida (2002); and far less stable than the conservative essentialist position delineated above by Scruton. In citing thinkers such as bell hooks, Honig claims that the concept of a stable home is in a sense an unattainable fantasy; however, one that various individuals are prone to strive for as "a place free of power, conflict, and struggle, a place—an identity, a private realm, a form of life, a group vision—unmarked or unriven by difference and untouched by the power brought to bear upon it by the identities that strive to ground themselves in its place" (Honig, 1994, p. 565). Therefore, contested subjectivities, narratives and identities such as that of an African American woman living under the 'double voiced' discourse of both *patriarchy* and *domestic racial prejudice* necessarily inculcate resistance, adjustment and negotiation as the basic elements of a human agent's constructed and unstable identity. Consequently, it seems problematic, if not impossible, in light of recent postcolonial theory, to sustain, at least in many ethnographic instances, an *essentialist* sense of home and hearth.

Given the complexities of the simple idea of home in a modernity at once punctuated by diasporas, industrial and economic relocation, imperialism and sociological fluctuation and ecological catastrophe, it is perhaps more important than ever to at least philosophically trace a *fundamental* sense of home in the organicism that was first given serious philosophical attention by the thinkers who were reacting to the dawn of the modern philosophical period after the instantiation of Rene Descartes' dualistic ontology of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*.

8. Schiller's seminal text, *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795) was hugely influential on the latter idealists and romantics.
9. Quoted in Aron Roy, "The Specter of Hegel in Coleridge's Biographia Literaria", in *Journal of the History of Ideas*. (Roy, 2007, p. 293).
10. *The Lyrical Ballads* were first published in 1798, however the edition with the seminal "Preface" was the 1800 edition, which was subsequently updated in the third (1802) edition.
11. Peter Cheyne's book goes a long way to restoring Coleridge back to his rightful place in the British philosophical tradition. Moreover, one can also discern a more logical picture in which to frame the three periods of Coleridge's thought in Cheyne's book. In some ways, Coleridge's contemplative philosophy is the praxis in which he secures more certainty about his noetic engagement with the *Logos*—more certainty than is often found in his poetry. In one sense, the architectonic of his poetic philosophy is more stable than his philosophical poetry. However, Cheyne's reading of

the sequence of "Limbo" poems convincingly argues for a rereading of Coleridge in the light of a better appreciation of his philosophical system.

12. Duncan Wu cites *Griggs*, who quotes a letter from Coleridge to William Sotheby wherein Coleridge explains that he wrote the poem "when I was on Scafell. I involuntarily poured forth a hymn in the manner of the Psalms, though afterwards I thought the ideas etc. disproportionate to our humble mountains, and, accidentally lighting on a short note in some Swiss poems concerning the Vale of Chamouni and its mountains, I transferred myself thither, in the spirit, and adapted my former feelings to these grander external objects." (Wu, 2001, p. 505). This explanation regarding the formalism of the poem goes some way to explaining the somewhat vatic structure of the imperative mood of the verb and the questions in the main body of the poem.

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