Subtle Cues and Other-Regarding Behaviors: Evidence from Economic Game Experiments in Thailand

Abstract

Traditional economic theory has been based on the assumption of human rationality and self-in-terest motivations. Results from economic game experiments that have been conducted over the past decades have challenged that notion by revealing the evidence of other-regarding behaviors, instead of the equilibrium prediction. In addition to explicit factors, other subtle  motivations could play an important role in influencing human behavior. Under the settings of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and the Dictator Game, watching eyes and flower images were introduced as subtle cues in this study. The results from the experiment on 130 Thai subjects confirmed the importance of prosocial behavior. The flower image raised the generosity level in the Dictator Game, but provided a neutral effect on the cooperation level in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Contrary to the findings of previous literature, the watching eyes had no effects on altruistic behavior in the Dictator Game, but its effect was to raise the defection rate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. The results suggest that Thais perceive close monitoring as a threat and react in a non-cooperative manner; whilst nature-related subtle cues trigger positive emotions and prosocial behavior.