Legal Philosophy Under Ethics in Artificial Intelligence: A Case Study of Autonomous Vehicles

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) in autonomous vehicles has raised significant ethical and legal concerns. This article analyzes these issues through the lens of natural law theory as proposed by Lon Fuller, his concept of External Morality of Law within the eight principles of Internal Morality of Law to establish legal legitimacy.  Additionally, legal positivism—particularly the theories of H.L.A. Hart and Hans Kelsen—as well as Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism. The findings suggest that AI decision-making in ethically conflicting situations, such as choosing between colliding with a group of children or elderly individuals or determining whether to prioritize those who comply with traffic laws over those who violate them, lacks absolute justification. While utilitarian principles may lead to decisions that align with the greatest overall welfare, they do not provide a universally acceptable resolution. Furthermore, Kelsen’s pure theory of law highlights that, in the absence of explicit legal provisions governing AI liability, such actions could be deemed entirely unlawful or require the application of the closest applicable legal framework. Currently, there is no globally unified approach to the criminal liability of AI systems, underscoring the need for clear legal definitions and the delineation of liability for both drivers and manufacturers. This would prevent the unjust punishment of individuals who have not engaged in wrongful conduct while simultaneously maintaining a legal structure that supports technological advancement within the framework of justice and fairness.