The Board's Structure and Board's Remuneration Affecting to the Firm Performance of Listed Companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand: MAI
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Abstract
The purposes of this research to study the board’s structure and board's remuneration affecting to the Firm Performance of Listed Companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand in the MAI group. This is a quantitative research, collect data from the report 56-1 of listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand in the MAI group continue with 5 years of operating results from the year 2014-2018, total 77 companies. Analyzed data with descriptive statistics, such as average, value Standard deviation variance, skewness and kurtosis. Inferential analysis test for variable relationships by Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient test statistics and using Multiple Regression methods to test hypotheses.
The results of the research showed that the board structure consists of the executive directors. independent directors and the of the audit committee has a negative influence on the performance of listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand, the MAI group, and the board's remuneration such as monthly salaries, annual bonuses, meeting allowances, and other benefits have a positive influence on the Firm Performance of listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand, MAI group, board structure and board's remuneration affects the Firm Performance of listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand, MAI group with statistical significance at the level of 0.05. The board structure should be adjusted to an appropriate size. For agility in management create strategies to keep up with situations and business competition and a committee that is knowledgeable and capable to remain in that company. Directors' remuneration should be set to knowledge, board capability and in accordance with the market price Because the board or committee also plays an important role in Firm Performance.
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