An Analysis of Empiricist Theory from the Perspective of Theravāda Buddhist Philosophy

Abstract

This research aimed to (1) examine the scope and principal claims of empiricist theory; (2) investigate the sources, processes, and criteria of knowledge in Theravāda Buddhist philosophy; and (3) analyze the relationship, differences, and limitations involved in interpreting Theravāda Buddhist philosophy through an empiricist framework. This documentary study drew on the Tipiṭaka, commentaries, and post-canonical texts as primary sources, together with relevant books, articles, and research as secondary sources. The materials were analyzed in terms of sources of knowledge, ways of knowing, criteria of justification, the scope of experience, and the aims of knowledge, and were then comparatively synthesized through an inductive approach.
The findings were as follows:
1. In this article, empiricism refers to an epistemological theory that treats sensory experience as a primary basis of knowledge and employs observation, analysis, and induction to develop conclusions open to intersubjective examination. This differs from idealism and phenomenalism, which relate reality to the mind or to what appears to a perceiver, and from pragmatism, which evaluates meaning or truth through practical consequences.
2. Theravāda Buddhist philosophy does not restrict knowledge to the external senses. It includes the six sense bases, reflection on causal conditions, and inner experience cultivated through mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom. The credibility of knowledge is assessed through a replicable discipline of practice, consistency with causal relations, and ethical consequences evident in the reduction of defilements and suffering.
3. Western empiricism and Theravāda Buddhist philosophy share a refusal to accept unexamined belief, but differ in the scope of experience, criteria of justification, and aims of knowledge. Western empirical evidence emphasizes intersubjective examination of external phenomena. Meditative knowledge is first-person experience that cannot be directly experienced by another person, yet its procedure and consequences can be examined through shared disciplines of practice. The two traditions therefore show a limited methodological affinity rather than theoretical identity.