On the Limits of Kingma’s Critique of Boorse’s Bio-Statistical Theory and Reference Classes
Article Sidebar
Main Article Content
Abstract
This paper examined Christopher Boorse’s naturalist analysis of health and disease and evaluated Elselijn Kingma’s criticism of its claimed objectivity. After analyzing Boorse’s rejection of seven existing accounts of health and disease, the paper presented his Bio-Statistical Theory (BST), which defined health as statistically normal functional ability within appropriate reference classes (natural classes of organisms specified by age and sex). The paper then addressed Kingma’s central objection that the selection of appropriate reference classes lacked empirical grounding, thereby undermining Boorse’s claim to value-neutrality. Through the analysis of Kingma’s argument concerning uniformity within reference classes, this research illustrated that her critique was flawed due to the occurrence of the decomposition fallacy. While Kingma correctly identified reference classes as crucial to BST, her argument did not successfully challenge the objectivity of Boorse’s account.
Downloads
Article Details
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
บทความทุกบทความเป็นลิขสิทธิ์ของวารสารวิชาการมนุษยศาสตร์และสังคมศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยบูรพาเท่านั้น
References
Amoretti, M. C., & Lalumera, E. (2021). Wherein is the concept of disease normative? from weak normativity to value-conscious naturalism. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 24(3), 367-378. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-021-10048-x
Binney, R. (2024). Reference-class problems are real: health-adjusted reference classes and low bone mineral density. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 49(2), 128-146. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhae005
Boorse, C. (1977). Health as a theoretical concept. Philosophy of Science, 44(4), 542-573. https://bioetyka.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/06_BoorseHealthConcept.pdf
Boorse, C. (1997). A rebuttal on health. In J. M. Humber & R. F. Almeder (Eds.), What is disease? (pp. 1-134). Humana Press.
Boorse, C. (2014). A second rebuttal on health. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 39(6), 711-729. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhu035
Brown, P. (1985). The transfer of care: psychiatric deinstitutionalization and its aftermath. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Cooper, R. (2002). Disease. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 33(2), 263-282. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0039-3681(02)00018-3
Engelhardt, H. T. (1996). The foundations of bioethics (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
Ereshefsky, M. (2009). Defining ‘health’ and ‘disease’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C, 40(3), 221-227. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2009.06.005
Guerrero, J. D. (2010). On a naturalist theory of health: a critique. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C, 41(3), 272-278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2009.12.008
Hausman, D. M. (2014). Health and functional efficiency. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 39(6), 634-647. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhu036
Hershenov, D. B. (2020). A naturalist response to Kingma’s critique of naturalist accounts of disease. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 41(4), 243-258. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-020-09526-9
Kingma, E. (2007). What is it to be healthy?. Analysis, 67(2), 128-133. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00662.x
Kingma, E. (2010). Paracetamol, poison, and polio: why Boorse’s account of function fails to distinguish health and disease. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61(2), 241-264. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axp034
Matthewson, J., & Griffiths, P. E. (2017). Biological criteria of disease: four ways of going wrong. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 42(4), 447-466. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhx004
Nordenfelt, L. (1995). On the nature of health: an action-theoretic approach (2nd ed.). Kluwer Academic.
Schwartz, P. H. (2014). Reframing the disease debate and defending the biostatistical theory. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 39(6), 572-589. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhu039
Veit, W. (2021). Biological normativity: a new hope for naturalism? Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 24(2), 291-301. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-020-09993-w
Wakefield, J. C. (1992). The concept of mental disorder: on the boundary between biological facts and social values. American Psychologist, 47(3), 373-388. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.47.3.373
Wakefield, J. C. (1999). Evolutionary versus prototype analyses of the concept of disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108(3), 375-399. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.108.3.374
Werkhoven, S. (2020). Health and reference classes. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 45(2), 145-158. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhz042
