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Constitution Making : A Comparative Perspective
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May 6, 2022
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2022-05-06 (1)
Keywords:
constitution making, constitutional amendment, constitutional replacement, constitutional design, constitutional borrowing
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Abstract
This article will seek to explore an overview of the field of comparative constitution making that has advanced in the past three decades. In recent years, scholars have produced creative scholarship in comparative constitution making. They have asked some of major questions in constitutional change confronting constitutional designers, including the challenges of constitutional endurance, constitutional unamendability, constitutional legitimacy, and unconstitutional amendment. Scholars have also given significant attention to the study of constitutional amendment and various forms of constitutional change, whether it occurs formally or informally, and whether it entails substantial or minor changes to a constitution. This paper examines a range of issues surrounding constitution making around the world and identify some of the important conceptual and practical issues associated with constitution-making process, including the difference between constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement, the challenges of constitutional design and constitutional borrowing, and the role of constitutional designers. I would like to indicate that the study of constitution making is an interesting subject calling for additional research, on both conceptual and empirical levels, especially in the context of constitutional changes in Thailand. This field invites Thai scholars to draw insights about constitutional change across borders and cultures, to uncover the motivations behind constitutional change, and to identify the theoretical underpinnings of constitutional design.
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Chaiyachit, C. (2022). Constitution Making : A Comparative Perspective. King Prajadhipok’s Institute Journal, 20(1). Retrieved from https://so06.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/kpi_journal/article/view/252127
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References
Albert, R. (2017). Introduction: The state of the art in constitutional amendment. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 1-19). Portland: Hart.
Albertus, M., & Menaldo, V. (2018). Authoritarian and the elite origins of democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Arato, A. (2009). Constitution making under occupation: The politics of imposed revolution in Iraq. New York: Columbia University Press.
____. (2017). The adventures of the constituent power: Beyond revolutions?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bâli, A., & Lerner, H. (2016). Constitutional design without constitutional moments: Lessons from religiously divided societies. Cornell International Law Journal, 49 (2), 227-308.
____. (2017). Introduction. In A. Bâli & H. Lerner (Eds.), Constitution writing, religion and democracy (pp. 1-26). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Belmont, K., Mainwaring, S., & Reynolds, A. (2002). Introduction: Institutional design, conflict management, and democracy. In A. Reynolds (Ed.), The architecture of democracy: Constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy (pp. 1-11). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blount, J., Elkins, Z., & Ginsburg, T. (2012). Does the process of constitution-making matter? In T. Ginsburg (Ed.), Comparative constitutional design (pp. 1-66). Cambridge University Press.
Bonnet, M. (2019). The legitimacy of internationally imposed constitution-making in the context of state building. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The law and legitimacy of imposed constitutions (pp. 208-226). London: Routledge.
Braver, J. 2017. Revolutionary reform in Venezuela: Electoral rules and historical narratives in the creation of the 1999 constitution. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The Foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 137-156). Portland: Hart.
Bulmer, E. (2017). What is a constitution?: Principles and concepts. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Choudhry. S. 2006. Migration as a new metaphor in comparative constitutional law. In S. Choudhry (Ed.), The migration of constitutional ideas (pp. 14-35). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Colón-Ríos, J. (2018). Theorising about formal constitutional change: The case of Latin America. In G. Jacobsohn & M. Schor (Eds.), Comparative constitutional theory (pp. 354-371). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Contiades, X., & Fotiadou, A. (2017a). The People as amenders of the constitution. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), Participatory constitutional change: The people as amenders of the constitution (pp. 9-28). London: Routledge.
____. (2017b) Conclusion: The emergence of comparative constitutional amendment as a new discipline. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 369-388). Oregon: Hart.
Dann, P. (2013). International influence on post-conflict constitution-making. In G. Frankenberg (Ed.), Order from transfer: Comparative constitutional design and legal culture (pp. 243-260). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Dixon, R. (2011). Constitutional amendment rules: A comparative perspective. In R. Dixon & T. Ginsburg (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law (pp. 96-111). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
Doyle, O. (2017). Constraints on constitutional amendment powers. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 73-95). Portland: Hart.
Elazar, D. (1985). Constitution-making: The pre-eminently political act. In K. G. Banting & R. Simeon (Eds.), Redesigning the state: The politics of constitutional change in industrial nations (pp. 232-248). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T., & Melton, J. (2009). The endurance of national constitutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, J. (1995). Forces and mechanisms in the constitution-making process. Duke Law Journal, 45 (364), 364-396.
____. (1997). Ways of constitution-making. In A. Hadenius (Ed.), Democracy’s victory and crisis: Nobel symposium no. 93 (pp. 123-142). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____. (1998). Deliberation and constitution making. In J. Elster (Ed.), Deliberative democracy (pp. 97-122). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____. (2006). Legislatures as constitutional assemblies. In R. W. Bauman & T. Kahana (Eds.), The least examined branch: The role of legislatures in the constitutional state (pp. 181-197). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____. (2018). The political psychology of constitution making. In J. Elster, R. Gargarella, V. Naresh, & B. E. Rasch (Eds.), Constituent assemblies (pp. 207-245). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fowkes, J. (2016). Building the constitution: The practice of constitutional interpretation in post-apartheid South Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankenberg, G. (2013a). Constitutions as commodities: Notes on a theory of transfer. In G. Frankenberg (Ed.), Order from transfer: Comparative constitutional design and legal culture (pp. 1-26). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
____. (2013b). Constitutional transfer and experiments in the nineteenth century. In G. Frankenberg (Ed.), Order from transfer: Comparative constitutional design and legal culture (pp. 279-305). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
____. (2018). Comparative constitutional studies: Between magic and deceit. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Galligan, D. J., & Versteeg, M. (Eds.). (2013). Social and political foundations of constitutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ghai, Y., & Galli, G. (2006). Constitutional building process and democratization. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Ginsburg, T. (2011). Constitutional endurance. In T. Ginsburg & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law (pp. 112-125). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
____. (2012). Introduction. In T. Ginsburg (Ed.), Comparative constitutional design (pp. 1-14). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ginsburg, T., & Huq, A. Z. (2016). Assessing constitutional performance. In T. Ginsburg & A. Z. Huq (Eds.), Assessing constitutional performance (pp. 3-35). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Halmai, G. (2012). Unconstitutional constitutional amendments: Constitutional courts as guardians of the constitution?. Constellations, 19 (2), 182–203.
Hassal, G., & Saunders, C. (2002). Asia-Pacific constitutional systems. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hirschl, R. (2009). The design sciences and constitutional “success.” Texas Law Review, 87, 1339–1374.
____. (2013). The strategic foundations of constitutions. In D. J. Galligan & M. Versteeg (Eds.), Social and political foundation of constitutions (pp. 157-181). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Horowitz, D. (2002). Constitutional design: Proposals versus processes. in A. Reynolds (Ed.), The architecture of democracy: Constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy (pp. 15–36). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hudson, A. (2021). Citizens and political parties in constitution-making processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Irving, H. (2008). Gender and the constitution: Equality and agency in comparative constitutional design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kadelbach, S. (2013). Constitution-making in occupied countries. In G. Frankenberg (Ed.), Order from transfer: Comparative constitutional design and legal culture (pp. 237-242). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Klein, C., & Sajo, A. (2012). Constitution-making: Process and substance. In M. Rosenfeld & A. Sajo (Eds.), Oxford handbook of comparative constitutional law (pp. 419-441). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Klung, H. (2019). Constitution making and social transformation. In H. Lerner & D. Landau (Eds.), Comparative constitution making (pp. 48-49). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Landau, D. (2012). The importance of constitution-making. Denver Law Review, 89 (3), 611-633.
____. (2020). Courts and constitution making in democratic regimes. In G. L. Negretto (Ed.), Redrafting constitutions in democratic regimes: Theoretical and comparative perspectives (pp. 78-100) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Landau, D., & Dixon, R. (2015). Constraining constitutional change. Wake Forest Law Review, 50 (4), 859-890.
Lerner, H. (2011). Making constitutions in deeply divided society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____. (2018). Constituent assemblies and political continuity in divided societies. In J. Elster, R. Gargarella, V. Naresh, & B. E. Rasch (Eds.), Constituent assemblies (pp. 57-78). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lerner, H., & Landau, D. (2019). Introduction to comparative constitution making: The state of the field. In H. Lerner & D. Landau (Eds.), Comparative constitution making (pp. 1-25) Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
López-Guerra, C. (2014). Enfranchisement and constitution making. In C. López-Guerra & J. Maskivker (Eds.), Rationality, democracy, and justice: The legacy of Jon Elster (pp. 168-188). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lutz, D. S. (2006). Principles of constitutional design. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Malagodi, M. (2018). Constituent assembly failure in Pakistan and Nepal. In J. Elster, R. Gargarella, V. Naresh & B. E. Rasch (Eds.), Constituent assemblies (pp. 79-108). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Negretto, G. L. (2012). Replacing and amending constitutions: The logic of constitutional change in Latin America. Law & Society Review, 46 (4), 749-799.
____. (2013). Making constitutions: Presidents, parties, and institutional choice in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
____. (2014). Authoritarian constitution making: The role of the military in Latin America. In T. Ginsburg & A. Simpser (Eds.), Constitutions in authoritarian regimes (pp. 83-110). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Osiatynski, W. (2003). Paradoxes of constitutional borrowing. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 1 (2), 244-268.
Pereira, T. (2017). Constituting the amendment power: A framework for comparative amendment law. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 105-120). Portland: Hart.
Petersen, F., & Yanaşmayan, Z. (Eds.). (2020). The failure of popular constitution making in Turkey: Regressing toward constitutional autocracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Roznai, Y. (2017a). Amendment power, constituent power, and popular sovereignty: Linking unamendability and amendment procedures. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 23-49). Portland: Hart.
____. (2017b). Unconstitutional constitutional amendments: The limits of amendment powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thornhill, C. (2011). A Sociology of constitutions: Constitutions and state legitimacy in historical-sociological perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tierney, S. (2012). Constitutional referendums: The theory and practice of republican deliberation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tull, D. M., & Simons, C. (2017). The institutionalisation of power revisited: Presidential term limits in Africa. Africa Spectrum, 52 (2), 79-102.
Tushnet, M. (2013). Constitution-making: An introduction. Texas Law Review, 91 (1983), 1983-2013.
____. (2018). Amendment theory and constituent power. In G. Jacobsohn & M. Schor (Ed.), Comparative constitutional theory (pp. 317-333). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Vermeule, A. (2006). Constitutional amendments and the constitutional common law. In R. W. Bauman & T. Kahana (Eds.), The least examined branch: The role of legislatures in the constitutional state (pp. 229-271). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Voermans, W., Stremler, M., & Cliteur, P. (2017). Constitutional preambles: A comparative analysis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Widner, J., & Contiades, X. (2013). Constitution-writing process. In M. Tushnet, T. Fleiner & C. Saunder (Eds.), Routledge handbook of constitutional law (pp. 57-69). New York: Routledge.
Zurcher, A. J. (Ed.). (1951). Constitutions and constitutional trends since World War II: An examination of significant aspects of postwar public law with particular reference to the new constitutions of Western Europe. New York: New York University Press.
Albertus, M., & Menaldo, V. (2018). Authoritarian and the elite origins of democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Arato, A. (2009). Constitution making under occupation: The politics of imposed revolution in Iraq. New York: Columbia University Press.
____. (2017). The adventures of the constituent power: Beyond revolutions?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bâli, A., & Lerner, H. (2016). Constitutional design without constitutional moments: Lessons from religiously divided societies. Cornell International Law Journal, 49 (2), 227-308.
____. (2017). Introduction. In A. Bâli & H. Lerner (Eds.), Constitution writing, religion and democracy (pp. 1-26). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Belmont, K., Mainwaring, S., & Reynolds, A. (2002). Introduction: Institutional design, conflict management, and democracy. In A. Reynolds (Ed.), The architecture of democracy: Constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy (pp. 1-11). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blount, J., Elkins, Z., & Ginsburg, T. (2012). Does the process of constitution-making matter? In T. Ginsburg (Ed.), Comparative constitutional design (pp. 1-66). Cambridge University Press.
Bonnet, M. (2019). The legitimacy of internationally imposed constitution-making in the context of state building. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The law and legitimacy of imposed constitutions (pp. 208-226). London: Routledge.
Braver, J. 2017. Revolutionary reform in Venezuela: Electoral rules and historical narratives in the creation of the 1999 constitution. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The Foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 137-156). Portland: Hart.
Bulmer, E. (2017). What is a constitution?: Principles and concepts. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Choudhry. S. 2006. Migration as a new metaphor in comparative constitutional law. In S. Choudhry (Ed.), The migration of constitutional ideas (pp. 14-35). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Colón-Ríos, J. (2018). Theorising about formal constitutional change: The case of Latin America. In G. Jacobsohn & M. Schor (Eds.), Comparative constitutional theory (pp. 354-371). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Contiades, X., & Fotiadou, A. (2017a). The People as amenders of the constitution. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), Participatory constitutional change: The people as amenders of the constitution (pp. 9-28). London: Routledge.
____. (2017b) Conclusion: The emergence of comparative constitutional amendment as a new discipline. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 369-388). Oregon: Hart.
Dann, P. (2013). International influence on post-conflict constitution-making. In G. Frankenberg (Ed.), Order from transfer: Comparative constitutional design and legal culture (pp. 243-260). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Dixon, R. (2011). Constitutional amendment rules: A comparative perspective. In R. Dixon & T. Ginsburg (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law (pp. 96-111). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
Doyle, O. (2017). Constraints on constitutional amendment powers. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 73-95). Portland: Hart.
Elazar, D. (1985). Constitution-making: The pre-eminently political act. In K. G. Banting & R. Simeon (Eds.), Redesigning the state: The politics of constitutional change in industrial nations (pp. 232-248). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T., & Melton, J. (2009). The endurance of national constitutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, J. (1995). Forces and mechanisms in the constitution-making process. Duke Law Journal, 45 (364), 364-396.
____. (1997). Ways of constitution-making. In A. Hadenius (Ed.), Democracy’s victory and crisis: Nobel symposium no. 93 (pp. 123-142). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____. (1998). Deliberation and constitution making. In J. Elster (Ed.), Deliberative democracy (pp. 97-122). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____. (2006). Legislatures as constitutional assemblies. In R. W. Bauman & T. Kahana (Eds.), The least examined branch: The role of legislatures in the constitutional state (pp. 181-197). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____. (2018). The political psychology of constitution making. In J. Elster, R. Gargarella, V. Naresh, & B. E. Rasch (Eds.), Constituent assemblies (pp. 207-245). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fowkes, J. (2016). Building the constitution: The practice of constitutional interpretation in post-apartheid South Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankenberg, G. (2013a). Constitutions as commodities: Notes on a theory of transfer. In G. Frankenberg (Ed.), Order from transfer: Comparative constitutional design and legal culture (pp. 1-26). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
____. (2013b). Constitutional transfer and experiments in the nineteenth century. In G. Frankenberg (Ed.), Order from transfer: Comparative constitutional design and legal culture (pp. 279-305). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
____. (2018). Comparative constitutional studies: Between magic and deceit. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Galligan, D. J., & Versteeg, M. (Eds.). (2013). Social and political foundations of constitutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ghai, Y., & Galli, G. (2006). Constitutional building process and democratization. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Ginsburg, T. (2011). Constitutional endurance. In T. Ginsburg & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law (pp. 112-125). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
____. (2012). Introduction. In T. Ginsburg (Ed.), Comparative constitutional design (pp. 1-14). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ginsburg, T., & Huq, A. Z. (2016). Assessing constitutional performance. In T. Ginsburg & A. Z. Huq (Eds.), Assessing constitutional performance (pp. 3-35). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Halmai, G. (2012). Unconstitutional constitutional amendments: Constitutional courts as guardians of the constitution?. Constellations, 19 (2), 182–203.
Hassal, G., & Saunders, C. (2002). Asia-Pacific constitutional systems. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hirschl, R. (2009). The design sciences and constitutional “success.” Texas Law Review, 87, 1339–1374.
____. (2013). The strategic foundations of constitutions. In D. J. Galligan & M. Versteeg (Eds.), Social and political foundation of constitutions (pp. 157-181). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Horowitz, D. (2002). Constitutional design: Proposals versus processes. in A. Reynolds (Ed.), The architecture of democracy: Constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy (pp. 15–36). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hudson, A. (2021). Citizens and political parties in constitution-making processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Irving, H. (2008). Gender and the constitution: Equality and agency in comparative constitutional design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kadelbach, S. (2013). Constitution-making in occupied countries. In G. Frankenberg (Ed.), Order from transfer: Comparative constitutional design and legal culture (pp. 237-242). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Klein, C., & Sajo, A. (2012). Constitution-making: Process and substance. In M. Rosenfeld & A. Sajo (Eds.), Oxford handbook of comparative constitutional law (pp. 419-441). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Klung, H. (2019). Constitution making and social transformation. In H. Lerner & D. Landau (Eds.), Comparative constitution making (pp. 48-49). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Landau, D. (2012). The importance of constitution-making. Denver Law Review, 89 (3), 611-633.
____. (2020). Courts and constitution making in democratic regimes. In G. L. Negretto (Ed.), Redrafting constitutions in democratic regimes: Theoretical and comparative perspectives (pp. 78-100) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Landau, D., & Dixon, R. (2015). Constraining constitutional change. Wake Forest Law Review, 50 (4), 859-890.
Lerner, H. (2011). Making constitutions in deeply divided society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____. (2018). Constituent assemblies and political continuity in divided societies. In J. Elster, R. Gargarella, V. Naresh, & B. E. Rasch (Eds.), Constituent assemblies (pp. 57-78). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lerner, H., & Landau, D. (2019). Introduction to comparative constitution making: The state of the field. In H. Lerner & D. Landau (Eds.), Comparative constitution making (pp. 1-25) Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
López-Guerra, C. (2014). Enfranchisement and constitution making. In C. López-Guerra & J. Maskivker (Eds.), Rationality, democracy, and justice: The legacy of Jon Elster (pp. 168-188). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lutz, D. S. (2006). Principles of constitutional design. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Malagodi, M. (2018). Constituent assembly failure in Pakistan and Nepal. In J. Elster, R. Gargarella, V. Naresh & B. E. Rasch (Eds.), Constituent assemblies (pp. 79-108). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Negretto, G. L. (2012). Replacing and amending constitutions: The logic of constitutional change in Latin America. Law & Society Review, 46 (4), 749-799.
____. (2013). Making constitutions: Presidents, parties, and institutional choice in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
____. (2014). Authoritarian constitution making: The role of the military in Latin America. In T. Ginsburg & A. Simpser (Eds.), Constitutions in authoritarian regimes (pp. 83-110). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Osiatynski, W. (2003). Paradoxes of constitutional borrowing. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 1 (2), 244-268.
Pereira, T. (2017). Constituting the amendment power: A framework for comparative amendment law. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 105-120). Portland: Hart.
Petersen, F., & Yanaşmayan, Z. (Eds.). (2020). The failure of popular constitution making in Turkey: Regressing toward constitutional autocracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Roznai, Y. (2017a). Amendment power, constituent power, and popular sovereignty: Linking unamendability and amendment procedures. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 23-49). Portland: Hart.
____. (2017b). Unconstitutional constitutional amendments: The limits of amendment powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thornhill, C. (2011). A Sociology of constitutions: Constitutions and state legitimacy in historical-sociological perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tierney, S. (2012). Constitutional referendums: The theory and practice of republican deliberation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tull, D. M., & Simons, C. (2017). The institutionalisation of power revisited: Presidential term limits in Africa. Africa Spectrum, 52 (2), 79-102.
Tushnet, M. (2013). Constitution-making: An introduction. Texas Law Review, 91 (1983), 1983-2013.
____. (2018). Amendment theory and constituent power. In G. Jacobsohn & M. Schor (Ed.), Comparative constitutional theory (pp. 317-333). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Vermeule, A. (2006). Constitutional amendments and the constitutional common law. In R. W. Bauman & T. Kahana (Eds.), The least examined branch: The role of legislatures in the constitutional state (pp. 229-271). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Voermans, W., Stremler, M., & Cliteur, P. (2017). Constitutional preambles: A comparative analysis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Widner, J., & Contiades, X. (2013). Constitution-writing process. In M. Tushnet, T. Fleiner & C. Saunder (Eds.), Routledge handbook of constitutional law (pp. 57-69). New York: Routledge.
Zurcher, A. J. (Ed.). (1951). Constitutions and constitutional trends since World War II: An examination of significant aspects of postwar public law with particular reference to the new constitutions of Western Europe. New York: New York University Press.