เวอร์ชันเก่านี้เผยแพร่เมื่อ 2022-05-06 โปรดอ่าน เวอร์ชันล่าสุด
การจัดทำรัฐธรรมนูญใหม่ : มุมมองของการศึกษาเปรียบเทียบ
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พ.ค. 6, 2022
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2022-05-06 (1)
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การจัดทำรัฐธรรมนูญ การแก้ไขเพิ่มเติมรัฐธรรมนูญ การแทนที่รัฐธรรมนูญ การออกแบบรัฐธรรมนูญ การหยิบยืมตัวแบบรัฐธรรมนูญ
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บทคัดย่อ
การศึกษาการจัดทำรัฐธรรมนูญใหม่ในเชิงเปรียบเทียบก้าวหน้าขึ้นเป็นลำดับในช่วงสามทศวรรษที่ผ่านมา งานศึกษาเปรียบเทียบการจัดทำรัฐธรรมนูญชี้ให้เห็นประเด็นปัญหาสำคัญที่เป็นโจทย์ท้าทายสำหรับกลุ่มผู้ทำหน้าที่ออกแบบรัฐธรรมนูญใหม่ในหลายประเทศ อาทิ ความมั่นคงยืนยาวของรัฐธรรมนูญ สาระสำคัญของบทบัญญัติของรัฐธรรมนูญที่ไม่สามารถแก้ไขเปลี่ยนแปลงได้ การสร้างความชอบธรรมให้แก่รัฐธรรมนูญ
ที่จัดทำขึ้นใหม่ รวมถึงปัญหาความไม่ชอบด้วยรัฐธรรมนูญของการแก้ไขเปลี่ยนแปลงรัฐธรรมนูญ ประเด็น
ที่นักวิชาการให้ความสนใจอย่างเด่นชัด ได้แก่ การศึกษาวิเคราะห์การแก้ไขเปลี่ยนแปลงรัฐธรรมนูญ
การประกาศใช้รัฐธรรมนูญฉบับใหม่แทนที่รัฐธรรมนูญที่มีการแก้ไขเพิ่มเติม และการเปลี่ยนแปลงทางรัฐธรรมนูญทั้งที่ดำเนินไปโดยมีรูปแบบที่เป็นทางการและไม่เป็นทางการ และการเปลี่ยนแปลงเนื้อหาเพียงบางส่วนหรือเปลี่ยนแปลงสาระสำคัญขนานใหญ่ บทความนี้มุ่งสำรวจประเด็นที่อยู่ในความสนใจของนักวิชาการในภาพรวม โดยชี้ให้เห็นถึงข้อถกเถียงสำคัญที่ปรากฏในการวิเคราะห์กระบวนการจัดทำรัฐธรรมนูญ ทั้งประเด็นปัญหาในเชิงมโนทัศน์และในทางปฏิบัติ นับตั้งแต่ประเด็นข้อแตกต่างระหว่างการแก้ไขเปลี่ยนแปลงรัฐธรรมนูญและการเปลี่ยนแปลงที่นำไปสู่แทนที่รัฐธรรมนูญด้วยฉบับใหม่ ปัญหาท้าทายในการออกแบบรัฐธรรมนูญและการหยิบยืมตัวแบบทางรัฐธรรมนูญจากต่างประเทศมาปรับใช้ในบริบทที่ต่างกัน รวมถึงบทบาทของกลุ่มผู้ทำหน้าที่ออกแบบรัฐธรรมนูญ ผู้เขียนมุ่งชี้ให้เห็นว่า การศึกษาเปรียบเทียบการจัดทำรัฐธรรมนูญใหม่ในประเทศต่างๆ เป็นหัวข้อการวิจัยที่มีความน่าสนใจสำหรับนำมาศึกษาเปรียบเทียบกับ
การเปลี่ยนแปลงทางรัฐธรรมนูญในบริบทของไทย โดยเฉพาะการศึกษาการเปลี่ยนแปลงทางรัฐธรรมนูญในเชิงเปรียบเทียบ เพื่อทำความเข้าใจลักษณะของแรงผลักดันการจัดทำรัฐธรรมนูญใหม่ รวมถึงหลักการทางทฤษฎีที่เป็นฐานของกระบวนการออกแบบรัฐธรรมนูญในบริบทต่างๆ
Article Details
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Chaiyachit, C. (2022). การจัดทำรัฐธรรมนูญใหม่ : มุมมองของการศึกษาเปรียบเทียบ. วารสารสถาบันพระปกเกล้า, 20(1). สืบค้น จาก https://so06.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/kpi_journal/article/view/252127
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เอกสารอ้างอิง
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Arato, A. (2009). Constitution making under occupation: The politics of imposed revolution in Iraq. New York: Columbia University Press.
____. (2017). The adventures of the constituent power: Beyond revolutions?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bâli, A., & Lerner, H. (2016). Constitutional design without constitutional moments: Lessons from religiously divided societies. Cornell International Law Journal, 49 (2), 227-308.
____. (2017). Introduction. In A. Bâli & H. Lerner (Eds.), Constitution writing, religion and democracy (pp. 1-26). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Belmont, K., Mainwaring, S., & Reynolds, A. (2002). Introduction: Institutional design, conflict management, and democracy. In A. Reynolds (Ed.), The architecture of democracy: Constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy (pp. 1-11). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blount, J., Elkins, Z., & Ginsburg, T. (2012). Does the process of constitution-making matter? In T. Ginsburg (Ed.), Comparative constitutional design (pp. 1-66). Cambridge University Press.
Bonnet, M. (2019). The legitimacy of internationally imposed constitution-making in the context of state building. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The law and legitimacy of imposed constitutions (pp. 208-226). London: Routledge.
Braver, J. 2017. Revolutionary reform in Venezuela: Electoral rules and historical narratives in the creation of the 1999 constitution. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The Foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 137-156). Portland: Hart.
Bulmer, E. (2017). What is a constitution?: Principles and concepts. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Choudhry. S. 2006. Migration as a new metaphor in comparative constitutional law. In S. Choudhry (Ed.), The migration of constitutional ideas (pp. 14-35). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Colón-Ríos, J. (2018). Theorising about formal constitutional change: The case of Latin America. In G. Jacobsohn & M. Schor (Eds.), Comparative constitutional theory (pp. 354-371). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Contiades, X., & Fotiadou, A. (2017a). The People as amenders of the constitution. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), Participatory constitutional change: The people as amenders of the constitution (pp. 9-28). London: Routledge.
____. (2017b) Conclusion: The emergence of comparative constitutional amendment as a new discipline. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 369-388). Oregon: Hart.
Dann, P. (2013). International influence on post-conflict constitution-making. In G. Frankenberg (Ed.), Order from transfer: Comparative constitutional design and legal culture (pp. 243-260). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Dixon, R. (2011). Constitutional amendment rules: A comparative perspective. In R. Dixon & T. Ginsburg (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law (pp. 96-111). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
Doyle, O. (2017). Constraints on constitutional amendment powers. In R. Albert, X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The foundations and traditions of constitutional amendment (pp. 73-95). Portland: Hart.
Elazar, D. (1985). Constitution-making: The pre-eminently political act. In K. G. Banting & R. Simeon (Eds.), Redesigning the state: The politics of constitutional change in industrial nations (pp. 232-248). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T., & Melton, J. (2009). The endurance of national constitutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, J. (1995). Forces and mechanisms in the constitution-making process. Duke Law Journal, 45 (364), 364-396.
____. (1997). Ways of constitution-making. In A. Hadenius (Ed.), Democracy’s victory and crisis: Nobel symposium no. 93 (pp. 123-142). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____. (1998). Deliberation and constitution making. In J. Elster (Ed.), Deliberative democracy (pp. 97-122). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____. (2006). Legislatures as constitutional assemblies. In R. W. Bauman & T. Kahana (Eds.), The least examined branch: The role of legislatures in the constitutional state (pp. 181-197). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____. (2018). The political psychology of constitution making. In J. Elster, R. Gargarella, V. Naresh, & B. E. Rasch (Eds.), Constituent assemblies (pp. 207-245). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fowkes, J. (2016). Building the constitution: The practice of constitutional interpretation in post-apartheid South Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankenberg, G. (2013a). Constitutions as commodities: Notes on a theory of transfer. In G. Frankenberg (Ed.), Order from transfer: Comparative constitutional design and legal culture (pp. 1-26). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
____. (2013b). Constitutional transfer and experiments in the nineteenth century. In G. Frankenberg (Ed.), Order from transfer: Comparative constitutional design and legal culture (pp. 279-305). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
____. (2018). Comparative constitutional studies: Between magic and deceit. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Galligan, D. J., & Versteeg, M. (Eds.). (2013). Social and political foundations of constitutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ghai, Y., & Galli, G. (2006). Constitutional building process and democratization. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Ginsburg, T. (2011). Constitutional endurance. In T. Ginsburg & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law (pp. 112-125). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
____. (2012). Introduction. In T. Ginsburg (Ed.), Comparative constitutional design (pp. 1-14). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ginsburg, T., & Huq, A. Z. (2016). Assessing constitutional performance. In T. Ginsburg & A. Z. Huq (Eds.), Assessing constitutional performance (pp. 3-35). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Halmai, G. (2012). Unconstitutional constitutional amendments: Constitutional courts as guardians of the constitution?. Constellations, 19 (2), 182–203.
Hassal, G., & Saunders, C. (2002). Asia-Pacific constitutional systems. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hirschl, R. (2009). The design sciences and constitutional “success.” Texas Law Review, 87, 1339–1374.
____. (2013). The strategic foundations of constitutions. In D. J. Galligan & M. Versteeg (Eds.), Social and political foundation of constitutions (pp. 157-181). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Horowitz, D. (2002). Constitutional design: Proposals versus processes. in A. Reynolds (Ed.), The architecture of democracy: Constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy (pp. 15–36). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hudson, A. (2021). Citizens and political parties in constitution-making processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Irving, H. (2008). Gender and the constitution: Equality and agency in comparative constitutional design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kadelbach, S. (2013). Constitution-making in occupied countries. In G. Frankenberg (Ed.), Order from transfer: Comparative constitutional design and legal culture (pp. 237-242). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Klein, C., & Sajo, A. (2012). Constitution-making: Process and substance. In M. Rosenfeld & A. Sajo (Eds.), Oxford handbook of comparative constitutional law (pp. 419-441). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Klung, H. (2019). Constitution making and social transformation. In H. Lerner & D. Landau (Eds.), Comparative constitution making (pp. 48-49). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Landau, D. (2012). The importance of constitution-making. Denver Law Review, 89 (3), 611-633.
____. (2020). Courts and constitution making in democratic regimes. In G. L. Negretto (Ed.), Redrafting constitutions in democratic regimes: Theoretical and comparative perspectives (pp. 78-100) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Landau, D., & Dixon, R. (2015). Constraining constitutional change. Wake Forest Law Review, 50 (4), 859-890.
Lerner, H. (2011). Making constitutions in deeply divided society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____. (2018). Constituent assemblies and political continuity in divided societies. In J. Elster, R. Gargarella, V. Naresh, & B. E. Rasch (Eds.), Constituent assemblies (pp. 57-78). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lerner, H., & Landau, D. (2019). Introduction to comparative constitution making: The state of the field. In H. Lerner & D. Landau (Eds.), Comparative constitution making (pp. 1-25) Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
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