THE IMPACT OF DUAL CLASS SHARES STRUCTURE ON THE FIRM'S INNOVATION, EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS
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This study takes corporate innovation as the dependent variable, dual equity governance structure as the independent variable, and establishes a core conceptual framework through demographic variables such as industry of engagement and length of service. This study proposes the following hypotheses: 1).There is a significant positive correlation between the existence of dual equity governance structure and the level of corporate innovation. 2).There is a significant difference between different background variables on dual equity governance structure and corporate innovation. 3).The relationship between dual equity governance structure and corporate innovation is affected by the stage of the corporate life cycle. 4). In this study, a total of 550 and 526 questionnaires were distributed and returned to the employees of Chinese stock companies in different industries as a case study.This study found: There is a significant positive association between the existence of dual equity governance structure and the level of firm innovation. The length of service and position variables are significantly different in terms of firm innovation. 3. The relationship between dual equity governance structure and firm innovation is influenced by the stage of the firm's life cycle. That is, the positive association between dual equity governance structure and firm innovation is more pronounced in the growth and maturity stages than in the decline stage.
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