POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN THAILAND, 1997 - 2025
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Abstract
This research article analyzes the political impacts of Thailand’s Constitutional Court from 1997 to 2025, focusing on the phenomenon of “judicialization of politics,” through which judicial power especially that of the Constitutional Court has expanded beyond narrow legal dispute resolution to influence and steer political outcomes. The study draws on theoretical frameworks concerning court-politics relations, judicial review, the rule of law, and institutionalism to explain both the Court’s role and the institutional consequences of key rulings in major political cases. Methodologically, the research adopts a qualitative approach using documentary and content analysis, interpretation, and structural analysis. The materials examined include Constitutional Court decisions issued between 1997 and 2025, relevant constitutions and laws, and related academic literature. The findings indicate that the Court’s political interventions through its rulings have produced three major effects: 1) Legitimizing coups and the exercise of power by coup-installed regimes, making such authority legally effective and difficult to scrutinize; 2) Transforming the Constitutional Court into both a “political actor” and an “outcome determinant” in electoral and party competition, thereby affecting government stability and the dynamics of the party system; and 3) Enabling the Court to exert authority over constitutional amendment processes as well as political and legal policy through expansive interpretation and appeals to constitutional values or the “spirit” of the regime. In conditions of intense political conflict, the Court’s increasing political role generates institutional uncertainty and shifts political contestation from the executive and legislative arenas toward the judiciary. Consequently, the article proposes structural reforms to clarify the boundaries of judicial power, improve the appointment process for Constitutional Court judges, enhance transparency, and strengthen a people-centered conception of the rule of law.
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References
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