Societal Model for Securing Internet of Things

Main Article Content

Hiroshi TSUNODA
Glenn Mansfield KEENI

Abstract

From transportation to home and health care, In- ternet of Things (IoT) has penetrated almost every sphere of society. In the IoT concept, devices communicate auto­ nomously to provide services. A significant aspect of IoTs that makes it stand apart from present day networked devices and applications is a) the very large number of devices, produced by diverse makers and used by an even more diverse group of users; b) the applications residing and functioning in what were very private sanctums of life e.g. the car, home and the people themselves. Despite the fact that these devices require high level security, there has not been enough discussion on the security aspects of IoTs. In this paper, we propose a simple security model for IoT, the societal model. The basic concept of the model is borrowed from our human society. In the societal model, members play an important role in maintaining the security for the group. An IoT network mimics a society. IoT devices are members. Behavior of each member generally follows the group’s norms. Abnormal behavior evokes some reaction which includes rejection and/or notification to appropriate authorities. This paper investigates the requirements for realizing secure IoT networks based on the societal model.


 

Article Details

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Research Article

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