The Effects of Political Connections and Internal Control on Blockholder Rent Appropriation: An Empirical Study of Chinese Private Listed Companies
คำสำคัญ:
political connections, internal control, blockholder rent appropriation, Chinese private listed companyบทคัดย่อ
This study investigated the relationship between political connections, internal control, and blockholder rent appropriation in Chinese private listed companies.Drawing on a sample of listed companies issuing A- shares at on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchangesfrom 2010 and 2015, we find in Chinese private listed companies, executive political connections effectively inhibits profit grabbing by blockholders. In addition, internal control plays a mediating role on the effect of executive political connection on blockholder rent appropriation.
References
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Berkman, H., Cole, R. A., & Fu, L. J. (2010). Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(06), 1391-1417.
Faccio, M. (2006). Politically Connected Firms. The American Economic Review, 96(1), 369-386.
Fan, G., Wang, X., & Zhu, H (2014). National Economic Research Institute index of marketization of China’s provinces. Beijing: Economic Science Press.
Jiang, G., Lee, C. M., &Yue, H. (2010). Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience. Journal of Financial Economics, 98(1), 1-20.
La Porta, R., Lopezdesilanes, F., &Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517.
Peng, M. W., & Heath, P. S. (1996). The Growth of the Firm in Planned Economies in Transition: Institutions, Organizations, and Strategic Choice. Academy of Management Review, 21(2), 492-528.
Su, Z., & Fung, H. (2013). Political Connections and Firm Performance in Chinese Companies. Pacific Economic Review, 18(3), 283-317.
Sun, P., Hu, H. W., & Hillman, A. J. (2016). The dark side of board political capital: Enabling blockholder rent appropriation. Academy of Management Journal, 59(5), 1801-1822.
Wu, W., Johan, S., &Rui, O. M. (2016). Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud. Journal of Business Ethics, 134(4), 709-726.
Berkman, H., Cole, R. A., & Fu, L. J. (2010). Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(06), 1391-1417.
Faccio, M. (2006). Politically Connected Firms. The American Economic Review, 96(1), 369-386.
Fan, G., Wang, X., & Zhu, H (2014). National Economic Research Institute index of marketization of China’s provinces. Beijing: Economic Science Press.
Jiang, G., Lee, C. M., &Yue, H. (2010). Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience. Journal of Financial Economics, 98(1), 1-20.
La Porta, R., Lopezdesilanes, F., &Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517.
Peng, M. W., & Heath, P. S. (1996). The Growth of the Firm in Planned Economies in Transition: Institutions, Organizations, and Strategic Choice. Academy of Management Review, 21(2), 492-528.
Su, Z., & Fung, H. (2013). Political Connections and Firm Performance in Chinese Companies. Pacific Economic Review, 18(3), 283-317.
Sun, P., Hu, H. W., & Hillman, A. J. (2016). The dark side of board political capital: Enabling blockholder rent appropriation. Academy of Management Journal, 59(5), 1801-1822.
Wu, W., Johan, S., &Rui, O. M. (2016). Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud. Journal of Business Ethics, 134(4), 709-726.
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2020-06-30
