The Impact of Audit Committee Characteristics on Real Earnings Management: Evidence from Listed Companies in The Stock Exchange of Thailand
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Abstract
The objective of this research was to study the impact of audit committee characteristics on real earnings management through business activities of listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The audit committee characteristics used in this research were audit committee expertise, gender diversity, and audit committee size. The real earnings management model by Roychowdhury (2006) was used to determine the real earnings management model through business activities. This research collected data from secondary data (annual registration statement (56-1) and annual financial statements) using 2,306 samples from listed companies on the Stock Exchange of Thailand from 2011-2018. Multiple regression analysis techniques were used to test the hypothesis. The results found that expertise of the audit committee has a significant negative impact on real earnings management. On the other hand, audit committee size had a significant positive impact on real earnings management. However this research found a female audit committee had no effect on real earnings management.
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ลิขสิทธิ์ของบทความ
ผลงานที่ได้รับการตีพิมพ์ถือเป็นลิขสิทธิ์ของมหาวิทยาลัยหอการค้าไทย ห้ามมิให้นำเนื้อหา ทัศนะ หรือข้อคิดเห็นใด ๆ ของผลงานไปทำซ้ำ ดัดแปลง หรือเผยแพร่ ไม่ว่าทั้งหมดหรือบางส่วนโดยไม่ได้รับอนุญาตเป็นลายลักษณ์อักษรจากมหาวิทยาลัยหอการค้าไทยก่อน
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