Radical Enactivism and the Explanatory Gap
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Abstract
This article aims to critique the argument of radical enactivism in dealing with problem of ‘the explanatory gap’which is a controversial issue in philosophy of mind’s Physicalism. This problematic ‘gap’ is the gap between knowledge of physical facts and knowledge of phenomenal facts. Radical enactivism proposes a solution to this problem by arguing that, in fact, the physical facts of the interaction pattern between the cognitive system and the environment have the same identity as the physical facts. The author criticizes that the proposed argument is deficient. It is because the solution only addresses the explanatory gap in the qualitative aspect of the sensory experience. However, it cannot close the gap concerning the explanation of how an agent’s sensory experiences originated.
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