Structural Traps and the Crisis of Governance in Thailand’s Solid Waste Management

Abstract

The solid waste management crisis in Thailand is a chronic issue. General studies often attribute its causes to technical limitations or operational flaws in public administration. This study argues that such failure originates primarily from a crisis of governance, which embeds itself within state institutional structures and regulatory mechanisms. This research applies a critical institutional analysis framework alongside an examination of legal and policy documents to investigate the causes of this systemic failure. The findings indicate that the problem stems from three interlocking structural constraints. The first is the legal trap, caused by disproportionate penalties and obstacles regarding standards of proof. This renders law enforcement inefficient and creates zones of impunity. The second is the market trap, emerging from a policy vacuum concerning extended producer responsibility, which allows producers to externalize environmental costs to society. The third is the institutional trap, where the central government transfers waste management mandates to local governments without allocating adequate fiscal resources, emphasizing the decentralization paradox of the Thai state. Resolving the solid waste crisis cannot rely solely on conventional technical measures or traditional administrative approaches. The state needs to undertake institutional reform and redesign the regulatory structure to sustainably resolve the cycle of governance failure.